



Alberta Electric System Operator

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Complete Set of Alberta Reliability Standards

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Purpose

1 The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to provide a mechanism for a **market participant** to request, and for the **ISO** to approve, appropriate waivers and variances to specific requirements of a **reliability standard**.

Applicability

2 This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) a **market participant**, including:
 - (i) a **legal owner**; and
 - (ii) an **operator**; and
- (b) the **ISO**.

Requirements

Applicable reliability standards

3(1) The **ISO** must consider a request for either one or both of a waiver and variance to any requirement in the **reliability standards**, provided that the requirement does not have its own separate mechanism for requesting and approving a waiver or variance.

(2) The **ISO** may either grant, in whole or in part, or deny a request for a waiver or variance submitted in accordance with this **reliability standard**.

Grounds for requesting a waiver or variance

4(1) A **market participant** may request either one or both of a waiver and variance to any of the requirements set out in the **reliability standards**.

(2) A **market participant** must provide grounds for requesting a waiver or variance which must include one or more of the following circumstances where compliance with the requirements of the **reliability standard**:

- (a) is not technically possible or is precluded by technical limitations;
- (b) is operationally infeasible;
- (c) is operationally unnecessary to achieve the intended purpose or outcome of the **reliability standard**;
- (d) cannot be achieved by the required compliance date regardless of good faith efforts by the **market participant** which does not include a failure to appropriately plan;
- (e) would pose a safety risk or safety issue;
- (f) would conflict with a separate statutory or regulatory requirement that is applicable and cannot be waived or exempted;
- (g) would require the incurrence of costs that significantly outweigh the benefits achieved or would result in severe economic hardship;
- (h) could be achieved in an alternate timeframe that is reasonable to consider in light of other relevant factors, including upcoming scheduled maintenance, and anticipated facility upgrades;
- (i) would have suboptimal results compared with the use of alternate technology that would meet or exceed the objectives of the subject **reliability standards**; and
- (j) does not allow for testing the application of technology that was not considered during the development of the requirements.

Criteria for evaluating a request

5 The **ISO** must be satisfied that the grounds provided are sufficient and use one or more of the following criteria to evaluate any request for a waiver or variance:

- (a) technical feasibility;
- (b) operational feasibility and burden;
- (c) safety;
- (d) economic impacts;
- (e) material impacts on a fair, efficient, and openly competitive market;
- (f) whether appropriate mitigation measures, mitigation plans, or remediation plans can be or are put in place; and
- (g) the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**.

Submission of Information

6 A **market participant** must:

- (a) make a request for a waiver or variance to the **ISO** in writing;
- (b) respond to requests from the **ISO** for additional information or for the submission of a revised request; and
- (c) advise the **ISO** as soon as practicable upon becoming aware of a material change in the facts or circumstances underlying a request.

Evaluation Process

7 The **ISO** must:

- (a) acknowledge receipt of a request for a waiver or variance;
- (b) request any additional information it requires to complete the evaluation of the request;
- (c) provide updates on progress;
- (d) provide a written decision to the **market participant**; and
- (e) if it denies the request, give reasons.

Content of a waiver or variance

8 The **ISO** must include the effective date in an approved waiver or variance and any of the following as applicable:

- (a) expiry date;
- (b) mitigation or remediation plans, including milestones;
- (c) reporting requirements; and
- (d) any other terms and conditions the **ISO** considers necessary.

Ongoing management of a waiver or variance

9(1) A **market participant** must, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify the **ISO** of any material change to the facts or circumstances underlying the approval of a waiver or variance.

Alberta Reliability Standards

ADM-002-AB-1

Waivers and Variances



(2) A **market participant** may transfer a waiver or variance with the **ISO**'s written consent which consent will not be unreasonably withheld.

(3) The **ISO** may amend or revoke a waiver or variance upon reasonable notice if:

(a) there is a material change to the facts or circumstances underlying the approval of the waiver or variance; or

(b) the **market participant** does not fulfill the terms or conditions of the approval.

Revision History

Date	Description
2021-04-22	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Real Power Balancing Control Performance

BAL-001-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to control **Interconnection** frequency within defined limits.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO** except when:
 - (i) the **ISO** is receiving overlap regulation service;
 - (ii) the **ISO** is a member of a regulation reserve sharing group and remains in active status under the applicable agreement or the governing rules for the regulation reserve sharing group; or
 - (iii) the **interconnected electric system** is not synchronously connected to the **Interconnection**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must operate such that the **control performance standard** 1, calculated in accordance with Appendix 1, is greater than or equal to 100% for each preceding 12 consecutive **month** period, evaluated monthly.
- R2** The **ISO** must operate such that its clock-minute average of **reporting area control error** does not exceed the clock-minute **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** for more than 30 consecutive clock-minutes, calculated in accordance with Appendix 2.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of operating such that the **control performance standard** 1 is greater than or equal to 100% as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include dated calculation output from spreadsheets, system logs, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of operating such that the clock-minute average of **reporting area control error** does not exceed the clock-minute **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** for more than 30 consecutive clock-minutes as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include dated calculation output from spreadsheets, system logs, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 - *Equations Supporting Requirement R1 and Measure M1*

Appendix 2 - *Equations Supporting Requirement R2 and Measure M2*

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-07-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1 – Equations Supporting Requirement R1 and Measure M1

The **control performance standard 1** (CPS1) is calculated as follows:

$$CPS1 = (2 - CF) \times 100\%$$

The frequency-related compliance factor (**CF**), is a ratio of the accumulating clock-minute compliance parameters for the most recent preceding 12 consecutive **months**, divided by the square of the target frequency bound:

$$CF = \frac{CF_{12\text{-month}}}{(\epsilon 1_1)^2}$$

where $\epsilon 1_1$ is the constant derived from a targeted frequency bound for the **western interconnection** or as revised by the **NERC**.

The rating index $CF_{12\text{-month}}$ is derived from the most recent preceding 12 consecutive **months** of data. The accumulating clock-minute compliance parameters are derived from the one-minute averages of **reporting area control error**, **frequency error**, and **frequency bias settings**. A clock-minute average is the average of the reporting **balancing authority's** valid measured variable (i.e., for **reporting area control error** (**RACE**) and for **frequency error**) for each sampling cycle during a given clock-minute.

$$\left(\frac{RACE}{-10B} \right)_{\text{clock-minute}} = \frac{\left(\frac{\sum RACE_{\text{sampling cycles in clock-minute}}}{n_{\text{sampling cycles in clock-minute}}} \right)}{-10B}$$

And,

$$\Delta F_{\text{clock-minute}} = \frac{\sum \Delta F_{\text{sampling cycles in clock-minute}}}{n_{\text{sampling cycles in clock-minute}}}$$

The **balancing authority's** clock-minute compliance factor ($CF_{\text{clock-minute}}$) calculation is:

$$CF_{\text{clock-minute}} = \left[\left(\frac{RACE}{-10B} \right)_{\text{clock-minute}} \times \Delta F_{\text{clock-minute}} \right]$$

Normally, 60 clock-minute averages of the **reporting area control error** and **frequency error** will be used to compute the hourly average compliance factor ($CF_{\text{clock-hour}}$).

$$CF_{\text{clock-hour}} = \frac{\sum CF_{\text{clock-minute}}}{n_{\text{clock-minute samples in hour}}}$$

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Real Power Balancing Control Performance

BAL-001-AB-2



The reporting **balancing authority** must be able to recalculate and store each of the respective clock-hour averages ($CF_{\text{clock-hour average-month}}$) and the data samples for each 24-hour period (one for each clock-hour; i.e., hour ending (HE) 0100, HE 0200, ..., HE 2400). To calculate the monthly compliance factor (CF_{month}):

$$CF_{\text{clock-hour average-month}} = \frac{\sum_{\text{days-in-month}} [(CF_{\text{clock-hour}})(n_{\text{one-minute samples in clock-hour}})]}{\sum_{\text{days-in-month}} [n_{\text{one-minute samples in clock-hour}}]}$$

$$CF_{\text{month}} = \frac{\sum_{\text{hours-in-day}} [(CF_{\text{clock-hour average-month}})(n_{\text{one-minute samples in clock-hour averages}})]}{\sum_{\text{hours-in-day}} [n_{\text{one-minute samples in clock-hour averages}}]}$$

To calculate the 12-month compliance factor ($CF_{12\text{-month}}$):

$$CF_{12\text{-month}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{12} [(CF_{\text{month}-i})(n_{\text{(one-minute samples in month)-i}})]}{\sum_{i=1}^{12} [n_{\text{(one-minute samples in month)-i}}]}$$

To ensure that the average **reporting area control error** and **frequency error** calculated for any one-minute interval is representative of that time interval, it is necessary that at least 50% of both the **reporting area control error** and **frequency error** sample data during the one-minute interval is valid. If the recording of **reporting area control error** or **frequency error** is interrupted such that less than 50% of the one-minute sample period data is available or valid, then that one-minute interval is excluded from the CPS1 calculation.

A **balancing authority** providing overlap regulation service to another **balancing authority** calculates its CPS1 performance after combining its **reporting area control error** and **frequency bias settings** with the **reporting area control error** and **frequency bias settings** of the **balancing authority** receiving the regulation service.

Appendix 2 - Equations Supporting Requirement R2 and Measure M2

When actual frequency is equal to scheduled frequency, $BAAL_{High}$ and $BAAL_{Low}$ do not apply.

When actual frequency is less than scheduled frequency, $BAAL_{High}$ does not apply, and $BAAL_{Low}$ is calculated as:

$$BAAL_{Low} = (-10B_i \times (FTL_{Low} - F_S)) \times \frac{(FTL_{Low} - F_S)}{(F_A - F_S)}$$

When actual frequency is greater than scheduled frequency, $BAAL_{Low}$ does not apply and the $BAAL_{High}$ is calculated as:

$$BAAL_{High} = (-10B_i \times (FTL_{High} - F_S)) \times \frac{(FTL_{High} - F_S)}{(F_A - F_S)}$$

Where:

$BAAL_{Low}$ is the low **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** (MW)

$BAAL_{High}$ is the high **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** (MW)

10 is a constant to convert the **frequency bias setting** from MW/0.1 Hz to MW/Hz

B_i is the **frequency bias setting** for a **balancing authority** (expressed as MW/0.1 Hz)

F_A is the measured frequency in Hz.

F_S is the **scheduled frequency** in Hz.

FTL_{Low} is the low frequency trigger limit (calculated as $F_S - 3\epsilon 1_1$ Hz)

FTL_{High} is the high frequency trigger limit (calculated as $F_S + 3\epsilon 1_1$ Hz)

Where $\epsilon 1_1$ is the constant derived from a targeted frequency bound for the **western interconnection** or as revised by the **NERC**.

To ensure that the average actual frequency calculated for any one-minute interval is representative of that time interval, it is necessary that at least 50% of the actual frequency sample data during that one-minute interval is valid. If the recording of actual frequency is interrupted such that less than 50% of the one-minute sample period data is available or valid, then that one-minute interval is excluded from the **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** calculation and the 30-minute clock would be reset to zero.

A **balancing authority** providing overlap regulation service to another **balancing authority** calculates its **area control error** limit of the **balancing authority** performance after combining its **frequency bias setting** with the **frequency bias setting** of the **balancing authority** receiving overlap regulation service.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event

BAL-002-AB-3



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure the **ISO** balances resources and **demand** and returns the **area control error** to defined values, subject to applicable limits, following a reportable **balancing contingency event**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**, only in periods during which the **ISO** is not in active status under a **reserve sharing group** agreement or governing rules for a **reserve sharing group**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO**, when it is experiencing a reportable **balancing contingency event** must:

R1.1 within the **contingency** event recovery period, demonstrate recovery by returning its **reporting area control error** to at least the recovery value of:

- (a) zero (if its pre-reporting **contingency** event **area control error** value was positive or equal to zero); or
- (b) its pre-reporting **contingency** event **area control error** value (if its pre-reporting **contingency** event **area control error** value was negative);

however, any **balancing contingency event** that occurs during the **contingency** event recovery period must reduce the required recovery: (i) beginning at the time of, and (ii) by the magnitude of, such individual **balancing contingency event**;

R1.2. document all reportable **balancing contingency events** using the form the **NERC** designates; and

R1.3. deploy **contingency reserve**, within system constraints, to respond to all reportable **balancing contingency events**; however, the **ISO** is not subject to compliance with requirement R1.1 if the **ISO**:

- R1.3.1**
 - (a) is experiencing an **ISO** declared energy emergency alert level;
 - (b) is using its **contingency reserve** to mitigate an operating emergency in accordance with its emergency operating plan;
 - (c) has depleted its **contingency reserve** to a level below its most severe single **contingency**; and
 - (d) intentionally left blank; or

- R1.3.2**
 - (a) experiences multiple **contingencies** where the combined MW loss exceeds its most severe single **contingency** and that are defined as a single **balancing contingency event**; or
 - (b) experiences multiple **balancing contingency events** within the sum of the time periods defined by the **contingency** event recovery period and **contingency** reserve restoration period whose combined magnitude exceeds the **ISO's** most severe single **contingency**.

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Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event

BAL-002-AB-3



- R2** The **ISO** must develop, review, and maintain annually, and implement an operating process as part of its operating plan to determine its most severe single **contingency** and make preparations to have **contingency reserve** equal to, or greater than the **ISO**'s most severe single **contingency** available for maintaining system **reliability**.
- R3** The **ISO**, following a reportable **balancing contingency event**, must restore its **contingency reserve** to at least its most severe single **contingency**, before the end of the **contingency reserve** restoration period, but any **balancing contingency event** that occurs before the end of a **contingency reserve** restoration period resets the beginning of the **contingency** event recovery period.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1.1** Evidence of demonstrating the recovery of the **reporting area control error** as required in requirement R1.1 exists. Evidence may include documented reportable **balancing contingency events** using the designated form, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR1.2** Evidence of documenting all reportable **balancing contingency events** as required by requirement R1.2 exists. Evidence may include documented reportable **balancing contingency events** using the designated **NERC** form, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR1.3** Evidence of deploying **contingency** reserve, within system constraints, to respond to all reportable **balancing contingency events**, as required in requirement R1.3 exists. Evidence may include **directive** logs, phone calls, designated forms, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of developing, reviewing, maintaining and implementing an operating process to determine the most severe single **contingency** and to have **contingency** reserves as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include a dated operating process with a revision history, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of restoring **contingency reserve** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include historical data, computer logs, operator logs, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-07-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Contingency Reserve

BAL-002-WECC-AB1-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to specify the quantity and types of **contingency reserve** required to ensure reliability under normal and abnormal conditions.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**, which may meet the requirements of this reliability standard through participation in a **reserve sharing group** that the **ISO** has designated as its agent.

This **reliability standard** does not apply in the case of contingencies that result in the **interconnected electric system** losing synchronism with the **western interconnection**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must have held, at a minimum, an average amount of **contingency reserve** that is:

R1.1 the greater of either:

- (a) an amount equal to the loss of the most severe single **contingency**; or
- (b) an amount equal to the sum of:

three percent (3%) of the hourly integrated amount of load, being the hourly integrated amount of net generation the **ISO** determines is delivered to the grid minus **net actual interchange**;

plus

three percent (3%) of the hourly integrated amount of net generation the **ISO** determines is delivered to the grid;

where “net generation the **ISO** determines is delivered to the grid” is equal to the sum of:

- (i) generation from a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** but not including unit service and station service loads;
plus
- (ii) generation from an industrial complex or facility that has on-site generation but not including generation serving on-site load;
plus
- (iii) generation delivered to the grid by the City of Medicine Hat;

R1.2 comprised of any combination of the **operating reserve** types specified below:

- (a) **spinning reserve**;
- (b) **supplemental reserve**;

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Contingency Reserve

BAL-002-WECC-AB1-2



- (c) **interchange transactions** sourced within Alberta that the **ISO** designates as **supplemental reserve**;
- (d) **interchange transactions** sourced external to Alberta that the **ISO** designates as **spinning reserve** or **supplemental reserve** and that, by agreement, is deliverable to Alberta on firm transmission service;
- (e) a resource, other than a **generating unit**, an **aggregated generating facility** or load, that can provide energy or reduce energy consumption;
- (f) load, including demand response resources, demand-side management resources, direct control load management, interruptible load or **interruptible demand**, or any other load made available for curtailment by the **ISO** via contract or agreement; and
- (g) during capacity and energy emergencies, load that can be interrupted; and

R1.3 an amount of capacity from a resource that is capable of fully responding within ten (10) minutes;

except within the first sixty (60) minutes following a **disturbance** resulting from a loss of supply and requiring the activation of **contingency reserve** or except following the deployment of **contingency reserve** during implementation of the **ISO**'s capacity and energy emergency plan.

R2 The **ISO** must maintain at least fifty percent (50%) of its minimum amount of **contingency reserve** required in requirement R1 as **spinning reserve** that is immediately and automatically responsive to frequency deviations through the action of a **governor** or other control system.

R3 The **ISO** must, when operating as a sink **balancing authority**, maintain an amount of **operating reserve**, in addition to the minimum **contingency reserve** required in requirement R1, equal to the amount of **supplemental reserve** for any **interchange transaction** designated as part of the **supplemental reserve** of the source **balancing authority** or source **reserve sharing group**, except within the first sixty (60) minutes following an event requiring the activation of **contingency reserve** or except following the deployment of **contingency reserve** during implementation of the **ISO**'s capacity and energy emergency plan.

R4 The **ISO** must, when operating as a source **balancing authority**, maintain an amount of **operating reserve**, in addition to the minimum **contingency reserve** amounts required in requirement R1, equal to the amount and type of **operating reserve** for any **operating reserve** transactions for which it is the source **balancing authority**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this reliability standard. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of having held **contingency reserve** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include:

- (a) a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement, documentation of the methodology of the **contingency reserve** calculation, or **ancillary services** contracts; or

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Contingency Reserve

BAL-002-WECC-AB1-2



(b) records of **disturbances** or implementation of the **ISO's** capacity and emergency plan as required in requirement R1.

MR1.1 Evidence of calculating the amount of **contingency reserve** as required in requirement R1.1 exists. Evidence may include records of the required and available **contingency reserve**.

MR1.2 Evidence of having **contingency reserve** that is comprised of the **operating reserve** types as required in requirement R1.2 exists. Evidence may include a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement or **ancillary services** contracts.

MR1.3 Evidence of having access to **contingency reserve** that is capable of fully responding in ten (10) minutes as required in requirement R1.3 exists. Evidence may include a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement or technical requirements for **contingency reserve**.

MR2 Evidence of maintaining at least fifty percent (50%) of the ISO's minimum amount of **contingency reserve** as **spinning reserve** that is immediately responsive to frequency deviations as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement or records of **dispatches** of **ancillary services**.

MR3 Evidence of maintaining an amount of **operating reserve** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include a sworn affidavit from an appropriate **ISO** representative, authoritative documents that restrict or permit the transactions set out in requirement R3, documents that demonstrate the **ISO** was in a capacity and energy emergency, or a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement.

MR4 Evidence of maintaining an amount of **operating reserve** as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include a sworn affidavit from an appropriate **ISO** representative or a **reserve sharing group** agreement including an agent appointment agreement.

Revision History

Effective Date	Description
2015-07-26	Revised Applicability section to include exclusion for contingencies that result in the interconnected electric system losing synchronism with the western interconnection
2014-10-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting

BAL-003-AB1-1.1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to:

- (a) require sufficient **frequency response** from the **ISO** to maintain **Interconnection** frequency within predefined bounds by arresting frequency deviations and supporting frequency until the frequency is restored to its scheduled value; and
- (b) provide consistent methods for measuring **frequency response** and determining the **frequency bias setting**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**, unless the **interconnected electric system** is not synchronously connected to the **Interconnection**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must:

- (a) achieve an annual **frequency response** measure (as calculated in accordance with Appendix A) that is equal to or more negative than its **frequency response** obligation; and
- (b) report, in accordance with Appendix A, the annual **frequency response** measure calculated pursuant to requirement R1(a),

which obligations the **ISO** may meet through participation in a **frequency response** sharing group which the **ISO** has designated as its agent.

R2 The **ISO** must, if it is not receiving overlap regulation service and uses a fixed **frequency bias setting**:

R2.1 implement the **frequency bias setting** determined in accordance with Appendix A, as validated by the Electric Reliability Organization, into its **area control error** calculation during the implementation period specified by the Electric Reliability Organization; and

R2.2 use this **frequency bias setting** until directed to change by the Electric Reliability Organization.

R3 The **ISO** must, if it is not receiving overlap regulation service and is utilizing a variable **frequency bias setting**, maintain a **frequency bias setting** that is:

R3.1 less than zero at all times; and

R3.2 equal to or more negative than its **frequency response** obligation when frequency varies from 60 Hz by more than +/- 0.036 Hz.

R4 The **ISO** must, if it is performing overlap regulation service, modify its **frequency bias setting** in its **area control error** calculation, in order to represent the **frequency bias setting** for the combined **balancing authority area**, to be equivalent to either:

R4.1 the sum of the **frequency bias settings**, as shown on the **NERC FRS Form 1** and **FRS Form 2** for the participating **balancing authorities** and as validated by the Electric Reliability Organization, or

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R4.2 the **frequency bias setting** shown on the **NERC FRS Form 1** and **FRS Form 2** for the entirety of the participating **balancing authority areas**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of achieving an annual **frequency response** measure as required in requirement R1, and of reporting the annual **frequency response** measure as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include dated data plus documented formula in either hardcopy or electronic format that shows an annual **frequency response** measure was achieved that is equal to or more negative than the **frequency response** obligation, a dated document in hard copy or electronic format showing submission of a completed report, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of implementing the **frequency bias setting** as validated by the Electric Reliability Organization into the **area control error** calculation as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include a dated document in hard copy or electronic format showing the **frequency bias setting** as validated by the Electric Reliability Organization was implemented into the **area control error** calculation within the implementation period specified, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of maintaining a **frequency bias setting** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include a dated report in hard copy or electronic format showing the average clock-minute average **frequency bias setting** was less than zero and, during periods when the clock-minute average frequency was outside of the range 59.964 Hz to 60.036 Hz, was equal to or more negative than the **frequency response** obligation, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of modifying the **frequency bias setting** in the **area control error** calculation as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include a dated operating log, database or list, in hard copy or electronic format, showing that when overlap regulation service was performed the **frequency bias setting** was modified in the **area control error** calculation, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix A - *BAL-003-AB-1.1 Frequency Response & Frequency Bias Setting Standard Supporting Document*

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-08-01	Amended R1 as follows; replaced "reserve" with "response", bolded frequency and unbolded 'sharing group'.
2019-07-01	Initial release.

Appendix A

BAL-003-AB-1.1 Frequency Response & Frequency Bias Setting Standard Supporting Document

Interconnection Frequency Response Obligation

The Electric Reliability Organization, in consultation with regional representatives, has established a target contingency protection criterion for each **frequency response** obligation of the **Interconnection**. The default **frequency response** obligation of the **Interconnection** listed in Table 1 is based on the resource contingency criteria, which is the largest category C (N-2) event identified. A maximum delta frequency is calculated by adjusting a starting frequency for each **Interconnection** by the following:

- Prevailing **underfrequency load shedding** first step;
- CC_{Adj} which is the adjustment for the differences between 1-second and sub-second Point C observations for frequency events. A positive value indicates that the sub-second C data is lower than the 1-second data;
- CB_R which is the statistically determined ratio of the Point C to Value B; and
- BC'_{Adj} which is the statistically determined adjustment for the event nadir being below the Value B (Eastern Interconnection only) during primary **frequency response** withdrawal.

The **frequency response** obligation for each **Interconnection** in Table 1 is then calculated by dividing the resource **contingency** criteria MWs by 10 times the maximum delta frequency. In the Eastern Interconnection there is an additional adjustment (BC'_{Adj}) for the event nadir being below the Value B due to primary **frequency response** withdrawal. This **frequency response** obligation for the **Interconnection** includes uncertainty adjustments at a 95% confidence level. Detailed descriptions of the calculations used in Table 1 below are defined in the *Procedure for ERO Support of Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting Standard*.

Table 1

Interconnection	Eastern	Western	ERCOT	HQ	Units
Starting Frequency (F_{start})	59.974	59.976	59.963	59.972	Hz
Prevailing UFLS First Step	59.5*	59.5	59.3	58.5	Hz
Base Delta Frequency (DF_{Base})	0.474	0.476	0.663	1.472	Hz
CC_{ADJ}	0.007	0.004	0.012	N/A	Hz
Delta Frequency (DF_{CC})	0.467	0.472	0.651	1.472	Hz
CB_R	1.000	1.625	1.377	1.550	
Delta Frequency (DF_{CBR})	0.467	0.291	0.473	0.949	Hz
BC'_{ADJ}	0.018	N/A	N/A	N/A	Hz
Max. Delta Frequency	0.449	0.291	0.473	0.949	
Resource Contingency Criteria	4,500	2740	2,750	1700	MW

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Interconnection	Eastern	Western	ERCOT	HQ	Units
Credit for Load Resources (CLR)		300	1400**		MW
IFRO	-1002	-840	-286	-179	MW/0.1 Hz

*The Eastern Interconnection **underfrequency load setting** set point listed is a compromise value set midway between the stable frequency minimum established in the **NERC** standard PRC-006-1, *Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding* (59.3 Hz) and the local protection **underfrequency load setting** setting of 59.7 Hz used in Florida and Manitoba.

In the base obligation measure for ERCOT, 1400 MW (load resources triggered by under frequency relays at 59.70 Hz) was reduced from its resource **contingency criteria level of 2750 MW to get 239 MW/0.1 Hz. This was reduced to accurately account for designed response from load resources within 30 cycles.

An **Interconnection** may propose alternate **frequency response** obligation protection criteria for that **Interconnection** to the Electric Reliability Organization by submitting a *Standard Authorization Request* with supporting technical documentation.

Balancing Authority Frequency Response Obligation and Frequency Bias Setting

The Electric Reliability Organization will manage the administrative procedure for annually assigning a **frequency response** obligation and implementation of the **frequency bias setting** for each **balancing authority**. The annual timeline for all activities described in this section are shown below.

For an **Interconnection** with multiple **balancing authorities**, the **frequency response** obligation shown in Table 1 is allocated based on the **balancing authority** annual load and annual generation. The **frequency response** obligation allocation will be based on the following method:

$$FRO_{BA} = IFRO \times \frac{\text{Annual Gen}_{BA} + \text{Annual Load}_{BA}}{\text{Annual Gen}_{Int} + \text{Annual Load}_{Int}}$$

Where:

- Annual Gen_{BA} is the total annual “Output of Generating Plants” within the **balancing authority area**, on FERC *Form 714*, column c of Part II - Schedule 3.
- Annual Load_{BA} is total annual load within the **balancing authority area**, on FERC *Form 714*, column e of Part II - Schedule 3.
- Annual Gen_{Int} is the sum of all annual gen_{BA} values reported in that **Interconnection**.
- Annual Load_{Int} is the sum of all annual load_{BA} values reported in that **Interconnection**.

The data used for this calculation is from the most recently filed *Form 714*. As an example, a report to the **NERC** in January 2013 would use the *Form 714* data filed in 2012, which utilized data from 2011.

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Balancing authorities that are not FERC-jurisdictional should use the *Form 714 Instructions* to assemble and submit equivalent data to the Electric Reliability Organization for use in the **frequency response** obligation allocation process.

Balancing authorities that elect to form a **frequency response** sharing group will calculate a **frequency response** sharing group **frequency response** obligation by adding together the individual **frequency response** obligations of the **balancing authority**.

Balancing authorities that elect to form a **frequency response** sharing group as a means to jointly meet the **frequency response** obligation will calculate their **frequency response** measure performance in one of two ways:

- Calculate a group **net actual interchange** and measure the group response to all events in the reporting year on a single *FRS Form 1*, or
- Jointly submit the individual **balancing authorities' FRS Form 1s**, with a summary spreadsheet that contains the sum of each participant's individual event performance.

Balancing authorities that merge or that transfer load or generation are encouraged to notify the Electric Reliability Organization of the change in footprint and corresponding changes in allocation such that the net obligation to the **Interconnection** remains the same and so that **control performance standard** limits can be adjusted.

Each **balancing authority** reports its previous year's **frequency response** measure, **frequency bias setting** and **frequency bias** type (fixed or variable) to the Electric Reliability Organization each year to allow the Electric Reliability Organization to validate the revised **frequency bias settings** on *FRS Form 1*. If the Electric Reliability Organization posts the official list of events after the date specified in the timeline below, **balancing authorities** will be given **30 days** from the date the Electric Reliability Organization posts the official list of events to submit their *FRS Form 1*.

Once the Electric Reliability Organization reviews the data submitted in *FRS Form 1* and *FRS Form 2* for all **balancing authorities**, the Electric Reliability Organization will use *FRS Form 1* data to post the following information for each **balancing authority** for the upcoming year:

- **frequency bias setting**; and
- **frequency response** obligation.

Once the data listed above is fully posted, the Electric Reliability Organization will announce the three-day implementation period for changing the **frequency bias setting** if it differs from that shown in the timeline below.

A **balancing authority** using a fixed **frequency bias setting** sets its **frequency bias setting** to the greater of (in absolute value):

- Any number the **balancing authority** chooses between 100% and 125% of its **frequency response** measure as calculated on *FRS Form 1*; or
- The **Interconnection** minimum as determined by the Electric Reliability Organization.

For purposes of calculating the minimum **frequency bias setting**, a **balancing authority** participating in a **frequency response** sharing group will need to calculate its stand-alone **frequency response** measure using *FRS Form 1* and *FRS Form 2* to determine its minimum **frequency bias setting**.

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Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting

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A **balancing authority** providing overlap regulation will report the historic peak demand and generation of its combined **balancing authority areas** on *FRS Form 1* as described in requirement R4.

There are occasions when changes are needed to **frequency bias settings** outside of the normal schedule. Examples are footprint changes between **balancing authorities** and major changes in load or generation or the formation of new **balancing authorities**. In such cases, the changing **balancing authorities** will work with their regions, the **NERC**, and the Resources Subcommittee to confirm appropriate changes to **frequency bias settings**, **frequency response** obligation, **control performance standard** limits and **inadvertent interchange** balances.

If there is no net change to the **Interconnection** total **frequency bias**, the **balancing authorities** involved will agree on a date to implement their respective change in **frequency bias settings**. The **balancing authorities** and Electric Reliability Organization will also agree to the allocation of **frequency response** obligation such that the sum remains the same.

If there is a net change to the **Interconnection** total **frequency bias**, this will cause a change in CPS2 limits and **frequency response** obligation for other **balancing authorities** in the **Interconnection**. In this case, the Electric Reliability Organization will notify the impacted **balancing authorities** of their respective changes and provide an implementation window for making the **frequency bias setting** changes.

Frequency Response Measure

The **balancing authority** will calculate its **frequency response** measure from single event **frequency response** data, defined as: “the data from an individual event from a **balancing authority** that is used to calculate its **frequency response**, expressed in MW/0.1Hz” as calculated on *FRS Form 2* for each event shown on *FRS Form 1*. The events in *FRS Form 1* are selected by the Electric Reliability Organization using the *Procedure for ERO Support of Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting Standard*. The **frequency response** measure for a typical **balancing authority** in an **Interconnection** with more than one **balancing authority** is basically the change in its **net actual interchange** on its **intertie** with its **adjacent balancing authorities** divided by the change in **Interconnection** frequency. (Some **balancing authorities** may choose to apply corrections to their **net actual interchange** values to account for factors such as nonconforming loads.) *FRS Form 1* and *FRS Form 2* show the types of adjustments that are allowed. Note that with the exception of the contingent **balancing authority** column, any adjustments made must be made for all events in an evaluation year. As an example, if an entity has non-conforming loads and makes an adjustment for one event, all events must show the nonconforming load, even if the non-conforming load does not impact the calculation. This ensures that the reports are not utilizing the adjustments only when they are favorable to the **balancing authority**. The Electric Reliability Organization will use a standardized sampling interval of approximately 16 seconds before the event up to the time of the event for the pre-event **net actual interchange**, and frequency (A values) and approximately 20 to 52 seconds after the event for the post-event **net actual interchange** (B values) in the computation of **frequency response** measure values, dependent on the data scan rate of the **balancing authority's** Energy Management System.

All events listed on *FRS Form 1* need to be included in the annual submission of *FRS Form 1* and *FRS Form 2*. The only time a **balancing authority** should exclude an event is if its **intertie** data or its frequency data is corrupt or its Energy Management System was unavailable. *FRS Form 2* has instructions on how to correct the **balancing authority's** data if the given event is internal to the **balancing authority** or if other authorized adjustments are used.

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Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting

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Assuming data entry is correct, *FRS Form 1* will automatically calculate the **frequency response** measure of the **balancing authority** for the past 12 **months** as the median of the **frequency response** measure values. A **balancing authority** electing to report as an **frequency response** sharing group or a provider of overlap regulation service will provide an *FRS Form 1* for the aggregate of its participants.

To allow a **balancing authority** to plan its operations, events with a “Point C” that cause the **Interconnection** frequency to be lower than that shown in Table 1 above or higher than an equal change in frequency going above 60 Hz may be included in the list of events for that **Interconnection**. However, the calculation of the **balancing authority** response to such an event will be adjusted to show a frequency change only to the target minimum frequency shown in Table 1 above or a high frequency amount of an equal quantity. Should such an event happen, the Electric Reliability Organization will provide additional guidance.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Automatic Time Error Correction

BAL-004-WECC-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to maintain the frequency of the **western interconnection** and to ensure that **time error corrections** and **primary inadvertent interchange** payback are effectively conducted in a manner that does not adversely affect the **reliability** of the **western interconnection**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** Following the conclusion of each **month**, the **ISO** must verify that the absolute value of its accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** for both the monthly **on peak** period and the monthly **off peak** period are each individually less than or equal to 150% of the previous calendar year's peak demand, where peak demand is the highest hourly integrated **net energy for load**.
- R2** The **ISO** must, within ninety (90) days of discovery of an error in the calculation of hourly **primary inadvertent interchange**, recalculate the value of hourly **primary inadvertent interchange** and adjust the accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** from the time of the error.
- R3** The **ISO** must, while synchronously connected to the **western interconnection**, keep its **automatic time error correction** in service, with an allowable exception period of less than or equal to an accumulated twenty-four (24) hours per calendar quarter for **automatic time error correction** to be out of service.
 - R3.1** Notwithstanding requirement R3, the **ISO** may disable automatic **time error correction** if there is a **reliability** concern on the **interconnected electric system** while executing an automatic **time error correction**, and this time will not be included as part of the allowable exception period.
- R4** The **ISO** must compute the following by fifty (50) minutes after each hour:
 - R4.1** the hourly **primary inadvertent interchange**;
 - R4.2** the accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange**; and
 - R4.3** the **automatic time error correction** term.
- R5** The **ISO** must be able to change its **automatic generation control** operating mode between flat frequency, flat tie line, tie line bias, and tie line bias plus **time error** control, to correspond to current operating conditions.
- R6** The **ISO** must recalculate the hourly **primary inadvertent interchange** and accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** for the **on peak** and **off peak** periods whenever adjustments are made to hourly **inadvertent interchange** or the hourly change in system **time error**, as distributed by the **Interconnection** time monitor.
- R7** The **ISO** must make the same adjustment to the accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** as it did for any **month-end** meter reading adjustments to **inadvertent interchange**.
- R8** The **ISO** must payback **inadvertent interchange** using **automatic time error correction** rather than bilateral and unilateral payback.

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Automatic Time Error Correction

BAL-004-WECC-AB-2



4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of verifying the absolute value of the **ISO's** accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data, screen shots from the **WECC** Interchange Tool, production of data from any other databases, spreadsheets, displays, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of recalculating the value of hourly **primary inadvertent interchange** and adjusting the accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** from the time of the error as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data, screen shots from the **WECC** Interchange Tool, production data from any other databases, spreadsheets, displays, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of keeping the **automatic time error correction** in service as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated archived files, historical data, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of computing the hourly **primary inadvertent interchange**, accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** and **automatic time error correction** as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data, screen shots from the **WECC** Interchange Tool, data from any other databases, spreadsheets, displays, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of having the ability to change the **automatic generation control** operating mode as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, snapshots of the operating interface provided in the energy management system for changing its **automatic generation control** operating mode, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of recalculating hourly **primary inadvertent interchange** and accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data, screen shots from the **WECC** Interchange Tool, data from any other databases, spreadsheets, displays, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of making the adjustments to accumulated **primary inadvertent interchange** as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data, screen shots of the **WECC** Interchange Tool, data from any other databases, spreadsheets, displays, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8** Evidence of paying back the **inadvertent interchange** as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, historical **inadvertent interchange** data, data from the **WECC** Interchange Tool, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2016-12-19	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish requirements for acquiring data necessary to calculate **reporting area control error** and specify a minimum periodicity, accuracy, and availability requirement for acquisition of the data.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must use a design scan rate of no more than 9 seconds in acquiring data necessary to calculate **reporting area control error**.
- R2** Intentionally left blank.
- R3** The **ISO** must use frequency metering equipment for the calculation of **reporting area control error**:
 - R3.1** that is available a minimum of 99.95% for each calendar year; and
 - R3.2** with a minimum accuracy of 0.001 Hz.
- R4** The **ISO** must make available to its operating personnel information associated with **reporting area control error** including quality flags indicating missing or invalid data.
- R5** The **ISO** must ensure the system it uses to calculate **reporting area control error** is available a minimum of 99.5% of each calendar year.
- R6** The **ISO** must implement an operating process to identify and mitigate errors affecting the accuracy of scan rate data used in the calculation of **reporting area control error** for its **balancing authority area**.
- R7** The **ISO** must ensure that each **interconnection**, pseudo-tie, and dynamic schedule with an **adjacent balancing authority** is equipped with:
 - R7.1** a common source to provide information to both the **ISO** and the **adjacent balancing authority** for the scan rate values used in the calculation of **reporting area control error**; and,
 - R7.2** a time synchronized common source to determine hourly MWh values agreed-upon to aid in the identification and mitigation of errors.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of using a design scan rate as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include data files, database, spreadsheets, system logs, display information, other data, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Intentionally left blank.

- MR3** Evidence of using frequency metering equipment for the calculation of **reporting area control error** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include dated documents, data files, database, system logs, other data, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of making available information associated with **reporting area control error** as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include graphical display or dated alarm log that provides indication of data validity for the real-time **reporting area control error** based on both the calculated result and all of the associated inputs, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of ensuring the system used to calculate **reporting area control error** was available as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include data files, database, system logs, other data, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of implementing an operating process as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include evidence that shows the operating process was implemented, such as dated communications, incorporation in operator task verification, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of ensuring that each **interconnection**, pseudo-tie and dynamic schedule with an adjacent **balancing authority** is equipped with a common source as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include technical documentation, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-07-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security – Supplemental CIP Alberta Reliability Standard CIP-SUPP-001-AB1



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Supplemental CIP Alberta Reliability Standard
2. Number: CIP-SUPP-001-AB1
3. Purpose: The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to allow the **ISO** to approve variances to the requirements of a CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard**, other than **technical feasibility exceptions**.

4. Applicability:

This **reliability standard** applies to those Responsible Entities listed in CIP-002-AB-5.1, *Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization*, section 4, Applicability.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1 A Responsible Entity, other than the **ISO**, must, where it seeks a variance to the requirements of a CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard**, make a request in writing to the **ISO** outlining (i) the requirements of the particular CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard** in respect of which the variance is sought; (ii) the grounds in support of the requested variance, which grounds must not be frivolous or of little merit; and (iii) the requested effective dates of the variance.

M1 Evidence of a request for a variance being made in writing as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of the request.

R2 The **ISO** and the Responsible Entity must treat a request for a variance under requirement R1, all records related to such a request, and a variance approved under requirement R3, as confidential in accordance with the provisions of section 103.1 of the ISO rules, *Confidentiality*, provided however that where the request for a variance is made by a Responsible Entity whose rights and obligations are the subject of a power purchase arrangement that Responsible Entity may disclose to its counterparties such information in respect of the variance as and if required under the terms of the power purchase arrangement.

R2.1 Where the **ISO** determines that the disclosure of a request for a variance under requirement R1, all records related to such a request, or a variance approved under requirement R3:

- (a) would have no material impact on the **reliability** of the interconnected electric system; and
- (b) does not contain information which, in the opinion of the **ISO**, is commercially sensitive,

requirement R2 of this standard does not apply and the **ISO** may publicly disclose the request and all records related to the request in accordance with subsection 2(6)(b)(i) of section 103.1 of the **ISO rules**.

M2 Evidence of treating the request as confidential as described in requirement R2 exists, unless requirement R2.1 applies.

Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security – Supplemental CIP Alberta Reliability Standard CIP-SUPP-001-AB1



- R3** The **ISO** must, where it approves a variance requested under requirement R1:
- (a) indicate the effective dates of the variance;
 - (b) identify the Responsible Entity to which the variance applies;
 - (c) maintain a copy of the variance, in writing; and
 - (d) provide a copy of the variance, in writing, to the Responsible Entity that has requested the variance.
- M3** Evidence of taking the steps required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a written copy of the variance including its effective dates, correspondence to the Responsible Entity enclosing a copy of the variance or other equivalent evidence.
- R4** The **ISO** must not, in any event, approve a variance requested under requirement R1 unless the **ISO** determines, by its own assessment, that the variance has merit and will not have a material impact on the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**.
- M4** Evidence of performing an assessment in accordance with requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a copy of the **ISO**'s business practices relating to variances of a CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard**.
- R5** The **ISO** must, where it does not approve a variance requested under requirement R1, provide a copy of its decision, including reasons, in writing, to the Responsible Entity that has requested the variance.
- M5** Evidence of issuing a decision denying the variance requested exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of a letter from the **ISO** denying the variance requested.
- R6** Notwithstanding any of the requirements of this **reliability standard**, a Responsible Entity must make a request for a **technical feasibility exception** in accordance with the provisions of CIP-SUPP-002-AB, *Technical Feasibility Exceptions*.
- M6** Evidence of requesting a **technical feasibility exception** as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of the request, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-03-21	Addition of requirement R6 and associated measure. Revision to purpose statement.
2015-06-05	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Supplemental CIP Alberta Reliability Standard Technical Feasibility Exceptions

CIP-SUPP-002-AB



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Supplemental CIP Alberta Reliability Standard Technical Feasibility Exceptions
2. Number: CIP-SUPP-002-AB
3. Purpose: The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to allow the **ISO** to approve **technical feasibility exceptions** to the requirements of a CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard**.
4. Applicability:

This **reliability standard** applies to those Responsible Entities listed in CIP-002-AB-5.1, *Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization*, section 4, Applicability.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1 A Responsible Entity other than the **ISO** must, where:

- (a) a requirement in the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** uses the phrase “where technically feasible”; and
- (b) the Responsible Entity seeks a variance from the requirement referenced in sub-requirement R1(a) on the grounds of technical feasibility,

request that the **ISO** approve a **technical feasibility exception**.

MR1 Evidence of a request for a **technical feasibility exception** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of the request, or other equivalent evidence.

R2 A Responsible Entity must make a request under requirement R1 in writing in the form specified by the **ISO**.

MR2 Evidence of making a request in writing as described in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of the request, or other equivalent evidence.

R3 At the **ISO**’s request, a Responsible Entity must provide:

- (a) any additional information relating to a request for a **technical feasibility exception**; or
- (b) the reasons why the additional information will not be provided.

MR3 Evidence of providing additional information or reasons in accordance with requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a hard copy or electronic copy of the request and the response, or other equivalent evidence.

R4 The **ISO** and the Responsible Entity must treat a request for a **technical feasibility exception** under requirement R1, and all records related to such a request, as confidential in accordance with the provisions of section 103.1 of the ISO rules, *Confidentiality*, provided however that where the request for a **technical feasibility exception** is made by a Responsible Entity whose rights and obligations are the subject of a power purchase arrangement, that Responsible Entity may disclose to its counterparties such information in respect of the **technical feasibility exception** as and if required under the terms of the power purchase arrangement.

MR4 Evidence of treating the request as confidential as described in requirement R4 exists.

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Reliability Standard Technical Feasibility Exceptions

CIP-SUPP-002-AB



- R5** The **ISO** must post the criteria that it considers when determining whether to approve or disapprove a request for a **technical feasibility exception** on the AESO website, and must notify Responsible Entities at least thirty (30) **days** in advance of any amendments to the criteria.
- MR5** Evidence of posting the criteria and notifying Responsible Entities as described in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated copy of the AESO website posting and a dated posting in the AESO stakeholder newsletter.
- R6** The **ISO** must, upon reviewing a Responsible Entity's request submitted under requirement R1 and any additional information provided to the **ISO**, approve the request in whole or in part, or disapprove the request.
- R6.1** The **ISO** must, where the request submitted under requirement R1 is approved, provide a copy of its decision, in writing, to the Responsible Entity that has requested the **technical feasibility exception** and set out:
- (a) any terms and conditions of the approval; and
 - (b) the expiration date of the approval.
- R6.2** The **ISO** must, where the request submitted under requirement R1 is disapproved, provide a copy of its decision, including reasons, in writing, to the Responsible Entity that has requested the **technical feasibility exception**.
- MR6** Evidence of an approval or disapproval of the request as described in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include but is not limited to a dated copy of the approval or disapproval.
- R7** A Responsible Entity must, where there is a material change in the facts underlying the request for or approval of a **technical feasibility exception**, submit a revised request to the **ISO** under requirement R2 within sixty (60) **days** of becoming aware of the material change.
- MR7** Evidence of submitting a revised request to the **ISO** in accordance with requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated record of becoming aware of a material change in facts and a dated hard copy or electronic copy of the revised request, or other equivalent evidence.
- R8** The **ISO** may, after providing written notice to the Responsible Entity, amend or terminate a **technical feasibility exception** prior to the expiration date of the **technical feasibility exception** where:
- (a) a Responsible Entity does not fulfill the terms and conditions of the approval;
 - (b) there is a material change in the facts underlying the approval; or
 - (c) the Responsible Entity advises the **ISO**, in writing, that the **technical feasibility exception** is no longer required.
- MR8** Evidence of amending or terminating a **technical feasibility exception** and providing notice prior to the expiration date of the approval as described in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated hard copy or electronic copy of the amended or terminated **technical feasibility exception** provided to the Responsible Entity.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-03-21	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization

CIP-002-AB-5.1



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization
2. Number: CIP-002-AB-5.1
3. Purpose: To identify and categorize **BES cyber systems** and their associated **BES cyber assets** for the application of cyber security requirements commensurate with the adverse impact that loss, compromise, or misuse of those **BES cyber systems** could have on the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system**. Identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems** support appropriate protection against compromises that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.
4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities”. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.2. a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.1.2.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection 4.1.2., without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.1.2.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.1.2.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.1.3. the **operator** of a **generating unit** and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.4. the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

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- 4.1.6. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.7. the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
 - 4.1.8. the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and
 - 4.1.9. the **ISO**.
- 4.2. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.
- 4.2.1. One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.2.1.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.2.1.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.2.1.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.2.1.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** are responsible for:
 - 4.2.2.1. each **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** except each **transmission facility** that:
 - 4.2.2.1.1. is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kV or higher and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;
 - 4.2.2.1.2. radially connects only to load;
 - 4.2.2.1.3. radially connects only to one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** with a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**; or

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- 4.2.2.1.4. radially connects to load and one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that have a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.2. a **reactive power** resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing **reactive power** that is connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, except those **reactive power** resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use;
- 4.2.2.3. a **generating unit** that is:
 - 4.2.2.3.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.2. within a power plant which:
 - 4.2.2.3.2.1. is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.2.2.3.2.2. is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - 4.2.2.3.2.3. has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.3. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.3.4. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.4. an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - 4.2.2.4.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.4.2. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.4.3. a contracted **blackstart resource**;and
- 4.2.2.5. **control centres** and backup **control centres**.
- 4.2.3. The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:
 - 4.2.3.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.2. **cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.
 - 4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.4. for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection 4.2.1 above.

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5. [Intentionally left blank.]
6. [Intentionally left blank.]

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement a process that considers each of the following assets for purposes of parts 1.1 through 1.3:
- (i) **control centres** and backup **control centres**;
 - (ii) transmission stations and substations;
 - (iii) **generating units** and **aggregated generating facilities**;
 - (iv) systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including contracted **blackstart resources** and **cranking paths** and initial switching requirements;
 - (v) **remedial action schemes** that support the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (vi) for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **protection systems** specified in Applicability subsection 4.2.1 above.
- 1.1.** Identify each of the high impact **BES cyber systems** according to Attachment 1, Section 1, if any, at each asset;
- 1.2.** Identify each of the medium impact **BES cyber systems** according to Attachment 1, Section 2, if any, at each asset; and
- 1.3.** Identify each asset that contains a low impact **BES cyber system** according to Attachment 1, Section 3, if any (a discrete list of low impact **BES cyber systems** is not required).
- M1.** Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, dated electronic or physical lists required by requirement R1, and Parts 1.1 and 1.2.
- R2.** The Responsible Entity shall:
- 2.1.** review the identifications in requirement R1 and its parts (and update them if there are changes identified) at least once every 15 **months**, even if it has no identified items in requirement R1, and
 - 2.2.** have its **CIP senior manager** or delegate approve the identifications required by requirement R1 at least once every 15 **months**, even if it has no identified items in requirement R1.
- M2.** Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, electronic or physical dated records to demonstrate that the Responsible Entity has reviewed and updated, where necessary, the identifications required in requirement R1 and its parts, and has had its **CIP senior manager** or delegate approve the identifications required in requirement R1 and its parts at least once every 15 **months**, even if it has none identified in requirement R1 and its parts, as required by requirement R2.

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Attachments

Attachment 1 – *Impact Rating Criteria*

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-01	Initial release.

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Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization

CIP-002-AB-5.1



CIP-002-AB-5.1 Attachment 1

Impact Rating Criteria

The criteria defined in Attachment 1 do not constitute stand-alone compliance requirements, but are criteria characterizing the level of impact and are referenced by requirements.

1. High Impact Rating (H)

Each **BES cyber system** used by and located at any of the following:

- 1.1. the **ISO's control centre** and backup **control centre**;
- 1.2. [Intentionally left blank.]
- 1.3. each **control centre** or backup **control centre** used to perform the functional obligations of an **operator** of a **transmission facility** for one or more of the assets that meet criterion 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, or 2.10; and
- 1.4. each **control centre** or backup **control centre** used to perform the functional obligations of the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** for one or more of the assets that meet criterion 2.1, 2.3, 2.6, 2.8, or 2.9.

2. Medium Impact Rating (M)

Each **BES cyber system**, not included in Section 1 above, associated with any of the following:

- 2.1. commissioned generation, by each group of **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** at a single plant location, with an aggregate **maximum authorized real power** rating of each of the generating units minus the station service load equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single **Interconnection**. For each group of **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities**, the only **BES cyber systems** that meet this criterion are those shared **BES cyber systems** that could, within 15 minutes, adversely impact the reliable operation of any combination of **generating units** and/or **aggregated generating facilities** that in aggregate equal or exceed 1500 MW in a single **Interconnection**;
- 2.2. each **bulk electric system** reactive resource or group of resources at a single location (excluding **generating units** and **aggregated generating facilities**) with an aggregate maximum **reactive power** nameplate rating of 1000 MVAR or greater (excluding those at generating units or aggregated generating facilities). The only **BES cyber systems** that meet this criterion are those shared **BES cyber systems** that could, within 15 minutes, adversely impact the reliable operation of any combination of resources that in aggregate equal or exceed 1000 MVAR;
- 2.3. each **generating unit** and **aggregated generating facility** that the **ISO** designates, and informs the **legal owner** of the **generating unit** or **legal owner** of the **aggregated generating facility**, as necessary to avoid an **adverse reliability impact** in the planning horizon of more than one year;
- 2.4. **transmission facilities** operated at 500 kV or higher;

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- 2.5. **transmission facilities** that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing **bulk electric system** transmission line that is connected to another transmission station or substation;

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
Less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

- 2.6. **generating units** at a single plant location, **aggregated generating facilities** or **transmission facilities** at a single station or substation location that are identified by the ISO as critical to the derivation of **interconnection reliability operating limits** and their associated contingencies;
- 2.7. [Intentionally left blank.]
- 2.8. **transmission facilities** and switchyards associated with **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that connect the generator output to the **transmission system** that, if destroyed, degraded, misused, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would result in the loss of a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** identified by any **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or any **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** as a result of its application of Attachment 1, criterion 2.1 or 2.3;
- 2.9. each **remedial action scheme**, or automated switching system that operates **system element(s)** of the **bulk electric system**, that, if destroyed, degraded, misused or otherwise rendered unavailable, would cause one or more **interconnection reliability operating limits (IROLs)** violations for failure to operate as designed or cause a reduction in one or more **IROLs** if destroyed, degraded, misused, or otherwise rendered unavailable;
- 2.10. each system or group of element(s) that performs automatic load shedding under a common control system, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more implementing **under voltage load shed** or **underfrequency load shedding** under a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
- 2.11. each **control centre** or backup **control centre**, not already included in High Impact Rating (H) above, used to perform the functional obligations of the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** for an aggregate highest rated net **real power** capability of the preceding 12 months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW; and
- 2.12. each **control centre** or backup **control centre** used to perform the functional obligations of the **operator** of a **transmission facility** not included in High Impact Rating (H), above, with

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the exception of the **operator** of a transmission facility whose only transmission facility is a radial connection from either a **generating unit**, **aggregated generating facility** or industrial complex to either the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat.

2.13. [Intentionally left blank.]

3. Low Impact Rating (L)

BES cyber systems not included in sections 1 or 2 above that are associated with any of the following assets and that meet the applicability qualifications in subsection 4.2 of this **reliability standard**:

- 3.1. **control centres** and backup **control centres**;
- 3.2. transmission stations and substations;
- 3.3. **generating units** and **aggregated generating facilities**;
- 3.4. systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including contracted **blackstart resources** and **cranking paths** and initial switching requirements;
- 3.5. **remedial action schemes** that support the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system**; and
- 3.6. for a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **protection systems** specified in subsection 4.2.1 of this **reliability standard**.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Security Management Controls

CIP-003-AB-8



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security — Security Management Controls

2. Number: CIP-003-AB-8

3. Purpose: To specify consistent and sustainable security management controls that establish responsibility and accountability to protect **BES cyber systems** against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that:

4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.1.2.2. Each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard;

4.1.2.3. Each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to an electric distribution system where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and

4.1.2.4. Each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a blackstart resource up to and including the first point of connection of the starting station service of the next generating unit(s) or aggregated generating facility(ies) to be started.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility;

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO.

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in Section 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to any **transmission facility** or **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from CIP-003-AB-8:

4.2.3.1. Cyber assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. Cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.].

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

5. Effective Dates: See CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Security Management Controls

CIP-003-AB-8



6. Background:

Reliability standard CIP-003 exists as part of a suite of CIP **reliability standards** related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems** and require organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to **BES cyber systems**.

The term policy refers to one or a collection of written documents that are used to communicate the Responsible Entities' management goals, objectives and expectations for how the Responsible Entity will protect its **BES cyber systems**. The use of policies also establishes an overall governance foundation for creating a culture of security and compliance with laws, regulations, and **reliability standards**.

The term documented processes refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements.

The terms program and plan are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term program may refer to the organization's overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the **reliability standards** include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the **reliability standards**.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high, medium, and low impact **BES cyber systems**. For example, a single cyber security awareness program could meet the requirements across multiple **BES cyber systems**.

Measures provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of the requirement. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the **reliability standards**, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an "or," and numbered items are items that are linked with an "and."

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**. This particular threshold of 300 MW for **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding** was provided in the NERC Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security reliability standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding**, which are last ditch efforts to save the BES. A review of **underfrequency load shedding** tolerances defined within **reliability standards** for **underfrequency load shedding** program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable **underfrequency load shedding** operational tolerances.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Security Management Controls

CIP-003-AB-8



B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall review and obtain **CIP senior manager** approval at least once every **15 months** for one or more documented cyber security policies that collectively address the following topics: *[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- 1.1.** For its high impact and medium impact **BES cyber systems**, if any:
 - 1.1.1.** Personnel and training (CIP-004);
 - 1.1.2. Electronic security perimeters** (CIP-005) including **interactive remote access**;
 - 1.1.3.** Physical security of **BES cyber systems** (CIP-006);
 - 1.1.4.** System security management (CIP-007);
 - 1.1.5.** Incident reporting and response planning (CIP-008);
 - 1.1.6.** Recovery plans for **BES cyber systems** (CIP-009);
 - 1.1.7.** Configuration change management and vulnerability assessments (CIP-010);
 - 1.1.8.** Information protection (CIP-011); and
 - 1.1.9.** Declaring and responding to **CIP exceptional circumstances**.
- 1.2.** For its assets identified in CIP-002 containing low impact **BES cyber systems**, if any:
 - 1.2.1.** Cyber security awareness;
 - 1.2.2.** Physical security controls;
 - 1.2.3.** Electronic access controls;
 - 1.2.4. Cyber security incident** response;
 - 1.2.5. Transient cyber assets** and **removable media** malicious code risk mitigation; and
 - 1.2.6.** Declaring and responding to **CIP exceptional circumstances**.

M1. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, policy documents; revision history, records of review, or workflow evidence from a document management system that indicate review of each cyber security policy at least once every **15 months**; and documented approval by the **CIP senior manager** for each cyber security policy.

R2. Each Responsible Entity with at least one asset identified in CIP-002 containing low impact **BES cyber systems** shall implement one or more documented cyber security plan(s) for its low impact **BES cyber systems** that include the sections in Attachment 1. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Note: An inventory, list, or discrete identification of low impact **BES cyber systems** or their **BES cyber assets** is not required. Lists of authorized users are not required.

M2. Evidence shall include each of the documented cyber security plan(s) that collectively include each of the sections in Attachment 1 and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the cyber security plan(s). Additional examples of evidence per section are located in Attachment 2.

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall identify a **CIP senior manager** by name and document any change within **30 days** of the change. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Security Management Controls

CIP-003-AB-8



M3. An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated and approved document from a high level official designating the name of the individual identified as the **CIP senior manager**.

R4. The Responsible Entity shall implement a documented process to delegate authority, unless no delegations are used. Where allowed by the CIP **reliability standards**, the **CIP senior manager** may delegate authority for specific actions to a delegate or delegates. These delegations shall be documented, including the name or title of the delegate, the specific actions delegated, and the date of the delegation; approved by the **CIP senior manager**; and updated within 30 **days** of any change to the delegation. Delegation changes do not need to be reinstated with a change to the delegator. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

M4. An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated document, approved by the **CIP senior manager**, listing individuals (by name or title) who are delegated the authority to approve or authorize specifically identified items.

C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

- CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Changes
5	10/1/2017	Initial Alberta Version
8	10/1/2024	Addressed FERC directives from Order No. 791 and FERC Order No. 822. Specifically, from FERC Order No. 791: directives related to identify, assess, and correct language and communication networks, transient devices and low impact BES cyber systems. From FERC Order No. 822: directives related to (1) the definition of LERC and (2) transient devices

Attachment 1

Required Sections for Cyber Security Plan(s) for Assets Containing Low Impact **BES Cyber Systems**

Responsible Entities shall include each of the sections provided below in the cyber security plan(s) required under Requirement R2.

Responsible Entities with multiple-impact **BES cyber systems** ratings can utilize policies, procedures, and processes for their high or medium impact **BES cyber systems** to fulfill the sections for the development of low impact cyber security plan(s). Each Responsible Entity can develop a cyber security plan(s) either by individual asset or groups of assets.

Section 1. Cyber Security Awareness: Each Responsible Entity shall reinforce, at least once every 15 **months**, cyber security practices (which may include associated physical security practices).

Section 2. Physical Security Controls: Each Responsible Entity shall control physical access, based on need as determined by the Responsible Entity, to (1) the asset or the locations of the low impact **BES cyber systems** within the asset, and (2) the **cyber asset(s)**, as specified by the Responsible Entity, that provide electronic access control(s) implemented for Section 3.1, if any.

Section 3. Electronic Access Controls: For each asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)** identified pursuant to CIP-002, the Responsible Entity shall implement electronic access controls to:

3.1 Permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access as determined by the Responsible Entity for any communications that are:

- i. between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**;
- ii. using a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**; and
- iii. not used for time-sensitive protection or control functions between intelligent electronic devices (e.g., communications using protocol IEC TR-61850-90-5 R-GOOSE).

3.2 Authenticate all **dial-up connectivity**, if any, that provides access to low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, per **cyber asset** capability.

Section 4. Cyber Security Incident Response: Each Responsible Entity shall have one or more **cyber security incident** response plan(s), either by asset or group of assets, which shall include:

4.1 Identification, classification, and response to **cyber security incidents**;

4.2 Determination of whether an identified **cyber security incident** is a **reportable cyber security incident** and subsequent notification to the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), unless prohibited by law;

4.3 Identification of the roles and responsibilities for **cyber security incident** response by groups or individuals;

4.4 Incident handling for **cyber security incidents**;

4.5 Testing the **cyber security incident** response plan(s) at least once every 36 **months** by: (1) responding to an actual **reportable cyber security incident**; (2) using a drill or tabletop exercise of a **reportable cyber security incident**; or (3) using an operational exercise of a **reportable cyber security incident**; and

4.6 Updating the **cyber security incident** response plan(s), if needed, within 180 **days** after completion of a **cyber security incident** response plan(s) test or actual **reportable cyber security incident**.

Section 5. **Transient Cyber Asset** and **Removable Media** Malicious Code Risk Mitigation: Each Responsible Entity shall implement, except under **CIP exceptional circumstances**, one or more plan(s) to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of the introduction of malicious code to low impact **BES cyber systems** through the use of **transient cyber assets** or **removable media**. The plan(s) shall include:

5.1 For **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by the Responsible Entity, if any, the use of one or a combination of the following in an ongoing or on-demand manner (per **transient cyber asset** capability):

- Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of signatures or patterns;
- Application allowlisting; or
- Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.

5.2 For **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity, if any:

5.2.1 Use one or a combination of the following prior to connecting the **transient cyber asset** to a low impact **BES cyber system** (per **transient cyber asset** capability):

- Review of antivirus update level;
- Review of antivirus update process used by the party;
- Review of application allowlisting used by the party;
- Review use of live operating system and software executable only from read-only media;
- Review of system hardening used by the party; or
- Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.

5.2.2 For any method used pursuant to 5.2.1, Responsible Entities shall determine whether any additional mitigation actions are necessary and implement such actions prior to connecting the **transient cyber asset**.

5.3 For **removable media**, the use of each of the following:

5.3.1 Method(s) to detect malicious code on **removable media** using a **cyber asset** other than a **BES cyber system**; and

5.3.2 Mitigation of the threat of detected malicious code on the **removable media** prior to connecting **removable media** to a low impact **BES cyber system(s)**.

Attachment 2

Examples of Evidence for Cyber Security Plan(s) for Assets Containing Low Impact **BES Cyber Systems**

Section 1. Cyber Security Awareness: An example of evidence for Section 1 may include, but is not limited to, documentation that the reinforcement of cyber security practices occurred at least once every **15 months**. The evidence could be documentation through one or more of the following methods:

- Direct communications (for example, e-mails, memos, or computer-based training);
- Indirect communications (for example, posters, intranet, or brochures); or
- Management support and reinforcement (for example, presentations or meetings).

Section 2. Physical Security Controls: Examples of evidence for Section 2 may include, but are not limited to:

- Documentation of the selected access control(s) (e.g., card key, locks, perimeter controls), monitoring controls (e.g., alarm systems, human observation), or other operational, procedural, or technical physical security controls that control physical access to both:
 - a. The asset, if any, or the locations of the low impact **BES cyber systems** within the asset; and
 - b. The **cyber asset(s)** specified by the Responsible Entity that provide(s) electronic access controls implemented for Attachment 1, Section 3.1, if any.

Section 3. Electronic Access Controls: Examples of evidence for Section 3 may include, but are not limited to:

1. Documentation showing that at each asset or group of assets containing low impact **BES cyber systems**, routable communication between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset is restricted by electronic access controls to permit only inbound and outbound electronic access that the Responsible Entity deems necessary, except where an entity provides rationale that communication is used for time-sensitive protection or control functions between intelligent electronic devices. Examples of such documentation may include, but are not limited to representative diagrams that illustrate control of inbound and outbound communication(s) between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)** or lists of implemented electronic access controls (e.g., access control lists restricting IP addresses, ports, or services; implementing unidirectional gateways).
2. Documentation of authentication for **dial-up connectivity** (e.g., dial out only to a preprogrammed number to deliver data, dial-back modems, modems that must be remotely controlled by the **control centre** or control room, or access control on the **BES cyber system**).

Section 4. Cyber Security Incident Response: An example of evidence for Section 4 may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation, such as policies, procedures, or process documents of one or more **cyber security incident** response plan(s) developed either by asset or group of assets that include the following processes:

1. to identify, classify, and respond to **cyber security incidents**; to determine whether an identified **cyber security incident** is a **reportable cyber security incident** and for notifying the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC);
2. to identify and document the roles and responsibilities for **cyber security incident** response by groups or individuals (e.g., initiating, documenting, monitoring, reporting, etc.);

3. for incident handling of a **cyber security incident** (e.g., containment, eradication, or recovery/incident resolution);
4. for testing the plan(s) along with the dated documentation that a test has been completed at least once every 36 **months**; and
5. to update, as needed, **cyber security incident** response plan(s) within 180 **days** after completion of a test or actual **reportable cyber security incident**.

Section 5. **Transient Cyber Asset** and **Removable Media** Malicious Code Risk Mitigation:

1. Examples of evidence for Section 5.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to mitigate the introduction of malicious code such as antivirus software and processes for managing signature or pattern updates, application allowlisting practices, processes to restrict communication, or other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the vendor or Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.
2. Examples of evidence for Section 5.2.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail or procedures that document a review of the installed antivirus update level; memoranda, electronic mail, system documentation, policies or contracts from the party other than the Responsible Entity that identify the antivirus update process, the use of application allowlisting, use of live operating systems or system hardening performed by the party other than the Responsible Entity; evidence from change management systems, electronic mail or contracts that identifies the Responsible Entity's acceptance that the practices of the party other than the Responsible Entity are acceptable; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate malicious code for **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the Responsible Entity or the party other than the Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.

Examples of evidence for Attachment 1, Section 5.2.2 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail, or contracts that identifies a review to determine whether additional mitigation is necessary and has been implemented prior to connecting the **transient cyber asset** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity.

3. Examples of evidence for Section 5.3.1 may include, but are not limited to, documented process(es) of the method(s) used to detect malicious code such as results of scan settings for **removable media**, or implementation of on-demand scanning. Examples of evidence for Section 5.3.2 may include, but are not limited to, documented process(es) for the method(s) used for mitigating the threat of detected malicious code on **removable media**, such as logs from the method(s) used to detect malicious code that show the results of scanning and the mitigation of detected malicious code on **removable media** or documented confirmation by the entity that the **removable media** was deemed to be free of malicious code.

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Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the **reliability standards** provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of functional entities to which the **reliability standard** applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2.

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the **reliability standard**. In addition to the set of **bulk electric system** facilities, **control centres**, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**.

Requirement R1:

In developing policies in compliance with Requirement R1, the number of policies and their content should be guided by a Responsible Entity's management structure and operating conditions. Policies might be included as part of a general information security program for the entire organization, or as components of specific programs. The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to develop a single comprehensive cyber security policy covering the required topics, or it may choose to develop a single high-level umbrella policy and provide additional policy detail in lower level documents in its documentation hierarchy. In the case of a high-level umbrella policy, the Responsible Entity would be expected to provide the high-level policy as well as the additional documentation in order to demonstrate compliance with CIP-003-AB-8, Requirement R1.

If a Responsible Entity has any high or medium impact **BES cyber systems**, the one or more cyber security policies must cover the nine subject matter areas required by CIP-003-AB-8, Requirement R1, Part 1.1. If a Responsible Entity has identified from CIP-002 any assets containing low impact **BES cyber systems**, the one or more cyber security policies must cover the six subject matter areas required by Requirement R1, Part 1.2.

Responsible Entities that have multiple-impact rated **BES cyber systems** are not required to create separate cyber security policies for high, medium, or low impact **BES cyber systems**. The Responsible Entities have the flexibility to develop policies that cover all three impact ratings.

Implementation of the cyber security policy is not specifically included in CIP-003-AB-8, Requirement R1 as it is envisioned that the implementation of this policy is evidenced through successful implementation of CIP-003 through CIP-011. However, Responsible Entities are encouraged not to limit the scope of their cyber security policies to only those requirements in cyber security **reliability standards**, but to develop a holistic cyber security policy appropriate for its organization. Elements of a policy that extend beyond the scope of cyber security **reliability standards** will not be considered candidates for potential violations although they will help demonstrate the organization's internal culture of compliance and posture towards cyber security.

For Part 1.1, the Responsible Entity may consider the following for each of the required topics in its one or more cyber security policies for medium and high impact **BES cyber systems**, if any:

1.1.1 Personnel and training (CIP-004)

- Organization position on acceptable background investigations
- Identification of possible disciplinary action for violating this policy
- Account management

1.1.2 **Electronic security perimeters** (CIP-005) including **interactive remote access**

- Organization stance on use of wireless networks
- Identification of acceptable authentication methods
- Identification of trusted and untrusted resources
- Monitoring and logging of ingress and egress at **electronic access points**
- Maintaining up-to-date anti-malware software before initiating **interactive remote access**
- Maintaining up-to-date patch levels for operating systems and applications used to initiate **interactive remote access**
- Disabling VPN “split-tunneling” or “dual-homed” workstations before initiating **interactive remote access**
- For vendors, contractors, or consultants: include language in contracts that requires adherence to the Responsible Entity’s **interactive remote access** controls

1.1.3 Physical security of **BES cyber systems** (CIP-006)

- Strategy for protecting **cyber assets** from unauthorized physical access
- Acceptable physical access control methods
- Monitoring and logging of physical ingress

1.1.4 System security management (CIP-007)

- Strategies for system hardening
- Acceptable methods of authentication and access control
- Password policies including length, complexity, enforcement, prevention of brute force attempts
- Monitoring and logging of **BES cyber systems**

1.1.5 Incident reporting and response planning (CIP-008)

- Recognition of **cyber security incidents**
- Appropriate notifications upon discovery of an incident
- Obligations to report **cyber security incidents**

1.1.6 Recovery plans for **BES cyber systems** (CIP-009)

- Availability of spare components
- Availability of system backups

1.1.7 Configuration change management and vulnerability assessments (CIP-010)

- Initiation of change requests
- Approval of changes
- Break-fix processes

1.1.8 Information protection (CIP-011)

- Information access control methods
- Notification of unauthorized information disclosure
- Information access on a need-to-know basis

1.1.9 Declaring and responding to **CIP exceptional circumstances**

- Processes to invoke special procedures in the event of a **CIP exceptional circumstance**
- Processes to allow for exceptions to policy that do not violate CIP requirements

For Part 1.2, the Responsible Entity may consider the following for each of the required topics in its one or more cyber security policies for assets containing low impact **BES cyber systems**, if any:

1.2.1 Cyber security awareness

- Method(s) for delivery of security awareness
- Identification of groups to receive cyber security awareness

1.2.2 Physical security controls

- Acceptable approach(es) for selection of physical security control(s)

1.2.3 Electronic access controls

- Acceptable approach(es) for selection of electronic access control(s)

1.2.4 **Cyber security incident** response

- Recognition of **cyber security incidents**
- Appropriate notifications upon discovery of an incident
- Obligations to report **cyber security incidents**

1.2.5 **Transient cyber assets** and **removable media** Malicious Code Risk Mitigation

- Acceptable use of **transient cyber asset(s)** and **removable media**
- Method(s) to mitigate the risk of the introduction of malicious code to low impact **BES cyber systems** from **transient cyber assets** and **removable media**
- Method(s) to request **transient cyber asset** and **removable media**

1.2.6 Declaring and responding to **CIP exceptional circumstances**

- Process(es) to declare a **CIP exceptional circumstance**
- Process(es) to respond to a declared **CIP exceptional circumstance**

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Requirements relating to exceptions to a Responsible Entity's security policies were removed because it is a general management issue that is not within the scope of a reliability requirement. It is an internal policy requirement and not a reliability requirement. However, Responsible Entities are encouraged to continue this practice as a component of their cyber security policies.

In this and all subsequent required approvals in the CIP **reliability standards**, the Responsible Entity may elect to use hardcopy or electronic approvals to the extent that there is sufficient evidence to ensure the authenticity of the approving party.

Requirement R2:

The intent of Requirement R2 is for each Responsible Entity to create, document, and implement one or more cyber security plan(s) that address the security objective for the protection of low impact **BES cyber systems**. The required protections are designed to be part of a program that covers the low impact **BES cyber systems** collectively at an asset level (based on the list of assets containing low impact **BES cyber systems** identified in CIP-002), but not at an individual device or system level.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1

As noted, Attachment 1 contains the sections that must be included in the cyber security plan(s). The intent is to allow entities that have a combination of high, medium, and low impact **BES cyber systems** the flexibility to choose, if desired, to cover their low impact **BES cyber systems** (or any subset) under their programs used for the high or medium impact **BES cyber systems** rather than maintain two separate programs. The purpose of the cyber security plan(s) in Requirement R2 is for Responsible Entities to use the cyber security plan(s) as a means of documenting their approaches to meeting the subject matter areas. The cyber security plan(s) can be used to reference other policies and procedures that demonstrate "how" the Responsible Entity is meeting each of the subject matter areas, or Responsible Entities can develop comprehensive cyber security plan(s) that contain all of the detailed implementation content solely within the cyber security plan itself. To meet the obligation for the cyber security plan, the expectation is that the cyber security plan contains or references sufficient details to address the implementation of each of the required subject matters areas.

Guidance for each of the subject matter areas of Attachment 1 is provided below.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 1 – Cyber Security Awareness

The intent of the cyber security awareness program is for entities to reinforce good cyber security practices with their personnel at least once every 15 **months**. The entity has the discretion to determine the topics to be addressed and the manner in which it will communicate these topics. As evidence of compliance, the Responsible Entity should be able to produce the awareness material that was delivered according to the delivery method(s) (e.g., posters, emails, or topics at staff meetings, etc.). The NERC standard drafting team did not intend for Responsible Entities to be required to maintain lists of recipients and track the reception of the awareness material by personnel.

Although the focus of the awareness is cyber security, it does not mean that only technology-related topics can be included in the program. Appropriate physical security topics (e.g., tailgating awareness and protection of badges for physical security, or "If you see something, say something" campaigns, etc.) are valid for cyber security awareness. The intent is to cover topics concerning any aspect of the protection of **BES cyber systems**.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 2 – Physical Security Controls

The Responsible Entity must document and implement methods to control physical access to (1) the asset or the locations of low impact **BES cyber systems** within the asset, and (2) **cyber assets** that

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implement the electronic access control(s) specified by the Responsible Entity in Attachment 1, Section 3.1, if any. If these **cyber assets** implementing the electronic access controls are located within the same asset as the low impact **BES cyber asset(s)** and inherit the same physical access controls and the same need as outlined in Section 2, this may be noted by the Responsible Entity in either its policies or cyber security plan(s) to avoid duplicate documentation of the same controls.

The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to select the methods used to meet the objective of controlling physical access to (1) the asset(s) containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)** or the low impact **BES cyber systems** themselves and (2) the electronic access control **cyber assets** specified by the Responsible Entity, if any. The Responsible Entity may use one or a combination of physical access controls, monitoring controls, or other operational, procedural, or technical physical security controls. Entities may use perimeter controls (e.g., fences with locked gates, guards, or site access policies, etc.) or more granular areas of physical access control in areas where low impact **BES cyber systems** are located, such as control rooms or control houses.

The security objective is to control the physical access based on need as determined by the Responsible Entity. The need for physical access can be documented at the policy level. The NERC standard drafting team did not intend to obligate an entity to specify a need for each physical access or authorization of an individual for physical access.

Monitoring as a physical security control can be used as a complement or an alternative to physical access control. Examples of monitoring controls include, but are not limited to: (1) alarm systems to detect motion or entry into a controlled area, or (2) human observation of a controlled area. Monitoring does not necessarily require logging and maintaining logs but could include monitoring that physical access has occurred or been attempted (e.g., door alarm, or human observation, etc.). The NERC standard drafting team's intent is that the monitoring does not need to be per low impact **BES cyber system** but should be at the appropriate level to meet the security objective of controlling physical access.

User authorization programs and lists of authorized users for physical access are not required although they are an option to meet the security objective.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 3 – Electronic Access Controls

Section 3 requires the establishment of electronic access controls for assets containing low impact **BES cyber systems** when there is routable protocol communication or **dial-up connectivity** between **cyber asset(s)** outside of the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** within such asset. The establishment of electronic access controls is intended to reduce the risks associated with uncontrolled communication using routable protocols or **dial-up connectivity**.

When implementing Attachment 1, Section 3.1, Responsible Entities should note that electronic access controls to permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access are required for communications when those communications meet all three of the criteria identified in Attachment 1, Section 3.1. The Responsible Entity should evaluate the communications and when all three criteria are met, the Responsible Entity must document and implement electronic access control(s).

When identifying electronic access controls, Responsible Entities are provided flexibility in the selection of the electronic access controls that meet their operational needs while meeting the security objective of allowing only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to low impact **BES cyber systems** that use routable protocols between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset.

In essence, the intent is for Responsible Entities to determine whether there is communication between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing low impact **BES**

cyber system(s) that uses a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset or **dial-up connectivity** to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. Where such communication is present, Responsible Entities should document and implement electronic access control(s). Where routable protocol communication for time-sensitive protection or control functions between intelligent electronic devices that meets the exclusion language is present, Responsible Entities should document that communication, but are not required to establish any specific electronic access controls.

The inputs to this requirement are the assets identified in CIP-002 as containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**; therefore, the determination of routable protocol communications or **dial-up connectivity** is an attribute of the asset. However, it is not intended for communication that provides no access to or from the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, but happens to be located at the asset with the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, to be evaluated for electronic access controls.

Electronic Access Control Exclusion

In order to avoid future technology issues, the obligations for electronic access controls exclude communications between intelligent electronic devices that use routable communication protocols for time-sensitive protection or control functions, such as IEC TR-61850-90-5 R-GOOSE messaging. Time-sensitive in this context generally means functions that would be negatively impacted by the latency introduced in the communications by the required electronic access controls. This time-sensitivity exclusion does not apply to SCADA communications which typically operate on scan rates of 2 seconds or greater. While technically time-sensitive, SCADA communications over routable protocols can withstand the delay introduced by electronic access controls. Examples of excluded time-sensitive communications are those communications which may necessitate the tripping of a breaker within a few cycles. A Responsible Entity using this technology is not expected to implement the electronic access controls noted herein. This exception was included so as not to inhibit the functionality of the time-sensitive characteristics related to this technology and not to preclude the use of such time-sensitive reliability enhancing functions if they use a routable protocol in the future.

Considerations for Determining Routable Protocol Communications

To determine whether electronic access controls need to be implemented, the Responsible Entity has to determine whether there is communication between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** that uses a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset.

When determining whether a routable protocol is entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, Responsible Entities have flexibility in identifying an approach. One approach is for Responsible Entities to identify an “electronic boundary” associated with the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. This is not an **electronic security perimeter** *per se*, but a demarcation that demonstrates the routable protocol communication entering or leaving the asset between a low impact **BES cyber system** and **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset to then have electronic access controls implemented. This electronic boundary may vary by asset type (control centre, substation, generation resource) and the specific configuration of the asset. If this approach is used, the intent is for the Responsible Entity to define the electronic boundary such that the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** located at the asset are contained within the “electronic boundary.” This is strictly for determining which routable protocol communications and networks are internal or inside or local to the asset and which are external to or outside the asset.

Alternatively, the Responsible Entity may find the concepts of what is inside and outside to be intuitively obvious for a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)** communicating to a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** inside the asset. This may be the case when a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** is communicating with a **cyber asset** many miles away and a clear and

unambiguous demarcation exists. In this case, a Responsible Entity may decide not to identify an “electronic boundary,” but rather to simply leverage the unambiguous asset demarcation to ensure that the electronic access controls are placed between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and the **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset.

Determining Electronic Access Controls

Once a Responsible Entity has determined that there is routable communication between a low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** that uses a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, the intent is for the Responsible Entity to document and implement its chosen electronic access control(s). The control(s) are intended to allow only “necessary” inbound and outbound electronic access as determined by the Responsible Entity. However the Responsible Entity chooses to document the inbound and outbound access permissions and the need, the intent is that the Responsible Entity is able to explain the reasons for the electronic access permitted. The reasoning for “necessary” inbound and outbound electronic access controls may be documented within the Responsible Entity’s cyber security plan(s), within a comment on an access control list, a database, spreadsheet or other policies or procedures associated with the electronic access controls.

Concept Diagrams

The diagrams on the following pages are provided as examples to illustrate various electronic access controls at a conceptual level. Regardless of the concepts or configurations chosen by the Responsible Entity, the intent is to achieve the security objective of permitting only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access for communication between low impact **BES cyber systems** and **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** using a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset.

NOTE:

- This is not an exhaustive list of applicable concepts.
- The same legend is used in each diagram; however, the diagram may not contain all of the articles represented in the legend.

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
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
Reference Model 1 – Host-based Inbound & Outbound Access Permissions

The Responsible Entity may choose to utilize a host-based firewall technology on the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** itself that manages the inbound and outbound electronic access permissions so that only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access is allowed between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and the **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. When permitting the inbound and outbound electronic access permissions using access control lists, the Responsible Entity could restrict communication(s) using source and destination addresses or ranges of addresses. Responsible Entities could also restrict communication(s) using ports or services based on the capability of the electronic access control, the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, or the application(s).



Reference Model 1

The Responsible Entity may choose to use a security device that permits only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** within the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. In this example, two low impact **BES cyber systems** are accessed using the routable protocol that is entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The IP/Serial converter is continuing the same communications session from the **cyber asset(s)** that are outside the asset to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The security device provides the electronic access controls to permit only necessary inbound and outbound routable protocol access to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. When permitting the inbound and outbound electronic access permissions using access control lists, the Responsible Entity could restrict communication(s) using source and destination addresses or ranges of addresses. Responsible Entities could also restrict communication(s) using ports or services based on the capability of the electronic access control, the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, or the application(s).



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
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
Reference Model 3 – Centralized Network-based Inbound & Outbound Access Permissions

The Responsible Entity may choose to utilize a security device at a centralized location that may or may not be at another asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The electronic access control(s) do not necessarily have to reside inside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. A security device is in place at “Location X” to act as the electronic access control and permit only necessary inbound and outbound routable protocol access between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and the **cyber asset(s)** outside each asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. Care should be taken that electronic access to or between each asset is through the **cyber asset(s)** determined by the Responsible Entity to be performing electronic access controls at the centralized location. When permitting the inbound and outbound electronic access permissions using access control lists, the Responsible Entity could restrict communication(s) using source and destination addresses or ranges of addresses. Responsible Entities could also restrict communication(s) using ports or services based on the capability of the electronic access control, the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, or the application(s).



Reference Model 4 – Uni-directional Gateway

The Responsible Entity may choose to utilize a uni-directional gateway as the electronic access control. The low impact **BES cyber system(s)** is not accessible (data cannot flow into the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**) using the routable protocol entering the asset due to the implementation of a “one-way” (uni-directional) path for data to flow. The uni-directional gateway is configured to permit only the necessary outbound communications using the routable protocol communication leaving the asset.



Reference Model 4

Alberta Reliability Standard


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Reference Model 5 – User Authentication

This reference model demonstrates that Responsible Entities have flexibility in choosing electronic access controls so long as the security objective of the requirement is met. The Responsible Entity may choose to utilize a non-**BES cyber asset** located at the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system** that requires authentication for communication from the **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset. This non- **BES cyber system** performing the authentication permits only authenticated communication to connect to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, meeting the first half of the security objective to permit only necessary inbound electronic access. Additionally, the non- **BES cyber system** performing authentication is configured such that it permits only necessary outbound communication meeting the second half of the security objective. Often, the outbound communications would be controlled in this network architecture by permitting no communication to be initiated from the low impact **BES cyber system**. This configuration may be beneficial when the only communication to a device is for user-initiated interactive access.



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
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Reference Model 6 – Indirect Access

In implementing its electronic access controls, the Responsible Entity may identify that it has indirect access between the low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system** through a non-BES **cyber asset** located within the asset. This indirect access meets the criteria of having communication between the low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system**. In this reference model, it is intended that the Responsible Entity implement electronic access controls that permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to the low impact **BES cyber system**. Consistent with the other reference models provided, the electronic access in this reference model is controlled using the security device that is restricting the communication that is entering or leaving the asset.



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
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Reference Model 7 – Electronic Access Controls at assets containing low impact BES cyber systems and ERC

In this reference model, there is both a routable protocol entering and leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** that is used by **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset and **external routable connectivity** because there is at least one medium impact **BES cyber system** and one low impact **BES cyber system** within the asset using the routable protocol communications. The Responsible Entity may choose to leverage an interface on the medium impact **electronic access control or monitoring systems** to provide electronic access controls for purposes of CIP-003. The **electronic access control or monitoring system** is therefore performing multiple functions – as a medium impact **electronic access control or monitoring system** and as implementing electronic access controls for an asset containing low impact **BES cyber systems**.



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
CIP-003-AB-8



Reference Model 8 – Physical Isolation and Serial Non-routable Communications – No Electronic Access Controls Required

In this reference model, the criteria from Attachment 1, Section 3.1 requiring the implementation of electronic access controls are not met. This reference model demonstrates three concepts:

- 1) The physical isolation of the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** from the routable protocol communication entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, commonly referred to as an 'air gap', mitigates the need to implement the required electronic access controls;
- 2) The communication to the low impact **BES cyber system** from a **cyber asset** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** using only a serial non-routable protocol where such communication is entering or leaving the asset mitigates the need to implement the required electronic access controls.
- 3) The routable protocol communication between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and other **cyber asset(s)**, such as the second low impact **BES cyber system** depicted, may exist without needing to implement the required electronic access controls so long as the routable protocol communications never leaves the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**.



Reference Model 8

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
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Reference Model 9 – Logical Isolation - No Electronic Access Controls Required

In this reference model, the criteria from Attachment 1, Section 3.1 requiring the implementation of electronic access controls are not met. The Responsible Entity has logically isolated the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** from the routable protocol communication entering or leaving the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The logical network segmentation in this reference model permits no communication between a low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset. Additionally, no indirect access exists because those non-**BES cyber assets** that are able to communicate outside the asset are strictly prohibited from communicating to the low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The low impact **BES cyber system(s)** is on an isolated network segment with logical controls preventing routable protocol communication into or out of the network containing the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and these communications never leave the asset using a routable protocol.



Reference Model 9

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
Reference Model 10 - Serial Non-routable Communications Traversing an Isolated Channel on a Non-routable Transport Network – No Electronic Access Controls Required

In this reference model, the criteria from Attachment 1, Section 3.1 requiring the implementation of electronic access controls are not met. This reference model depicts communication between a low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset containing the low impact **BES cyber system** over a serial non-routable protocol which is transported across a wide-area network using a protocol independent transport that may carry routable and non-routable communication such as a Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) network, a Synchronous Optical Network (SONET), or a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. While there is routable protocol communication entering or leaving the asset containing low impact **BES cyber systems** and there is communication between a low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset, the communication between the low impact **BES cyber system** and the **cyber asset** outside the asset is not using the routable protocol communication. This model is related to Reference Model 9 in that it relies on logical isolation to prohibit the communication between a low impact **BES cyber system** and a **cyber asset** outside the asset from using a routable protocol.

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Reference Model 10

Dial-up Connectivity

Dial-up connectivity to a low impact **BES cyber system** is set to dial out only (no auto-answer) to a preprogrammed number to deliver data. Incoming **dial-up connectivity** is to a dialback modem, a modem that must be remotely controlled by the **control centre** or control room, has some form of access control, or the low impact **BES cyber system** has access control.

Insufficient Access Controls

Some examples of situations that would lack sufficient access controls to meet the intent of this requirement include:

- An asset has **dial-up connectivity** and a low impact **BES cyber system** is reachable via an auto-answer modem that connects any caller to the **cyber asset** that has a default password. There is no practical access control in this instance.
- A low impact **BES cyber system** has a wireless card on a public carrier that allows the **BES cyber system** to be reachable via a public IP address. In essence, low impact **BES cyber systems** should not be accessible from the Internet and search engines such as Shodan.
- Dual-homing or multiple-network interface cards without disabling IP forwarding in the non-**BES cyber asset** within the DMZ to provide separation between the low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and the external network would not meet the intent of “controlling” inbound and outbound electronic access assuming there was no other host-based firewall or other security devices on the non- **BES cyber asset**.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 4 – Cyber Security Incident Response

The entity should have one or more documented **cyber security incident** response plan(s) that include each of the topics listed in Section 4. If, in the normal course of business, suspicious activities are noted at an asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**, the intent is for the entity to implement a **cyber security incident** response plan that will guide the entity in responding to the incident and reporting the incident if it rises to the level of a **reportable cyber security incident**.

Entities are provided the flexibility to develop their Attachment 1, Section 4 **cyber security incident** response plan(s) by asset or group of assets. The plans do not need to be on a per asset site or per low impact **BES cyber system** basis. Entities can choose to use a single enterprise-wide plan to fulfill the obligations for low impact **BES cyber systems**.

The plan(s) must be tested once every 36 **months**. This is not an exercise per low impact **BES cyber asset** or per type of **BES cyber asset** but rather is an exercise of each incident response plan the entity created to meet this requirement. An actual **reportable cyber security incident** counts as an exercise as do other forms of tabletop exercises or drills. NERC-led exercises such as GridEx participation would also count as an exercise provided the entity’s response plan is followed. The intent of the requirement is for entities to keep the **cyber security incident** response plan(s) current, which includes updating the plan(s), if needed, within 180 **days** following a test or an actual incident.

For low impact **BES cyber systems**, the only portion of the definition of **cyber security incident** that would apply is, “A malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of a **BES cyber system**.” The other portion of that definition is not to be used to require **electronic security perimeters** and **physical security perimeters** for low impact **BES cyber systems**.

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Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 5 – **Transient Cyber Assets** and **Removable Media** Malicious Code Risk Mitigation

Most **BES cyber assets** and **BES cyber systems** are isolated from external public or untrusted networks, and therefore **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** are needed to transport files to and from secure areas to maintain, monitor, or troubleshoot critical systems. **Transient cyber assets** and **removable media** are a potential means for cyber-attack. To protect the **BES cyber assets** and **BES cyber systems**, CIP-003 Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 5 requires Responsible Entities to document and implement a plan for how they will mitigate the risk of malicious code introduction to low impact **BES cyber systems** from **transient cyber assets** and **removable media**. The approach of defining a plan allows the Responsible Entity to document processes that are supportable within its organization and in alignment with its change management processes.

Transient cyber assets can be one of many types of devices from a specially-designed device for maintaining equipment in support of the **bulk electric system** to a platform such as a laptop, desktop, or tablet that may interface with or run applications that support **BES cyber systems** and is capable of transmitting executable code to the **BES cyber asset(s)** or **BES cyber system(s)**. Note: **cyber assets** connected to a **BES cyber system** for less than 30 days due to an unplanned removal, such as premature failure, are not intended to be identified as **transient cyber assets**. **Removable media** subject to this requirement include, among others, floppy disks, compact disks, USB flash drives, external hard drives, and other flash memory cards/drives that contain nonvolatile memory.

Examples of these temporarily connected devices include, but are not limited to:

- Diagnostic test equipment;
- Equipment used for **BES cyber system** maintenance; or
- Equipment used for **BES cyber system** configuration.

To meet the objective of mitigating risks associated with the introduction of malicious code at low impact **BES cyber systems**, Section 5 specifies the capabilities and possible security methods available to Responsible Entities based upon asset type and ownership.

With the list of options provided in Attachment 1, the entity has the discretion to use the option(s) that is most appropriate. This includes documenting its approach for how and when the entity reviews the **transient cyber asset** under its control or under the control of parties other than the Responsible Entity. The entity should avoid implementing a security function that jeopardizes reliability by taking actions that would negatively impact the performance or support of the **transient cyber asset** or **BES cyber asset**.

Malicious Code Risk Mitigation

The terms “mitigate”, “mitigating”, and “mitigation” are used in Section 5 in Attachment 1 to address the risks posed by malicious code when connecting **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** to **BES cyber systems**. Mitigation is intended to mean that entities reduce security risks presented by connecting the **transient cyber asset** or **removable media**. When determining the method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code, it is not intended for entities to perform and document a formal risk assessment associated with the introduction of malicious code.

Per **Transient Cyber Asset** Capability

As with other CIP **reliability standards**, the requirements are intended for an entity to use the method(s) that the system is capable of performing. The use of “per **transient cyber asset** capability” is to eliminate the need for a **technical feasibility exception** when it is understood that the device cannot use a method(s). For example, for malicious code, many types of appliances are not capable of implementing

antivirus software; therefore, because it is not a capability of those types of devices, implementation of the antivirus software would not be required for those devices.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 5.1 - **Transient Cyber Asset(s)** Managed by the Responsible Entity

For **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** that are connected to both low impact and medium/high impact **BES cyber systems**, entities must be aware of the differing levels of requirements and manage these assets under the program that matches the highest impact level to which they will connect.

Section 5.1: Entities are to document and implement their plan(s) to mitigate malicious code through the use of one or more of the protective measures listed, based on the capability of the **transient cyber asset**.

The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to apply the selected method(s) to meet the objective of mitigating the introductions of malicious code either in an on-going or in an on-demand manner. An example of managing a device in an on-going manner is having the antivirus solution for the device managed as part of an end-point security solution with current signature or pattern updates, regularly scheduled systems scans, etc. In contrast, for devices that are used infrequently and the signatures or patterns are not kept current, the entity may manage those devices in an on-demand manner by requiring an update to the signatures or patterns and a scan of the device before the device is connected to ensure that it is free of malicious code.

Selecting management in an on-going or on-demand manner is not intended to imply that the control has to be verified at every single connection. For example, if the device is managed in an on-demand manner, but will be used to perform maintenance on several **BES cyber asset(s)**, the Responsible Entity may choose to document that the **transient cyber asset** has been updated before being connected as a **transient cyber asset** for the first use of that maintenance work. The intent is not to require a log documenting each connection of a **transient cyber asset** to a **BES cyber asset**.

The following is additional discussion of the methods to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.

- Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of signatures or patterns, provides flexibility to manage **transient cyber asset(s)** by deploying antivirus or endpoint security tools that maintain a scheduled update of the signatures or patterns. Also, for devices that do not regularly connect to receive scheduled updates, entities may choose to update the signatures or patterns and scan the **transient cyber asset** prior to connection to ensure no malicious software is present.
- Application allowlisting is a method of authorizing only the applications and processes that are necessary on the **transient cyber asset**. This reduces the risk that malicious software could execute on the **transient cyber asset** and impact the **BES cyber asset** or **BES cyber system**.
- When using methods other than those listed, entities need to document how the other method(s) meet the objective of mitigating the risk of the introduction of malicious code.

If malicious code is discovered on the **transient cyber asset**, it must be mitigated prior to connection to a **BES cyber system** to prevent the malicious code from being introduced into the **BES cyber system**. An entity may choose to not connect the **transient cyber asset** to a **BES cyber system** to prevent the malicious code from being introduced into the **BES cyber system**. Entities should also consider whether the detected malicious code is a **cyber security incident**.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 5.2 - **Transient Cyber Asset(s)** Managed by a Party Other than the Responsible Entity

Section 5 also recognizes the lack of direct control over **transient cyber assets** that are managed by parties other than the Responsible Entity. This lack of control, however, does not obviate the Responsible Entity's responsibility to ensure that methods have been deployed to mitigate the introduction of malicious code to low impact **BES cyber system(s)** from **transient cyber assets** it does not manage. Section 5 requires entities to review the other party's security practices with respect to **transient cyber assets** to help meet the objective of the requirement. The use of "prior to connecting the **transient cyber assets**" is intended to ensure that the Responsible Entity conducts the review before the first connection of the **transient cyber asset** to help meet the objective to mitigate the introduction of malicious code. The NERC standard drafting team did not intend for the Responsible Entity to conduct a review for every single connection of that **transient cyber asset** once the Responsible Entity has established the **transient cyber asset** is meeting the security objective. The intent is to not require a log documenting each connection of a **transient cyber asset** to a **BES cyber asset**.

To facilitate these controls, Responsible Entities may execute agreements with other parties to provide support services to **BES cyber systems** and **BES cyber assets** that may involve the use of **transient cyber assets**. Entities may consider using the Department of Energy Cybersecurity Procurement Language for Energy Delivery dated April 2014.¹ Procurement language may unify the other party and entity actions supporting the **BES cyber systems** and **BES cyber assets**. CIP program attributes may be considered including roles and responsibilities, access controls, monitoring, logging, vulnerability, and patch management along with incident response and back up recovery may be part of the other party's support. Entities may consider the "General Cybersecurity Procurement Language" and "The Supplier's Life Cycle Security Program" when drafting Master Service Agreements, Contracts, and the CIP program processes and controls.

Section 5.2.1: Entities are to document and implement their process(es) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code through the use of one or more of the protective measures listed.

- Review the use of antivirus software and signature or pattern levels to ensure that the level is adequate to the Responsible Entity to mitigate the risk of malicious software being introduced to an applicable system.
- Review the antivirus or endpoint security processes of the other party to ensure that their processes are adequate to the Responsible Entity to mitigate the risk of introducing malicious software to an applicable system.
- Review the use of application allowlisting used by the other party to mitigate the risk of introducing malicious software to an applicable system.
- Review the use of live operating systems or software executable only from read-only media to ensure that the media is free from malicious software itself. Entities should review the processes to build the read-only media as well as the media itself.
- Review system hardening practices used by the other party to ensure that unnecessary ports, services, applications, etc. have been disabled or removed. This method intends to reduce the attack surface on the **transient cyber asset** and reduce the avenues by which malicious software could be introduced.

¹ [Department of Energy](http://www.energy.gov), *Cybersecurity Procurement Language for Energy Delivery*, April 2014, Available at: www.energy.gov.

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Section 5.2.2: The intent of this section is to ensure that after conducting the selected review from Section 5.2.1, if there are deficiencies identified, actions mitigating the risk of the introduction of malicious code to low impact **BES cyber systems** must be completed prior to connecting the device(s) to an applicable system.

Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 5.3 - Removable Media

Entities have a high level of control for **removable media** that are going to be connected to their **BES cyber assets**.

Section 5.3: Entities are to document and implement their process(es) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code through the use of one or more method(s) to detect malicious code on the **removable media** before it is connected to a **BES cyber asset**. When using the method(s) to detect malicious code, it is expected to occur from a system that is not part of the **BES cyber system** to reduce the risk of propagating malicious code into the **BES cyber system** network or onto one of the **BES cyber assets**. If malicious code is discovered, it must be removed or mitigated to prevent it from being introduced into the **BES cyber asset** or **BES cyber system**. Entities should also consider whether the detected malicious code is a **cyber security incident**. Frequency and timing of the methods used to detect malicious code were intentionally excluded from the requirement because there are multiple timing scenarios that can be incorporated into a plan to mitigate the risk of malicious code. The NERC standard drafting team did not intend to obligate a Responsible Entity to conduct a review for every single connection of **removable media**, but rather to implement its plan(s) in a manner that protects all **BES cyber systems** where **removable media** may be used. The intent is to not require a log documenting each connection of **removable media** to a **BES cyber asset**.

As a method to detect malicious code, entities may choose to use **removable media** with on-board malicious code detection tools. For these tools, the **removable media** are still used in conjunction with a **cyber asset** to perform the detection. For Section 5.3.1, the **cyber asset** used to perform the malicious code detection must be outside of the **BES cyber system**.

Requirement R3:

The intent of CIP-003-AB-8, Requirement R3 is effectively unchanged since prior versions of the **reliability standard**. It is expected that the **CIP senior manager** will play a key role in ensuring proper strategic planning, executive/board-level awareness, and overall program governance.

Requirement R4:

As indicated in the rationale for CIP-003-AB-8, Requirement R4, this requirement is intended to demonstrate a clear line of authority and ownership for security matters. The intent of the NERC standard drafting team was not to impose any particular organizational structure, but, rather, the intent is to afford the Responsible Entity significant flexibility to adapt this requirement to its existing organizational structure. A Responsible Entity may satisfy this requirement through a single delegation document or through multiple delegation documents. The Responsible Entity can make use of the delegation of the delegation authority itself to increase the flexibility in how this applies to its organization. In such a case, delegations may exist in numerous documentation records as long as the collection of these documentation records shows a clear line of authority back to the **CIP senior manager**. In addition, the **CIP senior manager** could also choose not to delegate any authority and meet this requirement without such delegation documentation.

The Responsible Entity must keep its documentation of the **CIP senior manager** and any delegations up-to-date. This is to ensure that individuals do not assume any undocumented authority. However, delegations do not have to be re-instated if the individual who delegated the task changes roles or the individual is replaced. For instance, assume that John Doe is named the **CIP senior manager** and he

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delegates a specific task to the Substation Maintenance Manager. If John Doe is replaced as the **CIP senior manager**, the **CIP senior manager** documentation must be updated within the specified timeframe, but the existing delegation to the Substation Maintenance Manager remains in effect as approved by the previous **CIP senior manager**, John Doe.

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Rationale:

During development of this **reliability standard**, text boxes were embedded within the **reliability standard** to explain the rationale for various parts of the **reliability standard**. Upon NERC Board of Trustees approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

One or more security policies enable effective implementation of the requirements of the cyber security **reliability standards**. The purpose of policies is to provide a management and governance foundation for all requirements that apply to a Responsible Entity's **BES cyber systems**. The Responsible Entity can demonstrate through its policies that its management supports the accountability and responsibility necessary for effective implementation of the requirements.

Annual review and approval of the cyber security policies ensures that the policies are kept-up-to-date and periodically reaffirms management's commitment to the protection of its **BES cyber systems**.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

In response to FERC Order No. 791, Requirement R2 requires entities to develop and implement cyber security plans to meet specific security control objectives for assets containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. The cyber security plan(s) covers five subject matter areas: (1) cyber security awareness; (2) physical security controls; (3) electronic access controls; (4) **cyber security incident** response; and (5) **transient cyber asset** and **removable media** Malicious Code Risk Mitigation. This plan(s), along with the cyber security policies required under Requirement R1, Part 1.2, provides a framework for operational, procedural, and technical safeguards for low impact **BES cyber systems**.

Considering the varied types of low impact **BES cyber systems** across the **bulk electric system**, Attachment 1 provides Responsible Entities flexibility on how to apply the security controls to meet the security objectives. Additionally, because many Responsible Entities have multiple-impact rated **BES cyber systems**, nothing in the requirement prohibits entities from using their high and medium impact **BES cyber system** policies, procedures, and processes to implement security controls required for low impact **BES cyber systems**, as detailed in Requirement R2, Attachment 1.

Responsible Entities will use their identified assets containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)** (developed pursuant to CIP-002) to substantiate the sites or locations associated with low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. However, there is no requirement or compliance expectation for Responsible Entities to maintain a list(s) of individual low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and their associated **cyber assets** or to maintain a list of authorized users.

Rationale for Modifications to Sections 2 and 3 of Attachment 1 (Requirement R2):

Requirement R2 mandates that entities develop and implement one or more cyber security plan(s) to meet specific security objectives for assets containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. In Paragraph 73 of FERC Order No. 822, the Commission directed NERC to modify "...the Low Impact External Routable Connectivity definition to reflect the commentary in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-003-6...to provide needed clarity to the definition and eliminate ambiguity surrounding the term 'direct' as it is used in the proposed definition...within one year of the effective date of this Final Rule."

The revisions to Section 3 incorporate select language from the Low Impact **external routable connectivity** definition into Attachment 1 and focus the requirement on implementing electronic access controls for asset(s) containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. This change requires the Responsible Entity to permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access when using a routable protocol entering or leaving the asset between low impact **BES cyber system(s)** and a **cyber asset(s)** outside the asset containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. When this communication is present, Responsible

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Entities are required to implement electronic access controls unless that communication meets the following exclusion language (previously in the definition of Low Impact **external routable connectivity**) contained in romanette (iii): “not used for time-sensitive protection or control functions between intelligent electronic devices (e.g. communications using protocol IEC TR-61850-90-5 R-GOOSE)”.

The revisions to Section 2 of Attachment 1 complement the revisions to Section 3; consequently, the requirement now mandates the Responsible Entity control physical access to “the **cyber asset(s)**, as specified by the Responsible Entity, that provide electronic access control(s) implemented for Section 3.1, if any.” The focus on electronic access controls rather than on the Low Impact **BES cyber system electronic access points** eliminates the need for Low Impact **BES cyber system electronic access points**.

Rationale for Section 5 of Attachment 1 (Requirement R2):

Requirement R2 mandates that entities develop and implement one or more cyber security plan(s) to meet specific security objectives for assets containing low impact **BES cyber system(s)**. In Paragraph 32 of FERC Order No. 822, the Commission directed NERC to “...provide mandatory protection for transient devices used at Low Impact **BES cyber systems** based on the risk posed to bulk electric system reliability.” Transient devices are potential vehicles for introducing malicious code into low impact **BES cyber systems**. Section 5 of Attachment 1 is intended to mitigate the risk of malware propagation to the **bulk electric system** through low impact **BES cyber systems** by requiring entities to develop and implement one or more plan(s) to address the risk. The cyber security plan(s) along with the cyber security policies required under Requirement R1, Part 1.2, provide a framework for operational, procedural, and technical safeguards for low impact **BES cyber systems**.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

The identification and documentation of the single **CIP senior manager** ensures that there is clear authority and ownership for the CIP program within an organization, as called for in Blackout Report² Recommendation 43. The language that identifies **CIP senior manager** responsibilities is included in the AESO’s *Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary* used in **reliability standards** so that it may be used across the body of CIP **reliability standards** without an explicit cross-reference.

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 296, requests consideration of whether the single senior manager should be a corporate officer or equivalent. As implicated through the defined term, the senior manager has “the overall authority and responsibility for leading and managing implementation of the requirements within this set of **reliability standards**” which ensures that the **CIP senior manager** is of sufficient position in the Responsible Entity to ensure that cyber security receives the prominence that is necessary. In addition, given the range of business models for responsible entities, from municipal, cooperative, federal agencies, investor owned utilities, privately owned utilities, and everything in between, the NERC standard drafting team believes that requiring the **CIP senior manager** to be a “corporate officer or equivalent” would be extremely difficult to interpret and enforce on a consistent basis.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

The intent of the requirement is to ensure clear accountability within an organization for certain security matters. It also ensures that delegations are kept up-to-date and that individuals do not assume undocumented authority.

In FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 379 and 381, the Commission notes that Recommendation 43 of the 2003 Blackout Report calls for “clear lines of authority and ownership for security matters.” With this in

² U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, *Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendation*, Available at: www.epa.gov.

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mind, the NERC standard drafting team has sought to provide clarity in the requirement for delegations so that this line of authority is clear and apparent from the documented delegations.

A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security — Personnel & Training

2. Number: CIP-004-AB-7

3. Purpose: To minimize the risk against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system** from individuals accessing **BES cyber systems** by requiring an appropriate level of personnel risk assessment, training, security awareness, and access management in support of protecting **BES cyber systems**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.1.2.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.1.2.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to an **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. Is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. Performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to **transmission facility** or **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from **reliability standard** CIP-004-AB-7

4.2.3.1. cyber assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates: See CIP-PLAN-AB-3, *Cyber Security Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*

6. Background: **Reliability standard** CIP-004 exists as part of a suite of CIP **reliability standards** related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems**

and require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to **BES cyber systems**.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the common subject matter of the requirements.

The term documented processes refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms program and plan are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term program may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the **reliability standards** include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms program and plan do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the **reliability standards**.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact **BES cyber systems**. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple **BES cyber systems**.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the **reliability standards**, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**. This particular threshold of 300 MW for **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding** was provided in Version 1 of the NERC CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding**, which are last ditch efforts to save the **bulk electric system**. A review of **underfrequency load shedding** tolerances defined within **reliability standards** for **underfrequency load shedding** program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable **underfrequency load shedding** operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 and any amendments made thereto from time to time identification and categorization processes.

- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 and any amendments made thereto from time to time identification and categorization processes.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity – Only applies to medium impact **BES cyber systems** with **external routable connectivity**. This also excludes **cyber assets** in the **BES cyber system** that cannot be directly accessed through **external routable connectivity**.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems – Applies to each **electronic access control or monitoring system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- Physical Access Control Systems – Applies to each **physical access control system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program*.

[Alberta Risk Rating: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

M1. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Security awareness that, at least once each calendar quarter, reinforces cyber security practices (which may include associated physical security practices) for the Responsible Entity's personnel who have authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES cyber systems .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that the quarterly reinforcement has been provided. Examples of evidence of reinforcement may include, but are not limited to, dated copies of information used to reinforce security awareness, as well as evidence of distribution, such as: • direct communications (for example, e-mails, memos, computer-based training); or • indirect communications (for example, posters, intranet, or brochures); or • management support and reinforcement (for example, presentations or meetings).

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more cyber security training program(s) appropriate to individual roles, functions, or responsibilities that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program*. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

M2. Evidence must include the training program that includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the program(s).

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Training content on: 2.1.1. Cyber security policies; 2.1.2. Physical access controls; 2.1.3. Electronic access controls; 2.1.4. The visitor control program; 2.1.5. Handling of BES cyber system information and its storage; 2.1.6. Identification of a cyber security incident and initial notifications in accordance with the entity's incident response plan; 2.1.7. Recovery plans for BES cyber systems; 2.1.8. Response to cyber security incident; and 2.1.9. Cyber security risks associated with a BES cyber system's electronic interconnectivity and interoperability with other cyber assets, including transient cyber assets, and with removable media.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, training material such as power point presentations, instructor notes, student notes, handouts, or other training materials.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Require completion of the training specified in Part 2.1 prior to granting authorized electronic access and authorized unescorted physical access to applicable cyber assets, except during CIP exceptional circumstances.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, training records and documentation of when CIP exceptional circumstances were invoked.
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control	Require completion of the training specified in Part 2.1 at least once every 15 months.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated individual training records.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems		

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R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented personnel risk assessment program(s) to attain and retain authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to **BES cyber systems** that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M3. Evidence must include the documented personnel risk assessment programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the program(s).

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Process to confirm identity.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity's process to confirm identity.
3.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable	Process to perform a seven year criminal history records check as part of each personnel risk assessment that includes: 3.2.1 current residence, regardless of duration; and 3.2.2. other locations where, during the seven years immediately prior to the date of the criminal history records check, the subject has resided	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity's process to perform a seven year criminal history records check.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	for six consecutive months or more. If it is not possible to perform a full seven year criminal history records check, conduct as much of the seven year criminal history records check as possible and document the reason the full seven year criminal history records check could not be performed.	
3.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	Criteria or process to evaluate criminal history records checks for authorizing access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity's process to evaluate criminal history records checks.
3.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	Criteria or process for verifying that personnel risk assessments performed for contractors or service vendors are conducted according to Parts 3.1 through 3.3.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity's criteria or process for verifying contractors or service vendors personnel risk assessments.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems		
3.5	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Process to ensure that individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access have had a personnel risk assessment completed according to Parts 3.1 to 3.4 within the last seven years.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity's process for ensuring that individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access have had a personnel risk assessment completed within the last seven years.

R4. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented access management program(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R4 – Access Management Program*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].

M4. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R4 – Access Management Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate that the access management program was implemented as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R4 – Access Management Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Process to authorize based on need, as determined by the Responsible Entity, except for CIP exceptional circumstances: 4.1.1 Electronic access; and 4.1.2 Unescorted physical access into a physical security perimeter	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation of the process to authorize electronic access, and unescorted physical access in a physical security perimeter.
4.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring	Verify at least once each calendar quarter that individuals with active electronic access or unescorted physical access have authorization records.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • Dated documentation of the verification between the system generated list of individuals who have been authorized for access (i.e., workflow database) and a system generated list of personnel who have access (i.e., user account listing), or Dated documentation of the verification between a list of individuals who have been authorized for access (i.e., authorization forms) and a list of individuals provisioned for access (i.e., provisioning forms or

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R4 – Access Management Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems; and 2. physical access control systems		shared account listing).
4.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	For electronic access, verify at least once every 15 months that all user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated privileges are correct and are those that the Responsible Entity determines are necessary.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the review that includes all of the following: 1. A dated listing of all accounts/account groups or roles within the system; 2. A summary description of privileges associated with each group or role; 3. Accounts assigned to the group or role; and 4. Dated evidence showing verification of the privileges for the group are authorized and appropriate to the work function performed by people assigned to each account.

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R5. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented access revocation program(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R5 – Access Revocation*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations and Operations Planning].

M5. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R5 – Access Revocation* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	A process to initiate removal of an individual's ability for unescorted physical access and interactive remote access upon a termination action, and complete the removals within 24 hours of the termination action (Removal of the ability for access may be different than deletion, disabling, revocation, or removal of all access rights).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of all of the following: 1. Dated workflow or sign-off form verifying access removal associated with the termination action; and 2. Logs or other demonstration showing such persons no longer have access.
5.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control	For reassignments or transfers, revoke the individual's authorized electronic access to individual accounts and authorized unescorted physical access that the Responsible Entity determines are not necessary by the end of the next day following the date that the Responsible Entity determines	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of all of the following: 1. Dated workflow or sign-off form showing a review of logical and physical access; and 2. Logs or other demonstration showing

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R5 – Access Revocation

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	that the individual no longer requires retention of that access.	such persons no longer have access that the Responsible Entity determines is not necessary.
5.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: • electronic access control or monitoring systems	For termination actions, revoke the individual's non-shared user accounts (unless already revoked according to Part 5.1) within 30 days of the effective date of the termination action.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, workflow or sign-off form showing access removal for any individual cyber assets and software applications as determined necessary to completing the revocation of access and dated within thirty days of the termination actions
5.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: • electronic access control or monitoring systems	For termination actions, change passwords for shared account(s) known to the user within 30 days of the termination action. For reassignments or transfers, change passwords for shared account(s) known to the user within 30 days following the date that the Responsible Entity determines that the individual no longer requires retention of that access. If the Responsible Entity determines and documents that extenuating operating circumstances require a longer time period, change the password(s) within 10 days	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • Workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 30 days of the termination; • Workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 30 days of the reassignments or transfers; or Documentation of the extenuating operating circumstance and workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 10 days following the end of the operating circumstance.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R5 – Access Revocation

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
		following the end of the operating circumstances.	

R6. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented access management program(s) to authorize, verify, and revoke provisioned access to **BES cyber system information** pertaining to the “Applicable Systems” identified in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information* that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information*. To be considered access to **BES cyber system information** in the context of this requirement, an individual has both the ability to obtain and use **BES cyber system information**. Provisioned access is to be considered the result of the specific actions taken to provide an individual(s) the means to access **BES cyber system information** (e.g., may include physical keys or access cards, user accounts and associated rights and privileges, encryption keys).
[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations and Operations Planning].

M6. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented programs that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
6.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic	Prior to provisioning, authorize (unless already authorized according to Part 4.1.) based on need, as determined by the Responsible Entity, except for CIP exceptional circumstances: 6.1.1. Provisioned electronic access to electronic BES cyber system information; and 6.1.2. Provisioned physical access to physical BES cyber system information.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, individual records or lists that include who is authorized, the date of the authorization, and the justification of business need for the provisioned access.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems		
6.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Verify at least once every 15 months that all individuals with provisioned access to BES cyber system information: 6.2.1. have an authorization record; and 6.2.2. still need the provisioned access to perform their current work functions, as determined by the Responsible Entity.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, the documentation of the review that includes all of the following: • List of authorized individuals; • List of individuals who have been provisioned access; • Verification that provisioned access is appropriate based on need; and • Documented reconciliation actions, if any.

CIP-004-AB-7 Table R6 – Access Management for BES Cyber System Information

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
6.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	For termination actions, remove the individual's ability to use provisioned access to BES cyber system information (unless already revoked according to Part 5.1) by the end of the next day following the effective date of the termination action.	Examples of dated evidence may include, but are not limited to, access revocation records associated with the terminations and dated within the next day of the termination action.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Personnel and Training

CIP-004-AB-7



C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None

E. Interpretations

None

F. Associated Documents

- CIP-PLAN-AB-3, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Changes
5	Oct 1, 2017	Initial Version
7	April 1, 2026	Addressed FERC directives from Order No. 791. Revised to enhance BES reliability for entities to manage their BCSl.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Electronic Security

Perimeter(s)

CIP-005-AB-7



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

2. Number: CIP-005-AB-7

3. Purpose: To manage electronic access to **BES cyber systems** by specifying a controlled **electronic security perimeter** in support of protecting **BES cyber systems** against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that:

4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.1.2.2. Each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard;

4.1.2.3. Each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to an electric distribution system where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and

4.1.2.4. Each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a blackstart resource up to and including the first point of connection of the starting station service of the next generating unit(s) or aggregated generating facility(ies) to be started.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility;

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO.

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in Section 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to any **transmission facility** or **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from CIP-005-AB-7:

4.2.3.1. Cyber assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. Cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.].

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

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Cyber Security – Electronic Security

Perimeter(s)

CIP-005-AB-7



5. Effective Dates: See CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*

6. Background:

Reliability standard CIP-005 exists as part of a suite of CIP **reliability standards** related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems** and require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to **BES cyber systems**.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The term documented processes refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms program and plan are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term program may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the **reliability standards** include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms program and plan do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the **reliability standards**.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact **BES cyber systems**. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple **BES cyber systems**.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the **reliability standards**, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**. This particular threshold of 300 MW for **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding** was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding**, which are last ditch efforts to save the **bulk electric system**. A review of **underfrequency load shedding** tolerances defined within **reliability standards** for **underfrequency load shedding** program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable **underfrequency load shedding** operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a

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specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 NERC standard drafting team adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicability Systems” column as described.

- High Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity – Only applies to high impact **BES cyber systems** with **dial-up connectivity**.
- High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity – Only applies to high impact **BES cyber systems** with **external routable connectivity**. This also excludes **cyber assets** in the **BES cyber system** that cannot be directly accessed through **external routable connectivity**.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centres – Only applies to medium impact **BES cyber systems** located at a **control centre**.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity – Only applies to medium impact **BES cyber systems** with **dial-up connectivity**.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity – Only applies to medium impact **BES cyber systems** with **external routable connectivity**. This also excludes **cyber assets** in the **BES cyber system** that cannot be directly accessed through **external routable connectivity**.
- Protected Cyber Assets – Applies to each **protected cyber asset** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.
- Electronic Access Points – Applies at **electronic access points** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.
- Physical Access Control Systems – Applies to each **physical access control system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems – Applies to each **electronic access control or monitoring system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-AB-7 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].

M1. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-AB-7 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

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Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

CIP-005-AB-7



CIP-005-AB-7 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: - protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: - protected cyber assets	All applicable cyber assets connected to a network via a routable protocol shall reside within a defined electronic security perimeter .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of all electronic security perimeters with all uniquely identifiable applicable cyber assets connected via a routable protocol within each electronic security perimeter .
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: - protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: - protected cyber assets	All external routable connectivity must be through an identified electronic access point .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, network diagrams showing all external routable communication paths and the identified electronic access points .
1.3	Electronic access points for High Impact BES cyber systems Electronic access points for Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of rules (firewall, access control lists, etc.) that demonstrate that only permitted access is allowed and that each access rule has a documented reason.

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CIP-005-AB-7



CIP-005-AB-7 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.4	High Impact BES cyber systems with dial-up connectivity and their associated: • protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with dial-up connectivity and their associated: • protected cyber assets	Where technically feasible, perform authentication when establishing dial-up connectivity with applicable cyber assets .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented process that describes how the Responsible Entity is providing authenticated access through each dial-up connection.
1.5	Electronic access points for High Impact BES cyber systems Electronic access points for Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres	Have one or more methods for detecting known or suspected malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that malicious communications detection methods (e.g. intrusion detection system, application layer firewall, etc.) are implemented.

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CIP-005-AB-7



R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts, where technically feasible, in *CIP-005-AB-7 Table R2 –Remote Access Management*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].

M2. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP- 005-AB-7 Table R2 –Remote Access Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: - protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: - protected cyber assets	For all interactive remote access , utilize an intermediate system such that the cyber asset initiating interactive remote access does not directly access an applicable cyber asset .	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, network diagrams or architecture documents.
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: - protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: - protected cyber assets	For all interactive remote access sessions, utilize encryption that terminates at an intermediate system .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing where encryption initiates and terminates.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R2 – Remote Access Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: • protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: • protected cyber assets	Require multi-factor authentication for all interactive remote access sessions.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing the authentication factors used. Examples of authenticators may include, but are not limited to, • Something the individual knows such as passwords or PINs. This does not include User ID; • Something the individual has such as tokens, digital certificates, or smart cards; or • Something the individual is such as fingerprints, iris scans, or other biometric characteristics.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R2 – Remote Access Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: - protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: - protected cyber assets	Have one or more methods for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including interactive remote access and system-to-system remote access).	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine active vendor remote access (including interactive remote access and system-to-system remote access), such as: - Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine active vendor remote access sessions; - Methods for monitoring activity (e.g. connection tables or rule hit counters in a firewall, or user activity monitoring) or open ports (e.g. netstat or related commands to display currently active ports) to determine active system to system remote access sessions; or - Methods that control vendor initiation of remote access such as vendors calling and requesting a second factor in order to initiate remote access.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R2 – Remote Access Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.5	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: • protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: • protected cyber assets	Have one or more method(s) to disable active vendor remote access (including interactive remote access and system-to-system remote access).	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods(s) used to disable active vendor remote access (including interactive remote access and system-to-system remote access), such as: • Methods to disable vendor remote access at the applicable electronic access point for system-to-system remote access; or • Methods to disable vendor interactive remote access at the applicable intermediate system.

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R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-AB-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].

M3. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP- 005-AB-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	Electronic access control or monitoring systems and physical access control systems associated with High Impact BES cyber systems Electronic access control or monitoring systems and physical access control systems associated with Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Have one or more method(s) to determine authenticated vendor- initiated remote connections.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections, such as: Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections.

CIP-005-AB-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	Electronic access control or monitoring systems and physical access control systems associated with High Impact BES cyber systems Electronic access control or monitoring systems and physical access control systems associated with Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Have one or more method(s) to terminate authenticated vendor- initiated remote connections and control the ability to reconnect.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods(s) used to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections to applicable systems. Examples include terminating an active vendor-initiated shell/process/session or dropping an active vendor-initiated connection in a firewall. Methods to control the ability to reconnect, if necessary, could be: disabling an Active Directory account; disabling a security token; restricting IP addresses from vendor sources in a firewall; or physically disconnecting a network cable to prevent a reconnection.

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C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

- CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*
- NERC *Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s): Technical Rationale and Justification for Reliability Standard CIP-005-7*
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Changes
5	10/1/2022	Initial Version
7	10/1/2024	Modified to address certain directives in FERC Order No. 829 and 850.

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Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

CIP-006-AB-5



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems
2. Number: CIP-006-AB-5
3. Purpose: To manage physical access to **BES cyber systems** by specifying a physical security plan in support of protecting **BES cyber systems** against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.
4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.2. a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.1.2.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection 4.1.2., without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.1.2.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.1.2.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.1.3. the **operator** of a **generating unit** and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.4. the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.6. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.7. the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;

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Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

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4.1.8. the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and

4.1.9. the **ISO**.

4.2. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.2.1.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.2.1.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** are responsible for:

4.2.2.1. each **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** except each **transmission facility** that:

4.2.2.1.1. is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kV or higher and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

4.2.2.1.2. radially connects only to load;

4.2.2.1.3. radially connects only to one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** with a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**; or

4.2.2.1.4. radially connects to load and one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that have a combined **maximum authorized real power**

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of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

- 4.2.2.2. a **reactive power** resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing **reactive power** that is connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, except those **reactive power** resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use;
- 4.2.2.3. a **generating unit** that is:
 - 4.2.2.3.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.2. within a power plant which:
 - 4.2.2.3.2.1. is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.2.2.3.2.2. is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - 4.2.2.3.2.3. has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.3. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.3.4. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.4. an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - 4.2.2.4.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.4.2. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.4.3. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- and
- 4.2.2.5. **control centres** and backup **control centres**.
- 4.2.3. The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:
 - 4.2.3.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.2. **cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.
 - 4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.4. for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection 4.2.1 above.
 - 4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 identification and

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Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

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categorization processes.

5. [Intentionally left blank.]
6. [Intentionally left blank.]

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented physical security plans that collectively include all of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan*.
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the documented physical security plans that collectively include all of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the plan or plans as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	Medium Impact BES cyber systems without external routable connectivity Physical access control systems associated with: - High Impact BES cyber systems, or - Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Define operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that operational or procedural controls exist.
1.2	Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets	Utilize at least one physical access control to allow unescorted physical access into each applicable physical security perimeter to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes each physical security perimeter and how unescorted physical access is controlled by one or more different methods and proof that unescorted physical access is restricted to only authorized individuals, such as a list of authorized individuals accompanied by access logs.

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Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

CIP-006-AB-5



CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets	Where technically feasible, utilize two or more different physical access controls (this does not require two completely independent physical access control systems) to collectively allow unescorted physical access into physical security perimeters to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the physical security perimeters and how unescorted physical access is controlled by two or more different methods and proof that unescorted physical access is restricted to only authorized individuals, such as a list of authorized individuals accompanied by access logs.
1.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets	Monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a physical security perimeter .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of controls that monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a physical security perimeter .
1.5	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated:	Issue an alarm or alert in response to detected unauthorized access through a physical access point into a physical security perimeter to the personnel identified in the bulk electric system cyber security incident response plan within 15 minutes of detection.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the issuance of an alarm or alert in response to unauthorized access through a physical access control into a physical security perimeter and additional evidence that the alarm or alert was issued and communicated as

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CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets		identified in the bulk electric system cyber security incident response plan, such as manual or electronic alarm or alert logs, cell phone or pager logs, or other evidence that documents that the alarm or alert was generated and communicated.
1.6	Physical access control systems associated with: • High Impact BES cyber systems, or • Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Monitor each physical access control system for unauthorized physical access to a physical access control system .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of controls that monitor for unauthorized physical access to a physical access control system .
1.7	Physical access control systems associated with: • High Impact BES cyber systems, or • Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Issue an alarm or alert in response to detected unauthorized physical access to a physical access control system to the personnel identified in the bulk electric system cyber security incident response plan within 15 minutes of the detection.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the issuance of an alarm or alert in response to unauthorized physical access to physical access control systems and additional evidence that the alarm or alerts was issued and communicated as identified in the bulk electric system cyber security incident response plan, such as alarm or alert logs, cell phone or pager logs, or other evidence that the alarm or alert was generated and communicated.
1.8	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and	Log (through automated means or by personnel who control entry) entry of each individual with authorized unescorted physical access	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes logging and recording of

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CIP-006-AB-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	2. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets	into each physical security perimeter , with information to identify the individual and date and time of entry.	physical entry into each physical security perimeter and additional evidence to demonstrate that this logging has been implemented, such as logs of physical access into physical security perimeters that show the individual and the date and time of entry into physical security perimeter .
1.9	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets	Retain physical access logs of entry of individuals with authorized unescorted physical access into each physical security perimeter for at least ninety days.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation such as logs of physical access into physical security perimeters that show the date and time of entry into physical security perimeter .

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented visitor control programs that include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program*.

M2. Evidence must include one or more documented visitor control programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-AB-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program

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Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets	Require continuous escorted access of visitors (individuals who are provided access but are not authorized for unescorted physical access) within each physical security perimeter, except during CIP exceptional circumstances.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in a visitor control program that requires continuous escorted access of visitors within physical security perimeters and additional evidence to demonstrate that the process was implemented, such as visitor logs.
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets	Require manual or automated logging of visitor entry into and exit from the physical security perimeter that includes date and time of the initial entry and last exit, the visitor's name, and the name of an individual point of contact responsible for the visitor, except during CIP exceptional circumstances.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in a visitor control program that requires continuous escorted access of visitors within physical security perimeters and additional evidence to demonstrate that the process was implemented, such as dated visitor logs that include the required information.
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and	Retain visitor logs for at least ninety days.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing logs have been retained for at least ninety days.

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CIP-006-AB-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and protected cyber assets		

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented **physical access control system** maintenance and testing programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R3 – Maintenance and Testing Program*.

M3. Evidence must include each of the documented **physical access control system** maintenance and testing programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-AB-5 Table R3 – Maintenance and Testing Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-AB-5 Table R3 – Maintenance and Testing Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	Physical access control systems associated with: - High Impact BES cyber systems, or - Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity Locally mounted hardware or devices at the physical security perimeter associated with: - High Impact BES cyber systems, or - Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity	Maintenance and testing of each physical access control system and locally mounted hardware or devices at the physical security perimeter at least once every 24 months to ensure they function properly.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a maintenance and testing program that provides for testing each physical access control system and locally mounted hardware or devices associated with each applicable physical security perimeter at least once every 24 months and additional evidence to demonstrate that this testing was done, such as dated maintenance records, or other documentation showing testing and maintenance has been performed on each applicable device or system at least once every 24 months .

Revision History

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Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

CIP-006-AB-5



Date	Description
2017-10-01	Initial release.

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Cyber Security – System Security Management

CIP-007-AB-5



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – System Security Management
2. Number: CIP-007-AB-5
3. Purpose: To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting **BES cyber systems** against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.
4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities”. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.2. a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.1.2.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection 4.1.2., without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.1.2.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.1.2.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.1.3. the **operator** of a **generating unit** and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.4. the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.6. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.7. the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;

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4.1.8. the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and

4.1.9. the **ISO**.

4.2. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.2.1.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.2.1.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** are responsible for:

4.2.2.1. each **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** except each **transmission facility** that:

4.2.2.1.1. is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kV or higher and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

4.2.2.1.2. radially connects only to load;

4.2.2.1.3. radially connects only to one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** with a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**; or

4.2.2.1.4. radially connects to load and one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that have a combined **maximum authorized real power**

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of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

- 4.2.2.2. a **reactive power** resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing **reactive power** that is connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, except those **reactive power** resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use;
- 4.2.2.3. a **generating unit** that is:
 - 4.2.2.3.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.2. within a power plant which:
 - 4.2.2.3.2.1. is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.2.2.3.2.2. is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - 4.2.2.3.2.3. has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.3. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.3.4. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.4. an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - 4.2.2.4.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.4.2. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.4.3. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- and
- 4.2.2.5. **control centres** and backup **control centres**.
- 4.2.3. The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:
 - 4.2.3.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.2. **cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.
 - 4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.4. for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection 4.2.1 above.
 - 4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 identification and

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categorization processes.

5. [Intentionally left blank.]
6. [Intentionally left blank.]

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services*.
- M1.** Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-AB-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	Where technically feasible, enable only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed by the Responsible Entity, including port ranges or services where needed to handle dynamic ports. If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: - documentation of the need for all enabled ports on all applicable cyber assets and electronic access points, individually or by group. - listings of the listening ports on the cyber assets, individually or by group, from either the device configuration files, command output (such as netstat), or network scans of open ports; or - configuration files of host-based firewalls or other device level mechanisms that only allow needed ports and deny all others.
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres	Protect against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or removable	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing types of protection of physical input/output ports, either

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
		media.	logically through system configuration or physically using a port lock or signage.

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management*.
- M2.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-AB-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable cyber assets . The tracking portion shall include the identification of a source or sources that the Responsible Entity tracks for the release of cyber security patches for applicable cyber assets that are updateable and for which a patching source exists.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of a patch management process and documentation or lists of sources that are monitored, whether on an individual BES cyber system or cyber asset basis.
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	At least once every 35 days , evaluate security patches for applicability that have been released since the last evaluation from the source or sources identified in part 2.1.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, an evaluation conducted by, referenced by, or on behalf of a Responsible Entity of security-related patches released by the documented sources at least once every 35 days .

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets		
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	For applicable patches identified in part 2.2, within 35 days of the evaluation completion, take one of the following actions: • apply the applicable patches; or • create a dated mitigation plan; or • revise an existing mitigation plan. Mitigation plans shall include the Responsible Entity's planned actions to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by each security patch and a timeframe to complete these mitigations.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • records of the installation of the patch (e.g., exports from automated patch management tools that provide installation date, verification of BES cyber system component software revision, or registry exports that show software has been installed); or • a dated plan showing when and how the vulnerability will be addressed, to include documentation of the actions to be taken by the Responsible Entity to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by the security patch and a timeframe for the completion of these mitigations.
2.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and	For each mitigation plan created or revised in part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the timeframe specified in part 2.3 is approved by the CIP senior	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, records of implementation of mitigations.

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	manager or delegate.	

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention*.

M3. Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-AB-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, records of the Responsible Entity's performance of these processes (e.g., through traditional antivirus, system hardening, policies, etc.).
3.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated:	Mitigate the threat of detected malicious code.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets		• records of response processes for malicious code detection • records of the performance of these processes when malicious code is detected.
3.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	For those methods identified in part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the signatures or patterns.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing the process used for the update of signatures or patterns.

R4. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring*.

M4. Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Log events at the BES cyber system level (per BES cyber system capability) or at the cyber asset level (per cyber asset capability) for identification of, and after-the-fact investigations of, cyber security incidents that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events: 4.1.1. detected successful login attempts; 4.1.2. detected failed access attempts and failed login attempts; 4.1.3. detected malicious code.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, a paper or system generated listing of event types for which the BES cyber system is capable of detecting and, for generated events, is configured to log. This listing must include the required types of events.
4.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Generate alerts for security events that the Responsible Entity determines necessitates an alert, that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events (per cyber asset or BES cyber system capability): 4.2.1. detected malicious code from part 4.1; and 4.2.2. detected failure of part 4.1 event logging.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, paper or system generated listing of security events that the Responsible Entity determined necessitate alerts, including paper or system generated list showing how alerts are configured.
4.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated:	Where technically feasible, retain applicable event logs identified in part 4.1 for at least	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the event log

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets	the last 90 consecutive days except under CIP exceptional circumstances .	retention process and paper or system generated reports showing log retention configuration set at 90 days or greater.
4.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; and 2. protected cyber assets	Review a summarization or sampling of logged events as determined by the Responsible Entity at intervals no greater than 15 days to identify undetected cyber security incidents .	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation describing the review, any findings from the review (if any), and dated documentation showing the review occurred.

R5. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls*.

M5. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-AB-5 Table 5 – System Access Controls* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control	Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation describing how access is authenticated.

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets		
5.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Identify and inventory all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a listing of accounts by account types showing the enabled or generic account types in use for the BES cyber system.

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, listing of shared accounts and the individuals who have authorized access to each shared account.
5.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Change known default passwords, per cyber asset capability.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • records of a procedure that passwords are changed when new devices are in production; or • documentation in system manuals or other vendor documents showing default vendor passwords were generated pseudo-randomly and are thereby unique to the device.
5.5	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems;	For password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce the following password	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • system-generated reports or screen-shots of the

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets	parameters: 5.5.1. password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length supported by the cyber asset ; and 5.5.2. minimum password complexity that is the lesser of three or more different types of characters (e.g., uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, nonalphanumeric) or the maximum complexity supported by the cyber asset .	system enforced password parameters, including length and complexity; or attestations that include a reference to the documented procedures that were followed.
5.6	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control systems ; and 3. protected cyber assets	Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at least once every 15 months .	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: - system-generated reports or screen-shots of the system enforced periodicity of changing passwords; or - attestations that include a reference to the documented procedures that were followed.
5.7	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems ; 2. physical access control	Where technically feasible, either: limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts; or	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: documentation of the account-lockout parameters; or

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CIP-007-AB-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts.	rules in the alerting configuration showing how the system notified individuals after a determined number of unsuccessful login attempts.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-01	Initial release.

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Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning

CIP-008-AB-5



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning
2. Number: CIP-008-AB-5
3. Purpose: To mitigate the risk to the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system** as the result of a **cyber security incident** by specifying incident response requirements.
4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities”. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.2. a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.1.2.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection 4.1.2., without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.1.2.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.1.2.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.1.3. the **operator** of a **generating unit** and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.4. the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.6. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.7. the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;

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- 4.1.8. the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and
- 4.1.9. the **ISO**.
- 4.2. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.
 - 4.2.1. One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.2.1.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.2.1.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.2.1.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.2.1.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** are responsible for:
 - 4.2.2.1. each **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** except each **transmission facility** that:
 - 4.2.2.1.1. is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kV or higher and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;
 - 4.2.2.1.2. radially connects only to load;
 - 4.2.2.1.3. radially connects only to one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** with a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**; or
 - 4.2.2.1.4. radially connects to load and one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that have a combined **maximum authorized real power**

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of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

- 4.2.2.2. a **reactive power** resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing **reactive power** that is connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, except those **reactive power** resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use;
- 4.2.2.3. a **generating unit** that is:
 - 4.2.2.3.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.2. within a power plant which:
 - 4.2.2.3.2.1. is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.2.2.3.2.2. is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - 4.2.2.3.2.3. has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.3. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.3.4. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.4. an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - 4.2.2.4.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.4.2. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.4.3. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- and
- 4.2.2.5. **control centres** and backup **control centres**.
- 4.2.3. The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:
 - 4.2.3.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.2. **cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.
 - 4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.4. for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection 4.2.1 above.
 - 4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 identification and

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categorization processes.

5. [Intentionally left blank.]
6. [Intentionally left blank.]

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall document one or more **cyber security incident** response plan(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications*.
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the documented plan(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications*.

CIP-008-AB-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	One or more processes to identify, classify, and respond to cyber security incidents .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation of cyber security incidents response plan(s) that include the process to identify, classify, and respond to cyber security incidents .
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	One or more processes to determine if an identified cyber security incident is a reportable cyber security incident and notify the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), unless prohibited by law. Initial notification to the ES-ISAC, which may be only a preliminary notice, shall not exceed one hour from the determination of a reportable cyber security incident .	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated documentation of cyber security incident response plan(s) that provide guidance or thresholds for determining which cyber security incidents are also reportable cyber security incidents and documentation of initial notices to the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC).
1.3	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	The roles and responsibilities of cyber security incident response groups or individuals.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated cyber security incident response process(es) or procedure(s) that define roles and responsibilities (e.g.,

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CIP-008-AB-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
			monitoring, reporting, initiating, documenting, etc.) of cyber security incident response groups or individuals.
1.4	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Incident handling procedures for cyber security incidents .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated for cyber security incident response process(es) or procedure(s) that address incident handling (e.g., containment, eradication, recovery/incident resolution).

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement each of its documented **cyber security incident** response plans to collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing*.
- M2.** Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates implementation of each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing*.

CIP-008-AB-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Test each cyber security incident response plan(s) at least once every 15 months: - by responding to an actual reportable cyber security incident; - with a paper drill or tabletop exercise of a reportable cyber security incident; or - with an operational exercise of a reportable cyber security incident.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated evidence of a lessons-learned report that includes a summary of the test or a compilation of notes, logs, and communication resulting from the test. Types of exercises may include discussion or operations based exercises.
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Use the cyber security incident response plan(s) under Requirement R1 when responding to a reportable	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, incident reports, logs, and notes that were kept during the

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CIP-008-AB-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems	cyber security incident or performing an exercise of a reportable cyber security incident . Document deviations from the plan(s) taken during the response to the incident or exercise.	incident response process, and follow-up documentation that describes deviations taken from the plan during the incident or exercise.
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	Retain records related to reportable cyber security incident .	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation, such as security logs, police reports, emails, response forms or checklists, forensic analysis results, restoration records, and post-incident review notes related to reportable cyber security incidents .

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall maintain each of its **cyber security incident** response plans according to each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication*.
- M3.** Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates maintenance of each **cyber security incident** response plan according to the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-AB-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication*.

CIP-008-AB-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	No later than 90 days after completion of a cyber security incident response plan(s) test or actual reportable cyber security incident response: 3.1.1. document any lessons learned or document the absence of any lessons learned; 3.1.2. update the cyber	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following: 1. dated documentation of post incident(s) review meeting notes or follow-up report showing lessons learned associated with the cyber security incident response plan(s) test or actual reportable cyber security incident

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CIP-008-AB-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
		security incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned associated with the plan; and 3.1.3. notify each person or group with a defined role in the cyber security incident response plan of the updates to the cyber security incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned.	response or dated documentation stating there were no lessons learned; 2. dated and revised cyber security incident response plan showing any changes based on the lessons learned; and 3. evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: • emails; • USPS or other mail service; • electronic distribution system; or • training sign-in sheets.
3.2	High Impact BES cyber systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems	No later than 60 days after a change to the roles or responsibilities, cyber security incident response groups or individuals, or technology that the Responsible Entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: 3.2.1. update the cyber security incident response plan(s); and 3.2.2. notify each person or group with a defined role in the cyber security incident response plan of the updates.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to: 1. dated and revised cyber security incident response plan with changes to the roles or responsibilities, responders or technology; and 2. evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: • emails; • USPS or other mail service; • electronic distribution system; or • training sign-in sheets.

Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning CIP-008-AB-5



Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-01	Initial release.

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Cyber Security – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems

CIP-009-AB-5



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems
2. Number: CIP-009-AB-5
3. Purpose: To recover reliability functions performed by **BES cyber systems** by specifying recovery plan requirements in support of the continued stability, operability, and reliability of the **bulk electric system**.
4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities". For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.2. a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:
 - 4.1.2.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection 4.1.2., without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;
 - 4.1.2.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;
 - 4.1.2.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and
 - 4.1.2.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;
 - 4.1.3. the **operator** of a **generating unit** and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.4. the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.6. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.1.7. the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;

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4.1.8. the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and

4.1.9. the **ISO**.

4.2. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.2.1.2. each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.2.1.3. each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to transmission where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.2.1.4. each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of supply** and/or **point of delivery** of the next **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be started;

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** are responsible for:

4.2.2.1. each **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** except each **transmission facility** that:

4.2.2.1.1. is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kV or higher and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**;

4.2.2.1.2. radially connects only to load;

4.2.2.1.3. radially connects only to one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** with a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart resource**; or

4.2.2.1.4. radially connects to load and one or more **generating units** or **aggregated generating facilities** that have a combined **maximum authorized real power** of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted **blackstart**

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resource;

- 4.2.2.2. a **reactive power** resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing **reactive power** that is connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, except those **reactive power** resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use;
- 4.2.2.3. a **generating unit** that is:
 - 4.2.2.3.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.2. within a power plant which:
 - 4.2.2.3.2.1. is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - 4.2.2.3.2.2. is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - 4.2.2.3.2.3. has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.3.3. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.3.4. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- 4.2.2.4. an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - 4.2.2.4.1. directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - 4.2.2.4.2. within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - 4.2.2.4.3. a contracted **blackstart resource**;
- and
- 4.2.2.5. **control centres** and backup **control centres**.
- 4.2.3. The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:
 - 4.2.3.1. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.2. **cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.
 - 4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]
 - 4.2.3.4. for the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection 4.2.1 above.
 - 4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 identification and categorization processes.

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Cyber Security – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems

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5. [Intentionally left blank.]

6. [Intentionally left blank.]

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall have one or more documented recovery plans that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications*.

M1. Evidence must include the documented recovery plan(s) that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications*.

CIP-009-AB-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	Conditions for activation of the recovery plan(s).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, one or more plans that include language identifying conditions for activation of the recovery plan(s).
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control	Roles and responsibilities of responders.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, one or more recovery plans that include language identifying the roles and responsibilities of responders.

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CIP-009-AB-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems		
1.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	One or more processes for the backup and storage of information required to recover BES cyber system functionality.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of specific processes for the backup and storage of information required to recover BES cyber system functionality.
1.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	One or more processes to verify the successful completion of the backup processes in Part 1.3 and to address any backup failures.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, logs, workflow or other documentation confirming that the backup process completed successfully and backup failures, if any, were addressed.
1.5	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	One or more processes to preserve data, per cyber asset capability, for determining the cause of a cyber security incident that triggers activation of the recovery plan(s). Data preservation should not	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, procedures to preserve data, such as preserving a corrupted drive or making a data mirror of the system before proceeding with recovery.

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CIP-009-AB-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	impede or restrict recovery.	

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, its documented recovery plan(s) to collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing*.

M2. Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates implementation of each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing*.

CIP-009-AB-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems	Test each of the recovery plans referenced in requirement R1 at least once every 15 months : - by recovering from an actual incident; - with a paper drill or tabletop exercise; or - with an operational exercise.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated evidence of a test (by recovering from an actual incident, with a paper drill or tabletop exercise, or with an operational exercise) of the recovery plan at least once every 15 months . For the paper drill or full operational exercise, evidence may include meeting notices, minutes, or other records of exercise findings.
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and	Test a representative sample of information used to recover BES cyber system functionality at least once every 15 months to ensure that the information is useable	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, operational logs or test results with criteria for testing the usability (e.g. sample tape load, browsing tape contents)

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Cyber Security – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems

CIP-009-AB-5



CIP-009-AB-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	and is compatible with current configurations. An actual recovery that incorporates the information used to recover BES cyber system functionality substitutes for this test.	and compatibility with current system configurations (e.g. manual or automated comparison checkpoints between backup media contents and current configuration).
2.3	High Impact BES cyber systems	Test each of the recovery plans referenced in requirement R1 at least once every 36 months through an operational exercise of the recovery plans in an environment representative of the production environment. An actual recovery response may substitute for an operational exercise.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated documentation of: - an operational exercise at least once every 36 months between exercises, that demonstrates recovery in a representative environment; or - an actual recovery response that occurred within the 36 month timeframe that exercised the recovery plans.

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall maintain each of its recovery plans in accordance with each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication*.

M3. Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-AB-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication*.

CIP-009-AB-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring	No later than 90 days after completion of a recovery plan test or actual recovery: 3.1.1. document any lessons	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following: 1. dated documentation of

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CIP-009-AB-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	learned associated with a recovery plan test or actual recovery or document the absence of any lessons learned; 3.1.2. update the recovery plan based on any documented lessons learned associated with the plan; and 3.1.3. notify each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan of the updates to the recovery plan based on any documented lessons learned.	identified deficiencies or lessons learned for each recovery plan test or actual incident recovery or dated documentation stating there were no lessons learned; 2. dated and revised recovery plan showing any changes based on the lessons learned; and 3. evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: • emails; • USPS or other mail service; • electronic distribution system; or • training sign-in sheets.
3.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems at control centres and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	No later than 60 days after a change to the roles or responsibilities, responders, or technology that the Responsible Entity determines would impact the ability to execute the recovery plan: 3.2.1. update the recovery plan; and 3.2.2. notify each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan of the updates.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following: 1. dated and revised recovery plan with changes to the roles or responsibilities, responders, or technology; and 2. evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: • emails; • USPS or other mail service; • electronic distribution system; or

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CIP-009-AB-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
			training sign-in sheets.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-01	Initial release.

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Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

CIP-010-AB-4



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
2. Number: CIP-010-AB-4
3. Purpose: To prevent and detect unauthorized changes to **BES cyber systems** by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting **BES cyber systems** from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that:

4.1.2.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more;

4.1.2.2. Each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard;

4.1.2.3. Each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to an electric distribution system where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and

4.1.2.4. Each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a blackstart resource up to and including the first point of connection of the starting station service of the next generating unit(s) or aggregated generating facility(ies) to be started.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility;

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO.

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in Section 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to any **transmission facility** or **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from CIP-010-AB-4:

4.2.3.1. **Cyber assets** at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. **Cyber assets** associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.].

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

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CIP-010-AB-4



5. Effective Dates: See CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*

6. Background:

Reliability standard CIP-010 exists as part of a suite of CIP **reliability standards** related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems** and require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to **BES cyber systems**.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The term documented processes refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms program and plan are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term program may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the **reliability standards** include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms program and plan do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the **reliability standards**.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact **BES cyber systems**. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple **BES cyber systems**.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the **reliability standards**, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**. This particular threshold of 300 MW for **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding** was provided in the NERC Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security reliability standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding**, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of **underfrequency load shedding** tolerances defined within **reliability standards** for **underfrequency load shedding** program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable **underfrequency load shedding** operational tolerances.

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“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 NERC standard drafting team adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicability Systems” column as described.

- High Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems – Applies to each **electronic access control or monitoring system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- Physical Access Control Systems – Applies to each **physical access control system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.
- Protected Cyber Assets – Applies to each **protected cyber asset** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.

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B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M1. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	Develop a baseline configuration, individually or by group, which shall include the following items: 1.1.1. Operating system(s) (including version) or firmware where no independent operating system exists; 1.1.2. Any commercially available or open-source application software (including version) intentionally installed; 1.1.3. Any custom software installed; 1.1.4. Any logical network accessible ports; and 1.1.5. Any security patches applied.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: - A spreadsheet identifying the required items of the baseline configuration for each cyber asset, individually or by group; or - A record in an asset management system that identifies the required items of the baseline configuration for each cyber asset, individually or by group.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Authorize and document changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: • A change request record and associated electronic authorization (performed by the individual or group with the authority to authorize the change) in a change management system for each change; or • Documentation that the change was performed in accordance with the requirement.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration, update the baseline configuration as necessary within 30 days of completing the change.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, updated baseline documentation with a date that is within 30 days of the date of the completion of the change.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: 1.4.1. Prior to the change, determine required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by the change; 1.4.2. Following the change, verify that required cyber security controls determined in 1.4.1 are not adversely affected; and 1.4.3. Document the results of the verification.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls verified or tested along with the dated test results.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.5	High Impact BES cyber systems	Where technically feasible, for each change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: 1.5.1. Prior to implementing any change in the production environment, test the changes in a test environment or test the changes in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration to ensure that required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 are not adversely affected; and 1.5.2. Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls tested along with successful test results and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for, including the date of the test.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.6	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; and physical access control systems Note: Implementation does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders). Additionally, the following issues are beyond the scope of Part 1.6: (1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract.	Prior to a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration associated with baseline items in Parts 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.5, and when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source: 1.6.1. Verify the identity of the software source; and 1.6.2. Verify the integrity of the software obtained from the software source.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to a change request record that demonstrates the verification of identity of the software source and integrity of the software was performed prior to the baseline change or a process which documents the mechanisms in place that would automatically ensure the identity of the software source and integrity of the software.

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M2. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets	Monitor at least once every 35 days for changes to the baseline configuration (as described in Requirement R1, Part 1.1). Document and investigate detected unauthorized changes.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, logs from a system that is monitoring the configuration along with records of investigation for any unauthorized changes that were detected.

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R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R3– Vulnerability Assessments*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning and Operations Planning]

M3. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-AB-4 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-010-AB-4 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	At least once every 15 months , conduct a paper or active vulnerability assessment.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: - A document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 15 months), the controls assessed for each BES cyber system along with the method of assessment; or - A document listing the date of the assessment and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	High Impact BES cyber systems	Where technically feasible, at least once every 36 months: 3.2.1 Perform an active vulnerability assessment in a test environment, or perform an active vulnerability assessment in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration of the BES cyber system in a production environment; and 3.2.2 Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 36 months), the output of the tools used to perform the assessment, and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for in conducting the assessment.

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CIP-010-AB-4 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.3	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. protected cyber assets	Prior to adding a new applicable cyber asset to a production environment, perform an active vulnerability assessment of the new cyber asset, except for CIP exceptional circumstances and like replacements of the same type of cyber asset with a baseline configuration that models an existing baseline configuration of the previous or other existing cyber asset.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed prior to the commissioning of the new cyber asset) and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment.
3.4	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Document the results of the assessments conducted according to Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 and the action plan to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments including the planned date of completing the action plan and the execution status of any remediation or mitigation action items.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the results or the review or assessment, a list of action items, documented proposed dates of completion for the action plan, and records of the status of the action items (such as minutes of a status meeting, updates in a work order system, or a spreadsheet tracking the action items).

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R4. Each Responsible Entity, for its high impact and medium impact **BES cyber systems** and associated **protected cyber assets**, shall implement, except under **CIP exceptional circumstances**, one or more documented plan(s) for **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** that include the sections in Attachment 1. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning and Operations Planning]*

M4. Evidence shall include each of the documented plan(s) for **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** that collectively include each of the applicable sections in Attachment 1 and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of plan(s) for **transient cyber assets** and **removable media**. Additional examples of evidence per section are located in Attachment 2. If a Responsible Entity does not use **transient cyber asset(s)** or **removable media**, examples of evidence include, but are not limited to, a statement, policy, or other document that states the Responsible Entity does not use **transient cyber asset(s)** or **removable media**.

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C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

- CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*
- NERC *Cyber Security - Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments: Technical Rationale and Justification for Reliability Standard CIP-010-4*
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Changes
1	10/1/2017	Initial Version
4	10/1/2024	Aligns with NERC changes which: addressed FERC directives from Order No. 791 related to identify, assess, and correct language and communication networks, as well as transient devices and low impact BES cyber systems. Also modified to address FERC Order No. 829 and 850.

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CIP-010-AB-4 - Attachment 1

Required Sections for Plans for **Transient Cyber Assets** and **Removable Media**

Responsible Entities shall include each of the sections provided below in their plan(s) for **transient cyber assets** and **removable media** as required under Requirement R4.

Section 1. **Transient Cyber Asset(s)** Managed by the Responsible Entity.

- 1.1. **Transient Cyber Asset Management**: Responsible Entities shall manage **transient cyber asset(s)**, individually or by group: (1) in an ongoing manner to ensure compliance with applicable requirements at all times, (2) in an on- demand manner applying the applicable requirements before connection to a **BES cyber system**, or (3) a combination of both (1) and (2) above.
- 1.2. **Transient Cyber Asset Authorization**: For each individual or group of **transient cyber asset(s)**, each Responsible Entity shall authorize:
 - 1.2.1. Users, either individually or by group or role;
 - 1.2.2. Locations, either individually or by group; and
 - 1.2.3. Uses, which shall be limited to what is necessary to perform business functions.
- 1.3. **Software Vulnerability Mitigation**: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software on the **transient cyber asset** (per **transient cyber asset** capability):
 - Security patching, including manual or managed updates;
 - Live operating system and software executable only from read-only media;
 - System hardening; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities.
- 1.4. **Introduction of Malicious Code Mitigation**: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the introduction of malicious code (per **transient cyber asset** capability):
 - Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of signatures or patterns;
 - Application allowlisting; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.
- 1.5. **Unauthorized Use Mitigation**: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of unauthorized use of **transient cyber asset(s)**:
 - Restrict physical access;
 - Full-disk encryption with authentication;
 - Multi-factor authentication; or

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- Other method(s) to mitigate the risk of unauthorized use.

Section 2. **Transient Cyber Asset(s)** Managed by a Party Other than the Responsible Entity.

- 2.1. Software Vulnerabilities Mitigation:** Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software on the **transient cyber asset** (per **transient cyber asset** capability):
- Review of installed security patch(es);
 - Review of security patching process used by the party;
 - Review of other vulnerability mitigation performed by the party; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities.
- 2.2. Introduction of malicious code mitigation:** Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating malicious code (per **transient cyber asset** capability):
- Review of antivirus update level;
 - Review of antivirus update process used by the party;
 - Review of application allowlisting used by the party;
 - Review use of live operating system and software executable only from read-only media;
 - Review of system hardening used by the party; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate malicious code.
- 2.3.** For any method used to mitigate software vulnerabilities or malicious code as specified in 2.1 and 2.2, Responsible Entities shall determine whether any additional mitigation actions are necessary and implement such actions prior to connecting the **transient cyber asset**.

Section 3. **Removable Media**

- 3.1. Removable Media Authorization:** For each individual or group of **removable media**, each Responsible Entity shall authorize:
- 3.1.1.** Users, either individually or by group or role; and
- 3.1.2.** Locations, either individually or by group.
- 3.2. Malicious Code Mitigation:** To achieve the objective of mitigating the threat of introducing malicious code to high impact or medium impact **BES cyber systems** and their associated **protected cyber assets**, each Responsible Entity shall:
- 3.2.1.** Use method(s) to detect malicious code on **removable media** using a **cyber asset** other than a **BES cyber system** or **protected cyber assets**; and
- 3.2.2.** Mitigate the threat of detected malicious code on **removable media** prior to connecting the **removable media** to a high impact or medium impact **BES cyber system** or associated **protected cyber assets**.

CIP-010-AB-4 - Attachment 2

Examples of Evidence for Plans for **Transient Cyber Assets** and **Removable Media**

- Section 1.1: Examples of evidence for Section 1.1 may include, but are not limited to, the method(s) of management for the **transient cyber asset(s)**. This can be included as part of the **transient cyber asset** plan(s), part of the documentation related to authorization of **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by the Responsible Entity or part of a security policy.
- Section 1.2: Examples of evidence for Section 1.2 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from asset management systems, human resource management systems, or forms or spreadsheets that show authorization of **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by the Responsible Entity. Alternatively, this can be documented in the overarching plan document.
- Section 1.3: Examples of evidence for Section 1.3 may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to mitigate software vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software such as security patch management implementation, the use of live operating systems from read-only media, system hardening practices or other method(s) to mitigate the software vulnerability posed by unpatched software. Evidence can be from change management systems, automated patch management solutions, procedures or processes associated with using live operating systems, or procedures or processes associated with system hardening practices. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the risk from unpatched software, evidence may include documentation by the vendor or Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.
- Section 1.4: Examples of evidence for Section 1.4 may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to mitigate the introduction of malicious code such as antivirus software and processes for managing signature or pattern updates, application allowlisting practices, processes to restrict communication, or other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the vendor or Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.
- Section 1.5: Examples of evidence for Section 1.5 may include, but are not limited to, documentation through policies or procedures of the method(s) to restrict physical access; method(s) of the full-disk encryption solution along with the authentication protocol; method(s) of the multi-factor authentication solution; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate the risk of unauthorized use.
- Section 2.1: Examples of evidence for Section 2.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail or procedures that document a review of installed security patch(es); memoranda, electronic mail, policies or contracts from parties other than the Responsible Entity that identify the security patching process or vulnerability mitigation performed by the party other than the Responsible Entity; evidence from change management systems, electronic mail, system documentation or contracts that identifies acceptance by the Responsible

Entity that the practices of the party other than the Responsible Entity are acceptable; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities for **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the risk from unpatched software, evidence may include documentation by the Responsible Entity or the party other than the Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.

Section 2.2: Examples of evidence for Section 2.2 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail or procedures that document a review of the installed antivirus update level; memoranda, electronic mail, system documentation, policies or contracts from the party other than the Responsible Entity that identify the antivirus update process, the use of application allowlisting, use of live of operating systems or system hardening performed by the party other than the Responsible Entity; evidence from change management systems, electronic mail or contracts that identifies the Responsible Entity's acceptance that the practices of the party other than the Responsible Entity are acceptable; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate malicious code for **transient cyber asset(s)** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity. If a **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the Responsible Entity or the party other than the Responsible Entity that identifies that the **transient cyber asset** does not have the capability.

Section 2.3: Examples of evidence for Section 2.3 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail, or contracts that identifies a review to determine whether additional mitigations are necessary and that they have been implemented prior to connecting the **transient cyber asset** managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity.

Section 3.1: Examples of evidence for Section 3.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from asset management systems, human resource management systems, forms or spreadsheets that shows authorization of **removable media**. The documentation must identify **removable media**, individually or by group of **removable media**, along with the authorized users, either individually or by group or role, and the authorized locations, either individually or by group.

Section 3.2: Examples of evidence for Section 3.2 may include, but are not limited to, documented process(es) of the method(s) used to mitigate malicious code such as results of scan settings for **removable media**, or implementation of on- demand scanning. Documented process(es) for the method(s) used for mitigating the threat of detected malicious code on **removable media**, such as logs from the method(s) used to detect malicious code that show the results of scanning and that show mitigation of detected malicious code on **removable media** or documented confirmation by the entity that the **removable media** was deemed to be free of malicious code.

A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security – Information Protection

2. Number: CIP-011-AB-3

3. Purpose: To prevent unauthorized access to **BES cyber system information** by specifying information protection requirements in support of protecting **BES cyber systems** against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the **bulk electric system**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.1.2.1.1. Is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.1.2.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**;

4.1.2.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to an **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, systems, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each **underfrequency load shedding** or **under voltage load shed** system that:

4.2.1.1.1. Is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. Performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each **remedial action scheme** where the **remedial action scheme** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.3. Each **protection system** (excluding **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**) that applies to **transmission facility** or **electric distribution system** where the **protection system** is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**.

4.2.1.4. Each **cranking path** and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a **blackstart resource** up to and including the first **point of connection** of the starting station service of the next **generating unit(s)** or **aggregated generating facility(ies)** to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from **reliability standard** CIP-011-AB-3

4.2.3.1. cyber assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates: See CIP-PLAN-AB-3, *Cyber Security Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*.

6. Background: **Reliability standard** CIP-011 exists as part of a suite of CIP **reliability standards** related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of **BES cyber systems** and require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to **BES cyber systems**.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The term documented processes refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms program and plan are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term program may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the **reliability standards** include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms program and plan do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the **reliability standards**.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact **BES cyber systems**. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple **BES cyber systems**.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the **reliability standards**, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for **underfrequency load shedding** and **under voltage load shed**. This particular threshold of 300 MW for **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding** was provided in Version 1 of the NERC CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing **under voltage load shed** and **underfrequency load shedding**, which are last ditch efforts to save the **bulk electric system**. A review of **underfrequency load shedding** tolerances defined within **reliability standards** for **underfrequency load shedding** program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable **underfrequency load shedding** operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 and any amendments made thereto from time to time identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to **BES cyber systems** categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 and any amendments made thereto from time to time identification and categorization processes.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems** – Applies to each **electronic access control or monitoring system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems** – Applies to each **physical access control system** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.
- **Protected Cyber Assets** – Applies to each **protected cyber asset** associated with a referenced high impact **BES cyber system** or medium impact **BES cyber system**.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented information protection program(s) for **BES cyber system information** pertaining to “Applicable Systems” identified in *CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program* that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M1. Evidence for the information protection program must include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Method(s) to identify BES cyber system information .	Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, the following: • Documented method(s) to identify BES cyber system information from the entity's information protection program; or • Indications on information (e.g., labels or classification) that identify BES cyber system information as designated in the entity's information protection program; or

CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
			• Training materials that provide personnel with sufficient knowledge to identify BES cyber system information; or • Storage locations identified for housing BES cyber system information in the entity's information protection program.
1.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; and 2. physical access control systems	Method(s) to protect and securely handle BES cyber system information to mitigate risks of compromising confidentiality.	Examples of evidence for on-premise BES cyber system information may include, but are not limited to, the following: • Procedures for protecting and securely handling, which include topics such as storage, security during transit, and use of BES cyber system information; or • Records indicating that BES cyber system information is handled in a manner consistent with the entity's documented procedure(s). Examples of evidence for off-premise BES cyber system information may include, but are not limited to, the following: • Implementation of electronic technical method(s) to protect electronic BES cyber system information (e.g., data masking, encryption, hashing, tokenization, cipher, electronic key management); or • Implementation of physical technical method(s) to protect physical BES cyber system information (e.g., physical lock and key management, physical badge management, biometrics, alarm system); or • Implementation of administrative method(s) to

CIP-011-AB-3 Table R1 – Information Protection Program

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
			protect BES cyber system information (e.g., vendor service risk assessments, business agreements).

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-AB-3 Table R2 – BES cyber asset Reuse and Disposal*. [Alberta Risk Rating: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M2. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-AB-3 Table R2 – BES cyber asset Reuse and Disposal* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-011-AB-3 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: electronic access control or monitoring systems; physical access control systems; and protected cyber assets	Prior to the release for reuse of applicable cyber assets that contain BES cyber system information (except for reuse within other systems identified in the “Applicable Systems” column), the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES cyber system information from the cyber asset data storage media.	Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, the following: - Records tracking sanitization actions taken to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES cyber system information such as clearing, purging, or destroying; or - Records tracking actions such as encrypting, retaining in the physical security perimeter or other methods used to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES cyber system information.

CIP-011-AB-3 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	High Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets Medium Impact BES cyber systems and their associated: 1. electronic access control or monitoring systems; 2. physical access control systems; and 3. protected cyber assets	Prior to the disposal of applicable cyber assets that contain BES cyber system information, the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES cyber system information from the cyber asset or destroy the data storage media.	Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, the following: • Records that indicate that data storage media was destroyed prior to the disposal of an applicable cyber asset; or • Records of actions taken to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES cyber system information prior to the disposal of an applicable cyber asset.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Information Protection

CIP-011-AB-3



C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None

E. Interpretations

None

F. Associated Documents

- CIP-PLAN-AB-3, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan* for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards and any amendments made thereto from time to time.
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Changes
1	Oct 1, 2017	Initial Version
3	April 1, 2026	Addresses directives from FERC Order No. 791. Revised to enhance BES reliability for entities to manage their BES cyber system information.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to protect the confidentiality and integrity of real-time assessment and real-time monitoring data transmitted between **control centres**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to the following entities, referred to as “Responsible Entities”:

- (a) the **operator** of a **generating unit**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit**;
- (c) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
- (d) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
- (e) the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
- (f) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and
- (g) the **ISO**,

that own or operate a **control centre**.

Exemptions: The following are exempt from this **reliability standard**:

- (a) **cyber assets** at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; and
- (b) a **control centre** that transmits to another **control centre** real-time assessment or real-time monitoring data pertaining only to the generating resource, transmission station, or substation co-located with the transmitting **control centre**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each Responsible Entity must implement, except under **CIP exceptional circumstances**, one or more documented plans to mitigate the risks posed by unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized modification of real-time assessment and real-time monitoring data while being transmitted between any applicable **control centres**. The Responsible Entity is not required to include oral communications in its plan. The plan must include:

- R1.1** identification of security protection used to mitigate the risks posed by unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized modification of real-time assessment and real-time monitoring data while being transmitted between **control centres**;
- R1.2** identification of where the Responsible Entity applied security protection for transmitting real-time assessment and real-time monitoring data between **control centres**; and
- R1.3** if the **control centres** are owned or operated by different Responsible Entities, identification of the responsibilities of each Responsible Entity for applying security protection to the transmission of real-time assessment and real-time monitoring data between those **control centres**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of implementing one or more documented plans and including the required elements of the plan as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include documentation demonstrating the implementation of the plan and a documented plan, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Implementation Plan*

Revision History

Date	Description
2022-07-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1 – Implementation Plan

1. Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to set the effective dates and the implementation timelines for **reliability standard** CIP-012-AB-1, *Cyber Security – Communications between Control Centres* ("CIP-012-AB-1").

2. Compliance with Reliability Standards

The Responsible Entities identified in section 2 of this **reliability standard** must comply with the requirements of CIP-012-AB-1 in accordance with the implementation schedule.

3. Effective Date

CIP-012-AB-1 will become effective on July 1, 2022. Responsible Entities must follow the phased implementation plan set out in sections 4 and 5 below.

4. Implementation Plan for the ISO

- (a) Where the **ISO** has communications with a **control centre** external to Alberta the **ISO** must be compliant with requirement R1 of CIP-012-AB-1 on July 1, 2022.
- (b) Where the **ISO** has communications with a **control centre** internal to Alberta the **ISO** must be compliant with requirement R1 of CIP-012-AB-1 on July 1, 2023.

5. Implementation Plan for all Responsible Entities, Excluding the ISO

All Responsible Entities listed in section 2 of this **reliability standard**, excluding the **ISO**, must be compliant with requirement R1 of CIP-012-AB-1 on July 1, 2023.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management

CIP-013-AB-2



A. Introduction

1. Title: Cyber Security - Supply Chain Risk Management

2. Number: CIP-013-AB-2

3. Purpose: To mitigate cyber security risks to the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system** by implementing security controls for supply chain risk management of **BES cyber systems**.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities." For requirements in this **standard** where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.2. a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system:

4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that:

4.1.2.1.1. Is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.1.2.1.2. Performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.1.2.2. Each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and

4.1.2.3. Each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to an electric distribution system where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard.

4.1.3. the operator of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the operator of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.4. the legal owner of a generating unit that is part of the bulk electric system and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility that is part of the bulk electric system;

4.1.5. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.1.6. the operator of a transmission facility;

4.1.7. the legal owner of a transmission facility; and

4.1.8. the ISO.

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which

these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Legal owner of an electric distribution system and legal owner of a transmission facility: One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kV or less and are owned by a **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** or a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** for the protection or restoration of the **bulk electric system**:

4.2.1.1. Each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that:

4.2.1.1.1. Is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a **reliability standard**; and

4.2.1.1.2. Performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard.

4.2.1.3. Each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to any transmission facility or electric distribution system where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard.

4.2.1.4. Each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a blackstart resource up to and including the first point of connection of the starting station service of the next generating unit(s) or aggregated generating facility(ies) to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system: all **bulk electric system** facilities

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from CIP-013-AB-2:

4.2.3.1. Cyber assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. Cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete **electronic security perimeters**.

4.2.3.3. [Intentionally left blank.]

4.2.3.4. For the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no **BES cyber systems** categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the identification and categorization process required by CIP-002-AB-5.1 or any subsequent version of that **reliability standard**.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management

CIP-013-AB-2



5. Effective Date: See CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall develop one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) for high and medium impact **BES cyber systems** and their associated **electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **physical access control systems**. The plan(s) shall include: *[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

1.1. One or more process(es) used in planning for the procurement of **BES cyber systems** and their associated **electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **physical access control systems** to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the **bulk electric system** from vendor products or services resulting from: (i) procuring and installing vendor equipment and software; and (ii) transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s).

1.2. One or more process(es) used in procuring **BES cyber systems**, and their associated **electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **physical access control systems**, that address the following, as applicable:

1.2.1. Notification by the vendor of vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity;

1.2.2. Coordination of responses to vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity;

1.2.3. Notification by vendors when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to vendor representatives;

1.2.4. Disclosure by vendors of known vulnerabilities related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity;

1.2.5. Verification of software integrity and authenticity of all software and patches provided by the vendor for use in the **BES cyber system** and their associated **electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **physical access control systems**; and

1.2.6. Coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access.

M1. Evidence shall include one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) as specified in the Requirement.

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1. *[Alberta Risk Rating: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Note: Implementation of the plan does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders). Additionally, the following issues are beyond the scope of Requirement R2: (1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract.

M2. Evidence shall include documentation to demonstrate implementation of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), which could include, but is not limited to, correspondence, policy documents, or working documents that demonstrate use of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan.

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Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management

CIP-013-AB-2



R3. Each Responsible Entity shall review and obtain **CIP senior manager** or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1 at least once every 15 **months**. [*Alberta Risk Rating: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

M3. Evidence shall include the dated supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) approved by the **CIP senior manager** or delegate(s) and additional evidence to demonstrate review of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s). Evidence may include, but is not limited to, policy documents, revision history, records of review, or workflow evidence from a document management system that indicate review of supply chain risk management plan(s) at least once every 15 **months**; and documented approval by the **CIP senior manager** or delegate.

C. Compliance

[Intentionally left blank.]

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

- NERC *Cyber Security — Supply Chain Risk Management: Technical Rationale and Justification for Reliability Standard CIP-013-2*
- CIP-PLAN-AB-2, *Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standards*
- AESO Information Document, #2015-003RS, *Guidance Information for CIP Standards* and any amendments made thereto from time to time.

Version History

Version	Effective Date	Description of Change
2	10/01/2024	Initial Version

Alberta Reliability Standard

Physical Security

CIP-014-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to identify and protect transmission substations and their associated primary **control centres**, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or **cascading** within an **Interconnection**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that the **ISO** notifies pursuant to requirement R2;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** notifies pursuant to requirement R3; and
- (c) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of existing transmission substations and those planned to be in service within 24 **months** that meet any of the following criteria:

- (i) **transmission facilities** operated at 500 kV or higher;
- (ii) **transmission facilities** that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single substation, where the substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to 3 or more other substations and has an aggregate weighted value exceeding 3000 according to the table below, with the “aggregate weighted value” for a substation determined by summing the “weight value per line” shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing **bulk electric system** transmission line that is connected to another transmission substation:

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300

- (iii) **transmission facilities** at a single substation location that are critical to the derivation of **interconnection reliability operating limits** and their associated contingencies;

and those risk assessments must consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify those transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or **cascading**.

R1.1 The **ISO** must perform subsequent risk assessments at least once every 30 **months** on a rolling basis.

R1.2 Intentionally left blank

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R2 The **ISO** must notify the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** of the transmission substations identified through the application of requirement R1 within 30 **days** following the completed requirement R1 risk assessment.

R2.1 The **ISO** must, if a transmission substation previously identified under requirement R1 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to requirement R1, within 30 **days** following the subsequent risk assessment, notify the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** of the removal.

R3 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must,

- (a) if a transmission substation is identified under requirement R1; and
- (b) if the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** does not operate the transmission substation; then

within 7 **days** following the notification under requirement R2, provide notification of the identification to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that has operational control of the associated primary **control centre**.

R3.1 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must,

- (a) if a transmission substation previously identified under requirement R1 is removed from the identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to requirement R1; and
- (b) if the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** does not operate the transmission substation; then

within 7 **days** following the notification under requirement R2.1, provide notification of the removal to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that has operational control of the associated primary **control centre**.

R4 Each of:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** with a transmission substation identified in the notification provided under requirement R2;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** with a primary **control centre** that controls any of the substations identified in the notification provided under requirement R3; and
- (c) the **ISO** in respect of its primary **control centre**;

must conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of those respective facilities, which evaluation must consider the following:

R4.1 unique characteristics of the identified transmission substations and primary **control centres**;

R4.2 prior history of attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and

R4.3 intelligence or threat warnings received from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, U.S. federal governmental agencies, Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.

R5 Each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** with a transmission substation identified in accordance with requirement R2, the **operator** of a **transmission facility** with a primary **control centre** that controls any of the substations identified in the notification provided under requirement R3, and the **ISO** in respect of its primary **control centre**, must:

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Physical Security

CIP-014-AB-2



- (a) develop and implement one or more documented physical security plans that covers any respective transmission substations, and primary **control centre**;
- (b) develop such physical security plans:
 - (i) within 180 **days** following the applicable notifications received in accordance with requirement R2 or requirement R3; or
 - (ii) for the **ISO's** primary **control centre**, within 180 **days** of the effective date of this **reliability standard**; and
- (c) implement such physical security plans according to the timeline specified in the physical security plans.

R5.1 Each physical security plan must include the following attributes:

- R5.1.1** resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation conducted in requirement R4;
- R5.1.2** law enforcement contact and coordination information;
- R5.1.3** a timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan; and
- R5.1.4** provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to each transmission substations, or primary **control centres**.

R6 Each of:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** with a transmission substation identified in accordance with requirement R2;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** with a primary **control centre** that controls any of the substations identified in the notification provided under requirement R3; and
- (c) the **ISO** in respect of its primary control centre,

must have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under requirement R4 and any security plans developed under requirement R5.

R6.1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** must select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:

- (a) an entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional or Physical Security Professional certification;
- (b) an entity or organization approved by the **NERC**;
- (c) a governmental agency with physical security expertise; or
- (d) an entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

R6.2 Each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** must ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 **days** of completing the security plans developed in requirement R5.

R6.3 Each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** must, if the unaffiliated third party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under requirement R4 or any security plans developed under requirement R5 and within 60 **days** of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:

- (a) modify its evaluation or security plans consistent with the recommendation; or
- (b) document the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plans consistent with the recommendation.

R6.4 Each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** must implement procedures for protecting sensitive or confidential information made available to the unaffiliated third party reviewer and to protect or exempt sensitive or confidential information developed pursuant to this **reliability standard** from public disclosure.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of performing an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of the transmission substations, or other equivalent evidence.

MR1.1 Evidence of performing subsequent risk assessments as required in requirement R1.1 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic documentation of the subsequent risk assessments, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of notifying the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** of the transmission substations identified through the application of requirements R1 as required in requirement R2. Evidence may include dated emails or other equivalent evidence.

MR2.1 Evidence of notifying the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** of the transmission substations removed through the application of requirements R1 as required in requirement R2. Evidence may include dated emails or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of notifying the **operator** of the **transmission facility** of the transmission substations identified through the application of requirements R1 as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic notifications or communications, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3.1 Evidence of notifying the **operator** of the **transmission facility** of the transmission substations removed through the application of requirements R1 as required in requirement R3.1 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic notifications or communications, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of conducting an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic documentation that each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective transmission stations, transmission substations and primary **control centres**, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of developing and implementing one or more documented physical security plans as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic documentation

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of its physical security plans that covers their respective identified and verified transmission substations, and primary **control centres**, and additional evidence demonstrating execution of the physical security plan according to the timeline specified in the physical security plan, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of having an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include written or electronic documentation demonstrating that each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under requirement R4 and any security plans developed under requirement R5, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.1 Evidence of selecting an unaffiliated third party reviewer as required in requirement R6.1 exists. Evidence may include documentation demonstrating the selection of an unaffiliated third party reviewer and a statutory declaration confirming that the third party is unaffiliated, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.2 Evidence of ensuring that the unaffiliated third party review is completed as required in requirement R6.2 exists. Evidence may include a dated documented review performed by the unaffiliated third party, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.3 Evidence of modifying, or documenting the reasons for not modifying, the evaluation or security plans as required in requirement R6.3 exists. Evidence may include a modified evaluation or security plans, or documented reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plans in accordance with the recommended change, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.4 Evidence of implementing procedures as required in requirement R6.4 exists. Evidence may include written or electronic documentation of procedures to protect information, such as a non-disclosure agreement, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Implementation Plan

Each of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, and the **ISO** must implement requirement R1 through requirement R6 in accordance with the implementation plan in Appendix 1.

6. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Implementation plan effective dates*

Revision History

Date	Description
2020-07-01	Initial release.

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Appendix 1

Effective Dates:

1. CIP-014-AB-2 becomes effective on the first **day** of the calendar quarter (January 1, April 1, July 1 or October 1) that follows 6 full calendar quarters after approval by the **Commission**.
2. The initial risk assessment required by CIP-014-AB-2, requirement R1, must be completed on or before the effective date of this **reliability standard**.
3. The initial performance of CIP-014-AB-2, requirements R2 and R2.1 must be completed within 30 **days** of the effective date of this **reliability standard**.

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Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP

CIP-PLAN-AB-3



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to set the effective dates for requirements of CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** and describe compliance timelines for planned and unplanned changes that result in a higher categorization for a **BES cyber system**.

2. Applicable Reliability Standards

This **reliability standard** applies to the following CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**:

- CIP-002-AB-5.1, *Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization*;
- CIP-003-AB-8, *Cyber Security — Security Management Controls*;
- CIP-004-AB-7, *Cyber Security — Personnel and Training*;
- CIP-005-AB-7, *Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)*;
- CIP-006-AB-5, *Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems*;
- CIP-007-AB-5, *Cyber Security — Systems Security Management*;
- CIP-008-AB-5, *Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning*;
- CIP-009-AB-5, *Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems*;
- CIP-010-AB-4, *Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments*;
- CIP-011-AB-3, *Cyber Security — Information Protection*; and
- CIP-013-AB-2, *Cyber Security — Supply Chain Risk Management*

(collectively referred to as “CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**”)

3. General Considerations

The intent of the *Initial Performance of Certain Periodic Requirements* section below is for each Responsible Entity, as defined in the applicable **reliability standard**, to remain on the same time interval of the prior versions of the standards for their performance of the requirements under the new versions.

The implementation of CIP-005-AB-7, CIP-010-AB-4, and CIP-013-AB-2 does not require the abrogation or re-negotiation of contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders) with vendors, suppliers, or other entities executed as of the effective date of the **reliability standards**.

In implementing CIP-013-AB-2, Responsible Entities are expected to use their Supply Chain Cyber Security Risk Management Plans in procurement processes (e.g., Request for Proposal, requests to entities negotiating on behalf of the responsible entity in the case of cooperative purchase agreements, master agreements that the Responsible Entity negotiates after the effective date, or direct procurements covered under the Responsible Entity's plan) that begin on or after the effective date of CIP-013-AB-2. Contract effective date, commencement date, or other activation dates specified in a contract do not determine whether the procurement action is within scope of CIP-013-AB-2.

4. Compliance with Reliability Standards

Once each new version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** becomes effective, in accordance with the *Effective Date* section below, the Responsible Entities identified in the applicability section of each version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard** shall comply with the requirements of those **reliability standards**.

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5. Effective Date

The CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**, except for CIP-003-AB-8, CIP-004-AB-7, CIP-005-AB-7, CIP-010-AB-4, CIP-011-AB-3, and CIP-013-AB-2, became effective on October 1, 2017.

CIP-003-AB-8, with the exception of CIP-003-AB-8 requirement R2, CIP-005-AB-7, CIP-010-AB-4, and CIP-013-AB-2 become effective on October 1, 2024. CIP-003-AB-8, requirement R2 and CIP-004-AB-7 and CIP-011-AB-3 will become effective as set out in the implementation plans below.

Implementation plan for CIP-003-AB-8 R2

CIP-003-AB-8, requirement R2 shall be effective on the following timeline for all Responsible Entities:

- 15% of applicable assets by December 31, 2024;
- 30% of applicable assets by December 31, 2025;
- 60% of applicable assets by December 31, 2026; and
- 100% of applicable assets on October 1, 2027.

CIP-003-AB-5, requirement R2 shall remain effective throughout the phased implementation period of CIP-003-AB-8 R2. Each Responsible Entity must remain compliant with CIP-003-AB-5, requirement R2 until that entity meets the requirements of CIP-003-AB-8, requirement R2 in accordance with the Implementation Plan given above.

Early Implementation Plan for CIP-004-AB-7 and CIP-011-AB-3

CIP-004-AB-7 and CIP-011-AB-3 become effective on April 1, 2026. Each Responsible Entities, except for the **ISO**, may elect an earlier effective date following approval by the Alberta Utilities Commission and prior to April 1, 2026. Each Responsible Entities, except for the **ISO**, electing to comply with an earlier effective date shall notify the **ISO** of the date of compliance with the CIP-004-AB-7 and CIP-011-AB-3 **reliability standards** in writing.

The **ISO** may elect an earlier effective date following approval by the Alberta Utilities Commission and prior to April 1, 2026 by providing notice in writing to the Market Surveillance Administrator.

Each Responsible Entities shall comply with CIP-004-AB-5.1 and CIP-011-AB-1 until receipt of the notice confirming the elected earlier effective date..

6. Initial Performance of Certain Periodic Requirements

Specific CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** have periodic requirements that contain time parameters for subsequent and recurring iterations of the requirement, such as, but not limited to,

“... at least once every 15 **months** ...”, and Responsible Entities shall initially comply with those periodic requirements as follows:

6.1. on or before the effective date of CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirements:

- CIP-002-AB-5.1, requirement R2;
- CIP-003-AB-8, requirement R1;
- CIP-004-AB-7, requirement R6, Part 6.2;
- CIP-013-AB-2, requirement R3;

6.2. within 14 **days** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirement:

- CIP-007-AB-5, requirement R4, Part 4.4;

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- 6.3. within 35 **days** of the Responsible Entity's last performance requirement of requirement R2, Part 2.1 under CIP-010-AB-1:
- CIP-010-AB-4, requirement R2, Part 2.1;
- 6.4. within 3 **months** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirement:
- 6.5. within 12 **months** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirements:
- CIP-006-AB-5, requirement R3, Part 3.1;
 - CIP-008-AB-5, requirement R2, Part 2.1;
 - CIP-009-AB-5, requirement R2, Parts 2.1 and 2.2; and
- 6.6. within 15 **months** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirements:
- CIP-003-AB-8 R2, Attachment 1, Section 1
- 6.7. within 15 **months** of the Responsible Entity's last performance requirement of requirement R2, Part 2.3 under CIP-004-AB-5.1
- CIP-004-AB-7, requirement R2, Part 2.3;
- 6.8. within 15 **months** of the Responsible Entity's last performance requirement of requirement R4, Part 4.3 and 4.4 under CIP-004-AB-5.1
- CIP-004-AB-7, requirement R4, Part 4.3;
- 6.9. within 15 **months** of the Responsible Entity's last performance requirement of requirement R3, Part 3.1 under CIP-010-AB-1:
- CIP-010-AB-4, requirement R3, Part 3.1; and
- 6.10. within 24 **months** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirements:
- CIP-009-AB-5, requirement R2, Part 2.3; and
- 6.11. within 36 **months** of the Responsible Entity's last performance requirement of:
- CIP-010-AB-4, requirement R3, Part 3.2
- 6.12. within 36 **months** after the effective date of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** for the following requirements:
- CIP-003-AB-8, requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 4.5

7. Planned or Unplanned Changes Resulting in a Higher Categorization

Planned changes refer to any changes of the electric system or **BES cyber system** as identified through the annual assessment under CIP-002-AB-5.1, requirement R2, which were planned and implemented by the Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard**.

In contrast, unplanned changes refer to any changes of the electric system or **BES cyber system**, as identified through the annual assessment under CIP-002-AB-5.1, requirement R2, which were not planned by the Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP

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Cyber Security – Implementation Plan for CIP

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Cyber Security **reliability standard**.

For planned changes resulting in a higher categorization, the Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard** shall comply with all applicable requirements in the current version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards** on the update of the identification and categorization of the affected **BES cyber system** and any applicable and associated **physical access control systems, electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **protected cyber assets**, with additional time to comply for requirements in the same manner as those timelines specified in the section *Initial Performance of Certain Periodic Requirements* above.

For unplanned changes resulting in a higher categorization, the Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standard** shall comply with all applicable requirements in the current version of the CIP Cyber Security **reliability standards**, according to the following timelines, following the identification and categorization of the affected **BES cyber system** and any applicable and associated **physical access control systems, electronic access control or monitoring systems** and **protected cyber assets**, with additional time to comply for requirements in the same manner as those timelines specified in the section *Initial Performance of Certain Periodic Requirements* above.

Scenario of Unplanned Changes After the Effective Date for Each Version of the CIP Cyber Security Reliability Standard	Compliance Implementation
New High Impact BES cyber system	12 months
New Medium Impact BES cyber system	12 months
Newly categorized High Impact BES cyber system from Medium Impact BES cyber system	12 months for requirements not applicable to Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Newly categorized Medium Impact BES cyber system	12 months
The Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP Cyber Security reliability standard identifies first Medium Impact or High Impact BES cyber system (i.e., the Responsible Entity identified in the applicability section of each current version of the CIP Cyber Security reliability standard previously had no BES cyber systems categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP-002-AB-5.1 identification and categorization processes)	24 months

For unplanned changes resulting in a low impact categorization where previously the asset containing **BES Cyber Systems** had no categorization, the Responsible Entity shall comply with all requirements applicable to low impact **BES Cyber Systems** within 12 calendar **months** following the identification and categorization of the affected **BES Cyber System**.

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CIP-PLAN-AB-3



Revision History

Effective Date	Description
2024-05-02	Updated to incorporate the adoption of CIP-004-AB-7 AND CIP-011-AB-3; the retirement of CIP-004-AB-5.1 and CIP-011-AB-1; adding effective dates where known. Updated the document to include early compliance option process details for CIP-004-AB-7 and CIP-011-AB-3
2024-10-01	Updated to incorporate the adoption of CIP-003-AB-8, CIP-005-AB-7, CIP-010-AB-4, CIP-013-AB-2; the retirement of CIP-003-AB-5, CIP-005-AB-5, CIP-010-AB-1; added new section General Considerations; updated unplanned changes for low impact categorization; and minor editorial changes, including fixing typographical errors and adding in effective dates where known.
2017-10-01	Initial release

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish voice communication capabilities necessary to maintain the reliable operation of the **interconnected electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
- (b) the **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (c) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (d) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**; and
- (e) the **ISO**.

For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the above list of entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities”. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** shall have primary voice communication capability with the following entities, unless the **ISO** detects a failure of its primary voice communication capability, in which case requirement R10 shall apply:

- (a) each **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
- (b) each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (c) each **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (d) each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (e) each adjacent **reliability coordinator**;
- (f) each adjacent **interconnected transmission operator** directly connected to Alberta; and
- (g) each **adjacent balancing authority**.

R2 The **ISO** shall designate a backup voice communication capability in each control room with the following entities:

- (a) each **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
- (b) each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (c) each **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system**, with each **operator** control room that is capable of operating more than 50 MW of generation based on the total **maximum authorized real power**;
- (d) each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (e) each adjacent **reliability coordinator**;
- (f) each adjacent **interconnected transmission operator** directly connected to Alberta; and
- (g) each **adjacent balancing authority**.

R3 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall have primary voice communication capability with the following entities, unless the **operator** of a **transmission facility** detects a failure of its primary voice communication capability in which case requirement R10 shall apply:

- (a) the **ISO**;
- (b) each adjacent **operator** of a **transmission facility** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**;
- (c) each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**;
- (d) each **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system** and is directly connected to its **transmission facility** and;
- (e) each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** and is directly connected to its **transmission facility**; and
- (f) each adjacent **interconnected transmission operator** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**.

R3.A1¹ Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall have a primary voice communication capability that is:

- (a) a direct access telephone on the public telephone network;
- (b) not degraded by any other communication functionality or any other data transfer activities if there is any shared equipment; and
- (c) located in each control room.

R4 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall designate a backup voice communication capability with the following entities:

- (a) the **ISO**;
- (b) each adjacent **operator** of a **transmission facility** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**;
- (c) each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**;
- (d) each **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system** and is directly connected to its **transmission facility**;
- (e) each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** and is directly connected to its **transmission facility**; and
- (f) each adjacent **interconnected transmission operator** that is directly connected to its **transmission facility**.

R4.A1 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall have the type of backup voice communication capability, in each control room, as identified in:

- (a) Appendix 1 for communicating with the **ISO**; and

¹ Any requirement that contains an A in the designation, such as R3.A1, is an additional **ISO** requirement that was established by the **ISO** for use in its **balancing authority area** and was not derived from a NERC COM-001-3 requirement.

- (b) Appendix 2 for communicating with each entity specified in requirement R4.
- R5** Intentionally left blank.
- R6** Intentionally left blank.
- R7** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** shall have primary voice communication capability with the following entities, unless the **operator** of an **electric distribution system** detects a failure of its primary voice communication capability in which case requirement R11 shall apply:
- (a) the **ISO**; and
 - (b) its **operator** of a **transmission facility**.
- R7.A1** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** shall have a primary voice communication capability that is:
- (a) a direct access telephone on the public telephone network;
 - (b) not degraded by any other communication functionality or any other data transfer activities if there is any shared equipment; and
 - (c) located in each control room.
- R7.A2** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** shall have the type of backup voice communication capability, in each control room, as identified in:
- (a) Appendix 1 for communicating with the **ISO**; and
 - (b) Appendix 3 for communicating with its **operator** of a **transmission facility**.
- R8** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** shall have primary voice communication capability with the following entities, unless the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** detects a failure of its primary voice communication capability in which case requirement R11 shall apply:
- (a) the **ISO**; and
 - (b) its **operator** of a **transmission facility**.
- R8.A1** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** shall have a primary voice communication capability that is:
- (a) a direct access telephone on the public telephone network;
 - (b) not degraded by any other communication functionality or any other data transfer activities if there is any shared equipment; and
 - (c) located in each control room.
- R8.A2** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** shall have the type of backup voice communication capability, in each control room, as identified in:
- (a) Appendix 1 for communicating with the **ISO**; and
 - (b) Appendix 3 for communicating with its **operator** of a **transmission facility**.
- R9** Each Responsible Entity shall test its backup voice communication capability, as specified in Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and Appendix 3, at least once each **month**. If the test is unsuccessful, the Responsible Entity shall initiate action to repair or designate a temporary replacement backup voice communication capability within 2 hours of the unsuccessful test.

- R10** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall notify entities as identified in requirements R1 and R3, respectively within 60 minutes of the detection of a failure of its primary voice communication capability that lasts 30 minutes or longer.
- R11** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system**, **operator** of a **generating unit**, and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that detects a failure of its primary voice communication capability shall consult each entity affected by the failure, as identified in requirement R7 for an **operator** of an **electric distribution system** or requirement R8 for an **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**, to determine a mutually agreeable action for the restoration of its primary voice communication capability.
- R12** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit**, and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** shall have internal voice communication capabilities for the exchange of information necessary for the reliable operation of the **interconnected electric system**. This includes voice communication capabilities between control rooms within the same functional entity, and/or between a control room and field personnel.
- R13** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** shall have internal voice communication capabilities for the exchange of information necessary for the reliable operation of the **interconnected electric system**. This includes communication capabilities between control rooms within the same functional entity, and/or between a control room and field personnel.
- R14.A1** Each Responsible Entity shall, where its backup voice communication capability is a satellite telephone service, use a satellite network system, that is approved by the **ISO**.
- R15.A1** Each Responsible Entity shall, where its backup voice communication capability is a satellite telephone service or utility orderwire service,² have sufficient backup power supply to ensure that its backup voice communication capability, in its control room site, is capable of remaining operational for a minimum of 8 hours in the event of an extended power outage of its main power supply for its backup voice communication capability.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of designating a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, or dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of having primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

² "utility orderwire service" means a private voice communications system that is operated and controlled by one or more **market participant** and the **ISO**. The utility orderwire service leverages utility telecommunication network infrastructure owned by a **market participant** and the **ISO** and may also leverage passive telecommunication infrastructure owned by a third-party.

- MR3.A1** Evidence of having a primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R3.A1 exists. Evidence may include voice communication system design or configuration documentation, physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of designating a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, or dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4.A1** Evidence of having a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R4.A1 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Intentionally left blank.
- MR6** Intentionally left blank.
- MR7** Evidence of having primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7.A1** Evidence of having a primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R7.A1 exists. Evidence may include voice communication system design or configuration documentation, physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7.A2** Evidence of having a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R7.A2 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8** Evidence of having primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8.A1** Evidence of having a primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R8.A1 exists. Evidence may include voice communication system design or configuration documentation, physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8.A2** Evidence of having a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R8.A2 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.
- MR9** Evidence of testing backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R9 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

Evidence of initiating action to repair or designate a replacement of backup voice communication capability, which does not utilize the same infrastructure as voice communication used for day-to-day operation, as required in requirement R9 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR10 Evidence of notifying entities, within the minimum timeframe, after a detection of a failure of its primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R10 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR11 Evidence of consulting with each entity affected by the failure of its primary voice communication capability as required in requirement R11 exists. Evidence may include dated **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR12 Evidence of having internal voice communication capability as required in requirement R12 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, or dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, operating procedures, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR13 Evidence of having internal voice communication capability as required in requirement R13 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, or dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, operating procedures, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR14.A1 Evidence of using a satellite network system as a backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R14.A1 exists. Evidence may include physical assets, dated evidence, such as, equipment specifications and installation documentation, test records, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

MR15.A1 Evidence of having sufficient backup power supply that ensures its backup voice communication capability in its control room site is capable of remaining operational in the event of an extended power outage of its main power supply for its backup voice communication capability as required in requirement R15.A1 exists. Evidence may include backup power supply size and load calculations, and, if an extended power outage occurred, dated and time-stamped records of operations during the extended power outage, such as, **operator** logs, voice recordings, transcripts of voice recordings, or electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Responsible Entity Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with the ISO*

Appendix 2 – *Operator of a Transmission Facility Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with Adjacent Entities and Entities that are Directly Connected to its Transmission Facility*

Appendix 3 – *Operator of an Electric Distribution System, Operator of a Generating Unit, and Operator of an Aggregated Generating Facility Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with Its Operators of Transmission Facility*

Revision History

Date	Description
2024-04-01	Revised to remove excess whitespace and correct formatting.
2024-04-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1

Responsible Entity Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with the ISO

Responsible Entity Category	Responsible Entity subcategory	Responsible Entity Backup Voice Communication Capability Options for Communicating with the ISO
1. Each operator of a transmission facility	(a) that operates any transmission facility unless it meets the criteria specified in subcategory 1(b).	(1) Utility orderwire service
	(b) that only operates a radial circuit at the control room or only operates a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website.	None required
2. Each operator of an electric distribution system		(1) Utility orderwire service; (2) Satellite telephone service; or (3) Direct access telephone service.
3. Each operator of a generating unit and operator of an aggregated generating facility connected to the transmission system or to transmission facilities within the City of Medicine Hat where the maximum authorized real power is:	(a) less than 50 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	None required
	(b) equal to or greater than 50 MW and less than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
	(c) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, where the total synchronous generation is less than 300 MW, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
	(d) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of synchronous generation operated at the control room or a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service

Appendix 2

Operator of a Transmission Facility Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with Adjacent Entities and Entities that are Directly Connected to its Transmission Facility

Responsible Entity	Adjacent and Directly Connected Entity Category	Adjacent and Directly Connected Entity Subcategory	Operator of a Transmission Facility Backup Voice Communication Capability Options for Communicating with Each Adjacent and Directly Connected Entity
Operator of a transmission facility unless the only transmission facility operated at the control room is a radial circuit or is a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website	1. Each adjacent operator of a transmission facility that is directly connected to its transmission facility	(a) that operates any transmission facility unless it meets the criteria specified in subcategory 1(b)	(1) Utility orderwire service
		(b) that only operates a radial circuit or operates a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website.	(1) Utility orderwire service; (2) Satellite telephone service; or (3) Direct access telephone service.
	2. Each operator of an electric distribution system that is directly connected to its transmission facility		(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
	3. Each operator of a generating unit or aggregated generating facility that is directly connected to its transmission facility and the maximum authorized real power is:	(a) less than 50 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource ;	None required.
		(b) equal to or greater than 50 MW and less than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource ;	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
		(c) equal to or greater than	(1) Utility orderwire service; or

		300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, where the total synchronous generation is less than 300 MW, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource ; and	(2) Satellite telephone service.
		(d) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of synchronous generation operated at the control room or a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service
	4. Each adjacent interconnected transmission operator that is directly connected to its transmission facility		(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
Operator of a transmission facility where the transmission facility operated at the control room is a radial circuit or is a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website.	1. Each adjacent operator of a transmission facility that is directly connected to its transmission facility	(a) that operates any transmission facility unless it meets the criteria specified in subcategory 1(b)	(1) Utility orderwire service (2) satellite telephone service; or (3) direct access telephone service
		(b) that only operates a radial circuit or only operates a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website.	(1) Utility orderwire service; (2) Satellite telephone service; or (3) Direct access telephone service.
	2. Each operator of an electric distribution system that is directly connected to its transmission facility		(1) Utility orderwire service; (2) Satellite telephone service; or (3) direct access telephone service.
	3. Each operator of a generating unit or aggregated	(a) less than 50 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the	None required

	generating facility that is directly connected to its transmission facility and the maximum authorized real power is:	generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource;	
		(b) equal to or greater than 50 MW and less than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource;	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
		(c) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated by the control room, where the total synchronous generation is less than 300 MW, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource; and	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
		(d) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of synchronous generation operated at the control room or a blackstart resource.	(1) Utility orderwire service
	4. Each adjacent interconnected transmission operator that is directly connected to its transmission facility		(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.

Appendix 3

Operator of an Electric Distribution System, Operator of a Generating Unit, and Operator of an Aggregated Generating Facility Requirements for Each Backup Voice Communication Capability with Its Operator of Transmission Facility*

Responsible Entity Category	Responsible Entity Subcategory	Responsible Entity Backup Voice Communication Capability Options for Communicating with its
1. Each operator of an electric distribution system		(1) Utility orderwire service; (2) Satellite telephone service; or (3) An operator of electric distribution system may use direct access telephone service provided it is connected to a radial circuit or it is connected to a transmission facility identified in a list the ISO publishes on the AESO website.
2. Each operator of a generating unit and each operator of an aggregated generating facility where the maximum authorized real power is:	(a) less than 50 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	None required.
	(b) equal to or greater than 50 MW and less than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
	(c) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of generation operated at the control room, where the total synchronous generation is less than 300 MW, unless the generating unit or aggregated generating facility is a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service; or (2) Satellite telephone service.
	(d) equal to or greater than 300 MW based on the total amount of synchronous generation operated at the control room or is a blackstart resource .	(1) Utility orderwire service

*Appendix 3 does not include requirements for each **operator** of a **transmission facility**

Alberta Reliability Standard

Operating Personnel Communications Protocols

COM-002-AB-4



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to improve communications for the issuance of operating instructions¹, including **directives**, with predefined communications protocols to reduce the possibility of miscommunication that could lead to action or inaction harmful to the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
- (b) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (c) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (d) the **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; and
- (e) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall develop documented communication protocols for its operating personnel that issue or receive operating instructions, including **directives**. The protocols shall, at a minimum:

- R1.1** require its operating personnel that issues or receives an oral or written operating instruction to use the English language;
- R1.2** require its operating personnel that issues an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instruction to take one of the following actions:
 - (a) confirm the receiver's response if the repeated information is correct;
 - (b) reissue the operating instruction if the repeated information is incorrect or if requested by the receiver; or
 - (c) take an alternative action if a response is not received or if the operating instruction was not understood by the receiver.
- R1.3** require its operating personnel that receives an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instruction to take one of the following actions:
 - (a) repeat, not necessarily verbatim, the operating instruction and receive confirmation from the issuer that the response was correct; or
 - (b) request that the issuer reissue the operating instruction;
- R1.4** require its operating personnel that issues a written or oral single-party to multiple-party burst operating instruction to confirm or verify that the operating instruction was received by at least one receiver of the operating instruction;

¹ For the purposes of COM-002-AB-4, "operating instruction" means a command by operating personnel responsible for the real-time operation of the **interconnected electric system** to change or preserve the state, status, output, or input of a **system element**. A **directive** is a type of an **operating instruction**. (a discussion of general information and of potential options or alternatives to resolve **interconnected electric system** operating concerns is not a command and is not considered an operating instruction.)

- R1.5** specify the instances that require time identification when issuing an oral or written operating instruction and the format for that time identification; and
- R1.6** specify the nomenclature for transmission interface **system elements** and interface **transmission facilities** when issuing an oral or written operating instruction.
- R2** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall conduct initial training for each of its operating personnel responsible for the real-time operation of the **interconnected electric system** on the documented communications protocols developed in accordance with requirement R1 prior to that individual **operator** issuing an operating instruction, including **directives**.
- R3** Each **operator** of an **electric distribution system**, **operator** of a **generating unit**, and the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** shall conduct initial training for each of its operating personnel who can receive an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instruction prior to that individual **operator** receiving an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instruction, including **directives**, to either:
- (a) repeat, not necessarily verbatim, the operating instruction and receive confirmation from the issuer that the response was correct; or
 - (b) request that the issuer reissue the operating instruction.
- R4** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** shall at least once every 12 months:
- R4.1** assess adherence to the documented communications protocols in requirement R1 by its operating personnel that issue or receive operating instructions, including **directives**, provide feedback to those operating personnel, and take corrective action, as deemed appropriate by the entity, to address deviations from the documented protocols; and
- R4.2** assess the effectiveness of its documented communications protocols in requirement R1 for its operating personnel that issue or receive operating instructions, include **directives**, and modify its documented communication protocols, as necessary.
- R5** The **ISO** and **operator** of a **transmission facility** that issues an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instructions during an **emergency**, excluding written or oral single-party to multiple-party burst operating instruction, shall either:
- (a) confirm the receiver's response if the repeated information is correct (in accordance with requirement R6);
 - (b) reissue the operating instruction if the repeated information is incorrect or if requested by the receiver; or
 - (c) take an alternative action, if a response is not received or if the operating instruction was not understood by the receiver.
- R6** The **ISO** and each **operator** of an **electric distribution system**, **operator** of a **generating unit**, **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**, and **operator** of **transmission facility** that receives an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instructions during an **emergency**, excluding written or oral single-party to multiple-party burst operating instruction, shall either:
- (a) repeat, not necessarily verbatim, the operating instruction and receive confirmation from the issuer that the response was correct, or
 - (b) request that the issuer reissue the operating instruction.
- R7** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** that issues a written or oral single-party to multiple-party burst operating instruction during an **emergency** shall confirm or verify that the operating instruction was received by at least one receiver of the operating instruction.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having developed documented communication protocols for operating personnel that issue or receive operating instructions, including **directives**, as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include documented communication protocols or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of conducting initial training for each of its operating personnel for the real-time operation of the **interconnected electric system** as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include initial training records, such as dated class rosters, training certificates, lesson plans, course materials, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of conducting initial training for operating personnel who can receive an oral two-party, person-to-person operating instruction, including **directives**, as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include initial training records, such as dated class rosters, training certificates, lesson plans, course materials, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of assessing the adherence to and effectiveness of the documented communication protocols in requirement R1 as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include documented assessments, dated **operator** logs or other evidence of feedback, corrective actions taken, modified documented communication protocols, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of confirming receiver's response, reissuing the operating instruction during an **emergency**, or taking an alternative action as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped voice recordings, dated and time-stamped transcripts of voice recordings, dated **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of repeating the operating instruction during an **emergency** or requesting that the issuer reissue the operating instruction as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped voice recordings, dated and time-stamped transcripts of voice recordings, dated **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of confirming or verifying that a written or oral operating instruction during an **emergency** was received by at least one receiver as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped voice recordings, dated and time-stamped transcripts of voice recordings, dated **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2024-04-01	Revised to correct formatting and bold the defined term " emergency ".
2024-04-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Event Reporting

EOP-004-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to improve the reliability of the **bulk electric system** by requiring the reporting of events by the **ISO**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must have an event reporting operating plan to report the events identified in Appendix 1 to the **NERC** and other organizations, as appropriate.
- R2** The **ISO** must, upon recognition of a reportable event identified in Appendix 1, report the event in accordance with its event reporting operating plan as soon as practicable, but no more than five (5) **business days** following such recognition.
- R3** The **ISO** must validate all contact information contained in its event reporting operating plan each calendar year.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having an event reporting operating plan as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, an event reporting operating plan for the events identified in Appendix 1.
- MR2** Evidence of reporting events as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a copy of the completed report, operator logs, voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of validating all contact information contained in the event reporting operating plan as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated records showing contact information, electronic communications or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Reportable Events*

Revision History

Date	Description
2016-08-30	Initial release.

Appendix 1 Reportable Events

The following are the reportable events to be contained in the **ISO's** event reporting operating plan, as described in requirement R1:

1. a physical threat to a **control centre** of the **ISO**, excluding a weather or natural disaster related threat, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of a **control centre** of the **ISO**;
2. a suspicious device or activity at a **control centre** of the **ISO**;
3. a situation on the **bulk electric system** requiring a public appeal for load reduction;
4. a situation on the **bulk electric system** requiring a system-wide voltage reduction greater than or equal to 3%;
5. a situation on the **bulk electric system** requiring manual firm load shedding greater than or equal to 100 MW;
6. exceeding an **interconnection reliability operating limit** within the **interconnected electric system** for an amount of time that is greater than **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv**, or exceeding a **system operating limit** for a major transmission path identified in the table "Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System", as provided by the **WECC**, for more than thirty (30) minutes;
7. a loss of firm load greater than or equal to 300 MW for fifteen (15) minutes or more;
8. an unintended **transmission system** separation within the **interconnected electric system** that results in an island of greater than or equal to 100 MW, excluding an island created by the loss of:
 - a) a **transmission system** radial connection;
 - b) non-**transmission system** facilities (distribution level); or
 - c) the **interconnection**;
9. total generation loss, within one (1) minute, of greater than or equal to 2000 MW;
10. an unplanned evacuation of the **control centre** of the **ISO** for thirty (30) continuous minutes or more;
11. a complete loss, for thirty (30) continuous minutes or more, of voice communication systems for the **control centre** of the **ISO**; or
12. a complete loss of monitoring capability affecting the **control centre** of the **ISO** for thirty (30) continuous minutes or more that renders analysis capability, such as state estimator or contingency analysis, inoperable.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure plans, facilities, and personnel are prepared to enable restoration of the **interconnected electric system** starting from **blackstart resources**, to ensure **reliability** is maintained during restoration, and priority is placed on restoring the **interconnected electric system** and the **interconnection** in accordance with the **ISO's** restoration plan.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that the **ISO** includes in its restoration plan and in a list published on the AESO website that the **ISO** may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (c) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that:
 - (i) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (ii) has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW; and
 - (iii) is directly connected to either the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; and
- (d) the **operator** of an **electric distribution system** that is identified in the restoration plan of an **operator** of a **transmission facility**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must develop a restoration plan approved by the **ISO** and implement it to restore the **transmission facilities** that it operates, regardless of where the **blackstart resource** is located, following a **disturbance** in which:

- (a) one or more areas of the **interconnected electric system** shuts down; and
- (b) the use of **blackstart resources** is required to restore the shut-down area(s).

The restoration plan must include:

R1.1 strategies for system restoration that are coordinated with the **ISO's** restoration plan;

R1.2 intentionally left blank;

R1.3 procedures for restoring;

- (a) connections with other **operators** of **transmission facilities**; and
- (b) **interconnections** with any adjacent **interconnected transmission operators** under the direction of the **ISO**.

R1.4 the characteristics of each **blackstart resource** that is connected to the **transmission facilities** of the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, including but not limited to the:

- (a) name;
- (b) location;
- (c) megawatt and megavar capacity; and
- (d) type of **generating unit**;

- R1.5** the identification of the initial switching requirements for any facilities, operated by the **operator** of a **transmission facility**, that are a part of the **cranking paths** identified in the **ISO's** restoration plan;
- R1.6** acceptable operating voltage and frequency limits during restoration;
- R1.7** operating processes to re-establish connections between the **transmission facilities** of the **operator** of a **transmission facility** for areas that have been restored and are prepared for reconnection;
- R1.8** operating processes to restore loads required to restore the **interconnected electric system**, such as:
- (a) station service for substations;
 - (b) **generating units** to be restarted or stabilized; and
 - (c) load needed to stabilize generation and frequency, and to provide voltage control; and
- R1.9** operating processes for accepting operations from and transferring operations back to the **ISO** in accordance with the **ISO's** restoration plan.
- R2** In the event of changes to the roles and specific tasks of entities identified in a restoration plan:
- (a) the **ISO** must provide the affected entities identified in its restoration plan with a description of any changes to their roles and specific tasks prior to the effective date of the plan; and
 - (b) each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must provide the affected entities identified in its approved restoration plan with a description of their roles and any changes to their roles and specific tasks prior to the effective date of the plan.
- R3** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must within sixty (60) days, or another time period agreed to by the **ISO**, after receiving a copy of the **ISO's** restoration plan updated in accordance with requirement R3 of EOP-006-AB-3 or any subsequent version of that **reliability standard**:
- (a) review its restoration plan;
 - (b) align its restoration plan, as necessary, with the **ISO's** restoration plan; and
 - (c) submit its plan to the **ISO** for approval.
- R3.1** The **operator** of a **transmission facility** must, where the **ISO** disapproves a restoration plan submitted pursuant to requirement R3(c), resolve the issues described in the reasons provided by the **ISO** within a timeframe agreed to by the **ISO**.
- R4** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must update and submit its revised restoration plan to the **ISO** for approval, when the revision would change its ability to implement its restoration plan, as follows:
- (a) within ninety (90) **days** after identifying an unplanned permanent **interconnected electric system** modification; and
 - (b) not less than thirty (30) **days** prior to implementing a planned permanent **interconnected electric system** modification.
- R4.1** The **operator** of a **transmission facility** must, where the **ISO** disapproves a revised restoration plan submitted pursuant to requirement R4, resolve the issues described in the reasons provided by the **ISO** within a timeframe agreed to by the **ISO**.
- R5** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must have a copy of its latest **ISO**-approved restoration plan within its primary and backup control rooms prior to its effective date, for the purpose of ensuring it is available to its real-time operating personnel.

- R5.1** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must provide a copy of its latest **ISO**-approved restoration plan, prior to its effective date, to each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** identified in that plan.
- R6** The **ISO** must verify through analysis of actual events, a combination of steady state and dynamic simulations, or testing that its restoration plan accomplishes its intended function. This must be completed at least once every five (5) calendar years. Such analysis, simulations or testing must verify:
- R6.1** the capability of **blackstart resources** to meet the **real power** and **reactive power** requirements of the **cranking paths** and the dynamic capability to supply initial loads;
 - R6.2** the location and magnitude of loads required to control voltages and frequency within acceptable operating limits; and
 - R6.3** the capability of **generating units** required to control voltages and frequency within acceptable operating limits.
- R7** The **ISO** must have **blackstart resource** testing requirements to verify that each **blackstart resource** is capable of meeting the requirements of the **ISO**'s restoration plan. These **blackstart resource** testing requirements must include:
- R7.1** The frequency of testing such that each **blackstart resource** is tested at least once every three (3) calendar years.
 - R7.2** A list of required tests including:
 - (a) a test to verify the ability of the **blackstart resource** to:
 - (i) start the **generating unit(s)** associated with the **blackstart resource** when isolated with no support from the **interconnected electric system**; or
 - (ii) remain energized without connection to the remainder of the **interconnected electric system**, if designed to do so; and
 - (b) upon completion of (a), a test to verify the ability of the **generating unit(s)** associated with the **blackstart resource** to energize a bus. If it is not possible to energize a bus during the test, the testing entity must otherwise demonstrate that the **generating unit(s)** associated with the **blackstart resource** has the capability to energize a bus.
 - R7.3** The minimum duration of each of the required tests.
- R8** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must include system restoration training for its real-time operating personnel once each calendar year in its operations training program. This training program must include training on the following:
- (a) the **operator** of a **transmission facility**'s restoration plan including coordination with the **ISO** and each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** included in its restoration plan;
 - (b) restoration priorities;
 - (c) the building of **cranking paths** as included in its restoration plan
 - (d) synchronizing re-energized sections of the **interconnected electric system**; and
 - (e) transition of **demand** and resource balance to the **ISO**.
- R9** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** and **operator** of an **electric distribution system** must provide a minimum of two (2) hours of system restoration training every two (2) calendar years to its field switching personnel identified as performing unique tasks associated with the **operator** of a **transmission facility**'s restoration plan that are outside of their normal tasks.

- R10** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must participate in the **ISO's** restoration drills, exercises, or simulations if requested by the **ISO**.
- R11** The **ISO** must have written **blackstart resource** agreements or mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols with each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource**, specifying the terms and conditions of their arrangement. Such agreements must include references to the **blackstart resource** testing requirements, including those specified in requirement R7.
- R12** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** must have documented procedures for starting each **blackstart resource** and energizing a bus.
- R13** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** must notify the **ISO** of any known changes to the capabilities of that **blackstart resource** affecting the ability of the **operator** of a **generating unit** to fulfill the requirements of the **ISO's** restoration plan within twenty-four (24) hours of becoming aware of such change.
- R14** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** must perform **blackstart resource** tests, and maintain records of such testing, in accordance with the testing requirements set by the **ISO** as referenced in the **blackstart resource** agreements or mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols.
- R14.1** Testing records must include at a minimum:
- (a) name of the **blackstart resource**;
 - (b) **generating unit** tested;
 - (c) date of the test;
 - (d) duration of the test;
 - (e) time required to start the **generating unit**; and
 - (f) an indication of any testing requirements not met under requirement R7.
- R14.2** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** must provide the **blackstart resource** test results within thirty (30) days after receiving a request from the **ISO**.
- R15** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** must provide a minimum of two (2) hours of training every two (2) calendar years to each of its operating personnel responsible for:
- (a) the startup of its **blackstart resource**; and
 - (b) energizing a bus.
- R15.1** The training program must include training on the following:
- (a) those elements of the **ISO's** restoration plan that are applicable to the **blackstart resource**, including coordination with the **ISO** and the adjacent **operator** of a **transmission facility**; and
 - (b) the procedures documented in requirement R12.
- R16** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** must participate in the **ISO's** restoration drills, exercises, or simulations as requested by the **ISO**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of developing a restoration plan approved by the **ISO** and implementing it as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence of developing a restoration plan approved by the **ISO** may include:

- (a) email, mail or other equivalent evidence demonstrating approval of the restoration plan by the **ISO**; and
- (b) a documented restoration plan including the elements identified in requirement R1.

Evidence of implementing a restoration plan may include operator logs, voice recordings, other operating or communication documentation, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of providing a description of any changes to the roles and specific tasks of affected entities identified in the restoration plan as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include a documented restoration plan showing the effective date and dated emails with receipts or registered mail with receipts, including a description of any changes to roles and specific tasks, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of reviewing, aligning and submitting the restoration plan as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include a documented restoration plan, including a review or revision history, and emails with receipts or registered mail with receipts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3.1 Evidence of resolving the issues described in the reasons provided by the **ISO** within a timeframe agreed to by the **ISO** as required in requirement R3.1 exists. Evidence may include emails with receipts or registered mail with receipts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of updating and submitting the revised restoration plan as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include:

- (a) for the date of identifying any unplanned permanent modifications: logs, a dated report, emails, or other equivalent evidence;
- (b) for the date of implementing planned modifications: logs, a dated report, emails, or other equivalent evidence;
- (c) for updating the restoration plan: a dated documented restoration plan and revision histories, or other equivalent evidence; and
- (d) for submitting the revised restoration plan: emails with receipts or registered mail receipts including submission date, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4.1 Evidence of resolving the issues described in the reasons provided by the **ISO** within a timeframe agreed to by the **ISO** as required in requirement R4.1 exists. Evidence may include emails with receipts or registered mail with receipts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of having a copy of its latest **ISO**-approved restoration plan within the primary and backup control rooms and of making it available to its real-time operating personnel prior to its effective date, as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated records to show that the latest **ISO**-approved copy of the restoration plan was made available as required in requirement R5, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5.1 Evidence of providing a copy of the latest **ISO**-approved restoration plan to each **operator** of an **electric distribution system** prior to its effective date as required in requirement R5.1 exists. Evidence may include dated emails with receipts or registered mail receipts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of verifying at least once every five (5) calendar years that the restoration plan accomplishes its intended function as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include dated event analysis assessments, dated study results, or other equivalent evidence.

MR7 Evidence of having **blackstart resource** testing requirements as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include **blackstart resource** testing requirement documentation, or other equivalent evidence.

- MR8** Evidence of including system restoration training within the operations training program as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include a documented operations training program including system restoration training for real-time operating personnel, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR9** Evidence of providing a minimum of two (2) hours of system restoration training every two (2) calendar years as required in requirement R9 exists. Evidence may include training records, training documentation including dates and duration, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR10** Evidence of participating in the **ISO's** restoration drills, exercises, or simulations as required in requirement R12 exists. Evidence may include:
- (a) documentation of the **ISO's** request; and
 - (b) training records, participation records, training documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR11** Evidence of having written **blackstart resource** agreements or mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols as required in requirement R11 exists. Evidence may include executed agreements, procedures or protocols, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR12** Evidence of having documented procedures for starting each **blackstart resource** and energizing a bus as required in requirement R12 exists. Evidence may include, dated documented procedures, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR13** Evidence of notifying the **ISO** of any known changes to the capabilities of the **blackstart resource** as required in requirement R13 exists. Evidence may include emails with receipts, registered mail receipts, time stamped voice recordings or operator logs, showing when the **operator** of a **generating unit** with a **blackstart resource** became aware of changes to the **blackstart resource** capabilities and that it notified the **ISO** within twenty-four (24) hours of becoming aware of such changes as required in requirement R15, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR14** Evidence of performing **blackstart resource** tests, maintaining records of such testing, and providing the **blackstart resource** test results as required in requirement R16 exists. Evidence may include test records, test results, and emails with receipts or registered mail receipts that show that it provided these records to the **ISO** when requested, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR15** Evidence of providing a minimum of two (2) hours of training every two (2) calendar years as required in requirement R15 exists. Evidence may include training records, including training dates and durations, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR15.1** Evidence of including training within the training program that training as required in requirement R15.1 exists. Evidence may include training materials, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR16** Evidence of participating in the **ISO's** restoration drills, exercises, or simulations as required in requirement R16 exists. Evidence may include training records, participation records, training documentation, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – Amending Process for List of Operators of Transmission Facilities Included in the AESO Restoration Plan

Revision History

Date	Description
2023-10-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1

Amending Process for List of Operators of Transmission Facilities included in the AESO Restoration Plan

In order to amend the list referenced in subsection (b) of section 2, *Applicability*, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that an **operator** of a **transmission facility** is to be added to the list, notify each affected **operator** of a **transmission facility** in writing and determine the date on which the amended list comes into effect, which must be no less than the first day of the month following four (4) full calendar quarters (January 1, April 1, July 1, October 1) after the date of notice, for the **operator** to meet the applicable requirements;
- (b) upon determining that an **operator** of a **transmission facility** is to be deleted, notify each affected **operator** of a **transmission facility** in writing and determine the date on which the amended list comes into effect such that the **operator** will no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) post the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure plans are established and personnel are prepared to enable effective coordination of the system restoration process to ensure **reliability** is maintained during restoration of the **interconnected electric system** in the event of a complete or partial **blackout**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must develop a restoration plan for its area and implement it following a **disturbance** in which:

- (a) one or more areas of the **interconnected electric system** shuts down; and
- (b) the use of **blackstart resources** is required to restore the shut down area.

The restoration plan must include:

- R1.1** a strategy to be employed during restoration events for restoring the **interconnected electric system** including minimum criteria for meeting the objectives of the **ISO's** restoration plan;
 - R1.2** criteria and conditions for re-establishing connections between each **operator** of a **transmission facility** within its area, with **transmission operators** in other **reliability coordinator areas**, and with other **reliability coordinators**;
 - R1.3** reporting requirements for the entities within the **ISO's** area during a restoration event;
 - R1.4** criteria for sharing information regarding restoration with neighbouring **reliability coordinators** and with **operators** of **transmission facilities** within the **ISO's** area; and
 - R1.5** identification of the **ISO** as the primary contact for disseminating information regarding restoration to neighbouring **reliability coordinators**, and to **operators** of **transmission facilities** within its area.
 - R1.6** Intentionally left blank.
- R2** The **ISO** must distribute its most recent restoration plan to each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, as referenced in the **ISO's** restoration plan, and to neighbouring **reliability coordinators** within thirty (30) **days** of creation or revision.
- R3** The **ISO** must review its restoration plan within thirteen (13) **months** of the last review.
- R4** The **ISO** must review its neighbouring **reliability coordinator's** restoration plans and provide written notification of any conflicts identified during that review to the applicable **reliability coordinator** within sixty (60) **days** of receipt.
- R4.1** If the **ISO** identifies any conflicts between its restoration plan and any of its neighbouring **reliability coordinator's plans**, the conflicts must be resolved within thirty (30) **days** of receipt of the **ISO's** written notification.
- R5** The **ISO** must review the restoration plans of **operators** of **transmission facilities** within its area that are required to be submitted to the **ISO** in accordance with EOP-005-AB-3 or any subsequent version of that **reliability standard**.
- R5.1** The **ISO** must determine whether each of the restoration plans referenced in requirement R5

is coordinated and compatible with the **ISO's** restoration plan and each of the other restoration plans referenced in requirement R5. The **ISO** must provide the **operator** of a **transmission facility** with written notification of approval or disapproval of its restoration plan, with stated reasons, within thirty (30) **days** after the **ISO's** receipt of the restoration plan.

- R6** The **ISO** must have within its primary and backup control rooms, so that it is available to all of its real-time operating personnel, a copy of its latest approved restoration plan prior to its effective date.
- R7** The **ISO** must include within its operations training program, annual **interconnected electric system** restoration training for its real-time operating personnel. This training program must address the following:
- R7.1** the coordination role of the **ISO**; and
 - R7.2** re-establishing **WECC** Paths 1 and 83.
- R8** The **ISO** must conduct two (2) scheduled instances of a system restoration drill, exercise, or simulation per calendar year, which must provide an opportunity for each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** to attend as dictated by the particular scope of the drill, exercise, or simulation that is being conducted.
- R8.1** The **ISO** must request each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**, as identified in the **ISO's** restoration plan, to participate in a drill, exercise, or simulation at least once every two calendar years.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of developing and implementing a restoration plan as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence of developing a restoration plan may include a dated copy of the restoration plan, or other equivalent evidence. Evidence of implementing a restoration plan may include operator logs, operating documentation, voice recordings, communication documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of distributing the restoration plan as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include dated e-mails with receipts, a dated posting to a secure website with notification to affected entities, dated registered mail receipts, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of reviewing the restoration plan as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include a dated review signature sheet, revision histories, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of reviewing each neighbouring **reliability coordinator's** restoration plans and providing notification of any conflicts, where applicable, within the timelines as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated emails, dated electronic receipts, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4.1** Evidence of resolving any conflicts within the timelines as required in requirement R4.1 exists. Evidence may include dated emails, dated electronic receipts, a dated updated plan, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of reviewing restoration plans of each **operator** of a **transmission facility** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include a dated review signature sheet, dated electronic receipts, dated emails, or other equivalent evidence.

- MR5.1** Evidence of approving or disapproving, and providing notification of any conflicts and resolving any conflicts within the timelines as required in requirement R5.1 exists. Evidence may include dated emails, dated electronic receipts, a dated updated plan, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of having copies of restoration plans as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include dated emails, dated electronic receipts, restoration plan documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of including the **interconnected electric system** restoration training as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include an electronic or a hard copy training program, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8** Evidence of conducting two scheduled instances of a system restoration drill, exercise, or simulation per calendar year and providing an opportunity for entities to attend, as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence of conducting the required drills, exercises or simulations may include dated training records, or other equivalent evidence. Evidence of providing an opportunity for each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** to attend, as required in requirement R8, may include dated records of the **ISO's** invitation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8.1** Evidence of requesting that each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**, as identified in the **ISO's** restoration plan, participate in a drill, exercise, or simulation, as required in requirement R8.1 exists. Evidence may include dated records of the **ISO's** request, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2023-10-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure continued reliable operations of the **bulk electric system** in the event that a **control centre** becomes inoperable.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**; and
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** who operates a **control centre** that controls **transmission facilities** that are part of the **bulk electric system**.

This **reliability standard** does not apply to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** whose **transmission facilities** are only:

- (a) radial **transmission facilities** connecting to:
 - load;
 - one or more **generating units**; and / or
 - one or more **aggregated generating facilities**; or
- (b) either part of an industrial complex or connected to an industrial complex and cannot interrupt power flow on the **interconnected electric system**, other than power flow on its own **transmission facilities**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must have a current operating plan describing the manner in which it continues to meet its functional obligations with regard to the reliable operations of the **bulk electric system** in the event that its primary **control centre** functionality is lost.

This operating plan for backup functionality must include the following, at a minimum:

- (a) the location and method of implementation for providing backup functionality;
- (b) a summary description of the items required to support the backup functionality. These items must include, at a minimum:
 - (i) tools and applications to ensure that system operators have situational awareness of the **bulk electric system**;
 - (ii) data communications;
 - (iii) voice communications;
 - (iv) power source(s); and
 - (v) physical and cyber security;
- (c) an operating process for keeping the backup functionality consistent with the primary **control centre**;
- (d) operating procedures, including decision authority, for use in determining when to implement the operating plan for backup functionality;

- (e) a transition period between the decision to transfer functionality to the back up **control centre** following the loss of primary **control centre** functionality and the time to fully implement the backup functionality that is less than or equal to two (2) hours; and
- (f) an operating process describing the actions to be taken during the transition period between the loss of primary **control centre** functionality and the time to fully implement the backup functionality items identified in requirement R1, part (b). The operating process must include at a minimum:
 - (i) a list of all entities to notify when there is a change in operating locations;
 - (ii) actions to manage the risk to the **bulk electric system** during the transition from primary to backup functionality, as well as during outages of the primary or backup functionality; and
 - (iii) identification of the roles for personnel involved during the initiation and implementation of the operating plan for backup functionality.

R2 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must have a copy of its current operating plan for backup functionality available at its primary **control centre** and at the location providing backup functionality.

R3 The **ISO** must have a backup **control centre** facility (provided through its own dedicated backup facility or at another entity's **control centre** staffed with **NERC** certified "reliability coordinator operators" when control has been transferred to the backup facility) that provides the functionality required for maintaining compliance with all **reliability standards** that depend on primary **control centre** functionality. To avoid requiring a tertiary facility, a backup facility is not required during:

- (a) planned outages of the primary or backup facilities of two (2) weeks or less; or
- (b) unplanned outages of the primary or backup facilities.

R4 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must, when control has been transferred to the backup functionality location, have backup functionality provided either through:

- (a) a facility staffed by operators that are certified in accordance with any applicable **reliability standards**; or
- (b) contracted services staffed by operators that are certified in accordance with any applicable **reliability standards**

that includes monitoring, control, logging, and alarming sufficient for maintaining compliance with all **reliability standards** that depend on the **operator** of a **transmission facility**'s primary **control centre** functionality.

To avoid requiring tertiary functionality, backup functionality is not required during:

- (i) planned outages of the primary or backup functionality of two (2) weeks or less; or
- (ii) unplanned outages of the primary or backup functionality.

R5 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must annually review and approve its operating plan for backup functionality.

R5.1 An update and approval of the operating plan for backup functionality must take place within sixty (60) **days** of identifying any necessary changes to any part of the operating plan described in requirement R1.

- R6** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must have primary and backup functionality that do not depend on each other for the **control centre** functionality required to maintain compliance with **reliability standards**.
- R7** The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must conduct and document results of an annual test of its operating plan that demonstrates:
- R7.1** The transition time between the decision to transfer functionality to the backup **control centre** following the simulated loss of primary **control centre** functionality and the time to fully implement the backup functionality; and
 - R7.2** The backup functionality for a minimum of two (2) continuous hours.
- R8** The following requirements apply in the event of a loss of primary or backup functionality that is anticipated to last for more than six (6) months:
- R8.1** Where the **operator** of a **transmission facility** loses primary or backup functionality as described in requirement R8, it must provide a plan to the **ISO** within six (6) **months** of the date when the functionality is lost, showing how it will re-establish primary or backup functionality; and
 - R8.2** Where the **ISO** loses primary or backup functionality as described in requirement R8, it must provide a plan to the **WECC** within six (6) **months** of the date when the functionality is lost, showing how it will re-establish primary or backup functionality.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having a current operating plan for backup functionality as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated, current operating plan with specified elements or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of having an electronic or paper copy of the current operating plan for backup functionality available at its primary **control centre** and at the location providing backup functionality as required in requirement R2 exists.
- Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a current electronic or paper copy of the operating plan, operator log identifying when the plan was put into the **control centre**, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of having a backup **control centre** facility that provides the functionality and is staffed as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation identifying that the backup **control centre** facility is staffed with **NERC** certified “reliability coordinator operators” and provides the same functionality to maintain compliance with all **reliability standards** as the primary **control centre**, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of having backup functionality provided either through a facility or contracted services staffed as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation identifying that the backup functionality includes monitoring, control, logging, and alarming sufficient for maintaining compliance with all **reliability standards** that depend on the primary **control centre** functionality, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of reviewing and approving annually the operating plan for backup functionality as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated, current,

operating plan for backup functionality, including a revision and approval history, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5.1 Evidence of updating and approving the operating plan for backup functionality as required in requirement R5.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, an updated and approved operating plan for backup functionality within sixty (60) **days** of any changes to any part of the operating plan described in requirement R1, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of having primary and backup functionality that do not depend on each other for the **control centre** functionality required to maintain compliance with **reliability standards** as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation or drawings that show the independence of the two (2) **control centres**, or other equivalent evidence.

MR7 Evidence of conducting an annual test for backup functionality and documenting the results of the operating plan as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, testing documentation or other equivalent evidence.

MR8 Evidence for requirement R8 is included in the following measures:

MR8.1 Evidence of providing a plan to the **ISO** as required in requirement R8.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated email or letter providing the plan to the **ISO**, or other equivalent evidence.

MR8.2 Evidence of providing a plan to the **WECC** as required in requirement R8.2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated email or letter to the **WECC**, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-07-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to address the effects of operating emergencies by ensuring the **ISO** and each applicable **operator** of a **transmission facility** has developed one or more operating plans to mitigate operating emergencies, and that those plans are coordinated within Alberta.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**; and
- (b) the **ISO**

This **reliability standard** does not apply to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** whose **transmission facilities** are only:

- (c) **radial circuits** connecting to any one or more of:
 - (i) load;
 - (ii) one or more **generating units**; and
 - (iii) one or more **aggregated generating facilities**; or
- (d) part of an industrial complex, or connected to an industrial complex, and cannot interrupt power flow on the **interconnected electric system** other than power flow on its own **transmission facilities**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must develop, maintain, and, in the event of an operating emergency, implement one or more **ISO**-reviewed operating plans to mitigate operating emergencies in its area. The operating plans must include the following, as applicable:

R1.1 roles and responsibilities for activating the operating plans;

R1.2 processes to prepare for and mitigate operating emergencies including:

R1.2.1 notification to the **ISO**, to include current and projected conditions, when experiencing an operating emergency;

R1.2.2 coordination with the **ISO** for the cancellation or recall of **transmission facility** outages;

R1.2.3 requests to the **ISO** for **transmission system** reconfiguration;

R1.2.4 requests to the **ISO** to change generation level;

R1.2.5 provisions for manual load shedding that minimizes the overlap with automatic load shedding and are capable of being implemented in a timeframe adequate for mitigating the emergency; and

R1.2.6 **reliability** impacts of extreme weather conditions.

R1A The **ISO** must develop, maintain, and implement one or more operating plans to mitigate operating emergencies on the **interconnected electric system**. The operating plans must include the following, as applicable:

R1A.1 roles and responsibilities for activating the operating plans;

R1A.2 processes to prepare for and mitigate operating emergencies including:

R1A.2.1 intentionally left blank;

R1A.2.2 cancellation or recall of **transmission facility** and **generating unit** outages;

- R1A.2.3 transmission system** reconfiguration;
 - R1A.2.4** provisions to issue **directives** for managing generation level;
 - R1A.2.5** provisions to issue **directives** for manual load shedding for mitigating the emergency; and;
 - R1A.2.6 reliability** impacts of extreme weather conditions.
- R2** The **ISO** must develop, maintain, and implement one or more operating plans to mitigate capacity emergencies and energy emergencies within its **balancing authority area**. The operating plans must include the following, as applicable:
 - R2.1** roles and responsibilities for activating the operating plans;
 - R2.2** processes to prepare for and mitigate emergencies including:
 - R2.2.1** intentionally left blank;
 - R2.2.2** declaring an energy emergency alert, in accordance with Appendix 1;
 - R2.2.3** managing generating resources in its **balancing authority area** to address:
 - R2.2.3.1** capability and availability;
 - R2.2.3.2** fuel supply and inventory concerns;
 - R2.2.3.3** fuel switching capabilities; and
 - R2.2.3.4** environmental constraints;
 - R2.2.4** public appeals for voluntary load reductions;
 - R2.2.5** intentionally left blank;
 - R2.2.6** intentionally left blank;
 - R2.2.7** use of **interruptible demand**, curtailable load and demand response;
 - R2.2.8** provisions to issue **directives** for manual load shedding for mitigating the emergency; and
 - R2.2.9 reliability** impacts of extreme weather conditions.
- R3** The **ISO** must review the operating plans to mitigate operating emergencies submitted by an **operator** of a **transmission facility** regarding any **reliability** risks that are identified between operating plans,
 - R3.1** within 60 **days** of receiving the initial operating plans and within 30 **days** of receiving subsequent operating plans, the **ISO** must:
 - R3.1.1** review each submitted operating plan on the basis of compatibility and inter-dependency with operating plans of the **ISO** and other **operators** of a **transmission facility**;
 - R3.1.2** review each submitted operating plan for coordination to avoid risk to wide-area **reliability**; and
 - R3.1.3** notify each **operator** of a **transmission facility** of the results of its review, specifying any time frame for resubmittal of its operating plans if revisions are identified.
- R4** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must address any **reliability** risks the **ISO** identifies pursuant to requirement R3 and resubmit the related operating plans to the **ISO** within a time period the **ISO** specifies.
- R5** The **ISO** must, when it identifies an operating emergency, notify within 30 minutes from the time of identification, any affected adjacent **reliability coordinators**.

R6 The **ISO** must, when experiencing a potential or actual energy emergency within Alberta declare an energy emergency alert, as detailed in Appendix 1.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of developing, maintaining, and implementing operating plans, and having operating plans reviewed as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence of:

- developing an operating plan may include documented operating plans with effective dates;
- maintaining an operating plan may include documented operating plans with version history;
- implementing an operating plan may include **operator** logs, voice recordings, system logs, sequence of events records or disturbance reports;
- having operating plan reviewed by the **ISO**, as applicable, which may include emails; or
- other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of developing, maintaining, and implementing one or more operating plans to mitigate capacity emergencies and energy emergencies as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include documented operating plans with effective dates, **operator** logs, voice recordings, system logs, sequence of events records, disturbance reports, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of reviewing operating plans as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include dated e-mails, other correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of addressing **reliability** risks identified in an operating plan as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated emails, other correspondence, version history showing that the **operator** of a **transmission facility** has responded and updated the operating plan, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of notifying affected adjacent **reliability coordinators** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include **operator** logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of declaring an energy emergency alert as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include **operator** logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 - *Energy Emergency Alerts*

Revision History

Date	Description
2022-01-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1

Energy Emergency Alerts

Introduction

This Appendix 1 provides the process and descriptions of the levels the **ISO** uses to communicate the condition of its **balancing authority area** when it is experiencing an energy emergency.

A. General Responsibilities

1. Initiation. The **ISO** may initiate an energy emergency alert.
2. Notification. The **ISO** must, when it declares an energy emergency alert, notify all adjacent **reliability coordinators**.

B. Energy Emergency Alert Levels

The **ISO** may declare whatever energy emergency alert level is necessary and need not proceed through the energy emergency alerts sequentially.

1. EEA 1 — All available generation resources in use.

Circumstances:

- The **ISO** is experiencing conditions where all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments, and is concerned about sustaining its required **contingency reserve**.
- Non-firm wholesale energy sales, other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements, have been curtailed.

2. EEA 2 — Load management procedures in effect.

Circumstances:

- The **ISO** is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is energy deficient.
- The **ISO** has implemented its operating plans to mitigate emergencies.
- The **ISO** is still able to maintain minimum **contingency reserve** requirements.

During EEA 2, the **ISO** has the following responsibilities:

- 2.1 notify **adjacent balancing authorities**.
- 2.2 the **ISO** must update the energy emergency alert levels as changes occur and pass this information on to the adjacent **reliability coordinators**, **adjacent balancing authorities**, and adjacent **interconnected transmission operators**.
- 2.3 sharing information on resource availability: The **ISO** must coordinate, as appropriate, with the **reliability coordinator** that has an energy deficient **balancing authority**.
- 2.4 evaluating and mitigating transmission limitations: The **ISO** must review **transmission facility** outages and work with the **operator** of a **transmission facility** to see if it is possible to return to service any transmission elements that may relieve the loading on **system operating limits** or **interconnection reliability operating limits**.
- 2.5 before declaring an EEA 3, the **ISO** must make use of all available resources; including:
 - 2.5.1 all available **generating units** are online: All **generating units** capable of being online in the time frame of the emergency are online.
 - 2.5.2 **demand-side management**: Activate **demand-side management** within provisions of any applicable agreements.

3. EEA 3 — Firm Load interruption is imminent or in progress.

Circumstances:

- The **ISO** is unable to meet minimum **contingency reserve** requirements.

During EEA 3, the **ISO** has the following responsibilities:

- 3.1 continue actions from EEA 2. The **ISO** must continue to take all actions initiated during EEA 2.
- 3.2 the **ISO** must update its information as changes occur and pass this information on to the adjacent **reliability coordinators**, **adjacent balancing authorities** and adjacent **interconnected transmission operators** until the EEA 3 is terminated.
- 3.3 re-evaluating and revising **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits**. The **ISO** must evaluate the risks of revising **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits**. The **ISO** must coordinate the re-evaluation of **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** with other affected **reliability coordinators**. The **ISO** may only revise **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** as long as an EEA 3 condition exists. The following are minimum requirements that the **ISO** must meet before **system operating limits** or **interconnection reliability operating limits** are revised:
 - 3.3.1 the **ISO** must, when it is energy deficient, immediately take whatever actions are necessary to mitigate any undue risk to the **Interconnection** which may include load shedding.
- 3.4 returning to pre-emergency conditions: Whenever energy is made available such that the systems can be returned to its pre-emergency **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits**, the **ISO** may downgrade the alert level.
 - 3.4.1 notification of other parties. Upon the **ISO** downgrading an alert level, it must notify the adjacent **reliability coordinators**, **adjacent balancing authorities** and adjacent **transmission operators** that systems can be returned to normal limits.

Alert 0 - Termination. When the **ISO** is able to meet its load and **operating reserve** requirements, it must terminate the energy emergency alert. The **ISO** must notify all other adjacent **reliability coordinators**, **adjacent balancing authorities** and adjacent **transmission operators** of the termination.

FAC-001-AB-0 Facility Connection Requirements

1. Purpose

The purpose of this *reliability standard* is to establish connection and performance requirements for *facilities* connecting to the *AIES*.

2. Applicability

This *reliability standard* applies to:

- *ISO*

3. Definitions

Italicized terms used in this *reliability standard* have the meanings as set out in the [Alberta Reliability Standards Glossary of Terms](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

R1 The *ISO* must document transmission *interconnection* requirements to comply with all *reliability standards*. The *ISO's* transmission *interconnection* requirements must address connection requirements for:

R1.1 Generating units

R1.2 *Transmission facilities*

R1.3 *Transmission connected end-use customer's facilities*

R2 The *ISO's* transmission *interconnection* requirements or project functional specification must address, but is not limited to, the following items:

R2.1 Voltage level and *MW* and *MVAR* capacity or *demand* at point of connection

R2.2 Breaker duty and *surge* protection

R2.3 *System* protection and coordination

R2.4 Metering and telecommunications

R2.5 Grounding and safety issues

R2.6 Insulation and insulation coordination

R2.7 Voltage, *reactive power*, and *power factor* control

R2.8 Power quality impacts

R2.9 Equipment *ratings*

R2.10 Synchronizing of *facilities*

R2.11 Maintenance coordination

R2.12 Operational issues (abnormal frequency and voltages)

R2.13 Inspection requirements for existing or new *facilities*

R2.14 Communications and procedures during normal and emergency operating conditions

R3 The *ISO* must assess the long term implications to the AIES of any facility to be connected to it.

R4 The *ISO* must maintain and update as required and post on its website its transmission *interconnection* requirements.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this *reliability standard*. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 The *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements include requirements for generating units, *transmission facilities* and *transmission connected end use customer facilities*.

The *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements include content that is compliant and consistent with all *reliability standards*.

MR2 The *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements or project functional specifications contain information addressing each item identified in R2.

MR3 The assessment made in R3 is included in either the transmission *interconnection* requirements or project functional specification.

MR4 The *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements are posted on its website.

A revision history for the *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements shows that updates were made for each change to *reliability standards*, as appropriate.

Changes to the *ISO* transmission *interconnection* requirements are completed within 12 months of the *Commission* approving a change in the *reliability standards*.

7. Appendices

No appendices have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

Revision History

Effective	Description
2010-09-24	New Issue

FAC-002-AB-0 Coordination of Plans for New Facilities

1. Purpose

The purpose of this *reliability standard* is to demonstrate that proper evaluation of potential *reliability* impacts of new *transmission facilities* to be connected to the *AIES* has occurred.

2. Applicability

This *reliability standard* applies to:

- *ISO*

3. Definitions

Italicized terms used in this *reliability standard* have the meanings as set out in the [Alberta Reliability Standards Glossary of Terms](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

- R1** The *ISO* must retain the documentation of its evaluation of the potential *reliability* impact of the new *transmission facilities* and their connections on the *AIES* for three years after energization.
- R2** The *ISO* must provide the documentation referred to in requirement R1 to the *WECC* within 30 calendar *days* of its request, provided such request is made with the three year period referred to in requirement R1.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this *reliability standard*. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

- MR1** Documentation exists for the past three years and is made available when requested per R1.
- MR2** Confirmation exists that documentation was received if requested.

7. Appendices

No appendices have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

Revision History

Effective	Description
2010-03-22	New Issue

FAC-003-AB1-1 Transmission Vegetation Management Program

1. Purpose

The purpose of this *reliability standard* is to improve the *reliability* of electric transmission systems by preventing *outages* from vegetation located on a right-of-way, corridor or other route (collectively “ROW”) and minimizing *outages* from vegetation located adjacent to a ROW, maintaining clearances between *transmission facilities* and vegetation on and along a ROW, and reporting vegetation related *outages* of electric transmission systems to the ISO and WECC.

2. Applicability

This *reliability standard* applies to:

- (a) the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* with *transmission facilities* operated at 200 kV and above and any lower voltage *transmission facilities* designated by the ISO as critical to the *reliability* of the AIES as identified in Appendix A; provided that *transmission facilities* on ROWs that are assessed and identified on an annual basis not to have vegetation capable of growing higher than 2 meters are excluded; and
- (b) the ISO.

3. Definitions

Italicized terms used in this *reliability standard* have the meanings as set out in the *Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary*.

4. Requirements

R1 Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must prepare a *TVMP*. This program is to be updated at least annually. The *TVMP* must include the objectives, practices, approved procedures, and work specifications ¹ of the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*.

R1.1 The *TVMP* must define a schedule for and the type (aerial or ground) of ROW vegetation inspections. This schedule must be flexible enough to adjust for changing conditions. The inspection schedule must be based on the anticipated growth of vegetation and any other environmental or operational factors that could impact the relationship of vegetation to the *transmission facilities* of the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*. The *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must perform vegetation inspections as identified in the schedule.

¹ ANSI A300, Tree Care Operations – Tree, Shrub, and Other Woody Plant Maintenance – Standard Practices, while not a requirement of this *reliability standard*, is considered by NERC to be an industry best practice.

- R1.2** The *TVMP* must identify and document clearances between vegetation and any overhead ungrounded supply conductors, taking into consideration transmission line voltage, the effects of ambient temperature on conductor sag under maximum design loading, and the effects of wind velocities on conductor sway. Specifically, the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must establish clearances to be achieved at the time of vegetation management work identified herein as Clearance 1, and must also establish and maintain a set of clearance requirements identified herein as Clearance 2 to prevent flashover between vegetation and overhead ungrounded supply conductors.
- R1.2.1** Clearance 1 — Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must determine and document appropriate clearance distances to be achieved at the time of vegetation management work based upon local conditions and the expected time frame in which the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* plans to return for future vegetation management work. Local conditions may include, but are not limited to: operating voltage, appropriate vegetation management techniques, fire risk, reasonably anticipated tree and conductor movement, species types and growth rates, species failure characteristics, local climate and rainfall patterns, line terrain and elevation, location of the vegetation within the span, and worker approach distance requirements. Clearance 1 distances must be greater than those defined in Clearance 2.
- R1.2.2** Clearance 2 — Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must determine and document specific minimum radial clearance distances to be maintained between vegetation and conductors under all rated electrical operating conditions. These minimum radial clearance distances are necessary to prevent flashover between vegetation and conductors and will vary due to such factors as altitude and operating voltage. Subject to R1.2.2.1 and R1.2.2.2, the documented specific minimum radial clearance distances must be no less than those set forth in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 516-2003 (*Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines*) and as specified in its Section 4.2.2.3, Minimum Air Insulation Distances without Tools in the Air Gap.
- R1.2.2.1** Where transmission system transient overvoltage factors are not known, clearances must be derived from Table 5, IEEE 516-2003, phase-to-ground distances, with appropriate altitude correction factors applied.
- R1.2.2.2** Where transmission system transient overvoltage factors are known, clearances must be derived from Table 7, IEEE 516-2003, phase-to-phase voltages, with appropriate altitude correction factors applied.
- R1.3** All personnel directly involved in the design and implementation of the *TVMP* must hold appropriate qualifications and must have taken appropriate training, as defined by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*, to perform their duties.
- R1.4** Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must develop mitigation measures to achieve sufficient clearances for the protection of its *transmission facilities*

when it identifies locations on the ROW where it is restricted from attaining Clearance 1 distances.

- R1.5** Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must establish and document a process for the immediate communication of vegetation conditions that present an imminent threat of a transmission line *outage*.

This is so that action (temporary reduction in line rating, switching line out of service, etc.) may be taken until the threat is relieved.

- R2** The *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must create and implement an annual plan for vegetation management work to ensure the *reliability* of its *transmission facilities*. The plan must describe the methods used, such as manual clearing, mechanical clearing, herbicide treatment, or other actions. The plan must be flexible enough to adjust to changing conditions, taking into consideration anticipated growth of vegetation and all other environmental factors that may have an impact on the *reliability* of the *AIES*. Adjustments to the plan must be documented as they occur. The plan must include the time required to obtain permissions or permits from landowners or regulatory authorities. Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must have systems and procedures for documenting and tracking the planned vegetation management work and ensuring that the vegetation management work was completed according to its work specifications.

- R3** Each *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* must report quarterly to the *ISO*, *sustained outages* to its transmission lines determined by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* to have been caused by vegetation.

- R3.1** Multiple *sustained outages* on an individual transmission line, if caused by the same vegetation, must be reported as one *outage* regardless of the actual number of *outages* within a 24-hour period.

- R3.2** The *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* is not required to report to the *ISO*, *sustained outages* to its transmission lines caused by either:

- vegetation falling onto a transmission line from outside the ROW caused by a natural disasters are not considered reportable (examples of disasters include, but are not limited to, earthquakes, fires, tornados, hurricanes, landslides, wind shear, ice storms, floods, major storms as defined either by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* or an applicable regulatory body); or
- vegetation falling onto a transmission line caused by human or animal activity are not considered reportable (examples of human or animal activity include, but are not limited to, logging, animal severing tree, vehicle contact with tree, arboricultural, horticultural or agricultural activities, or removal/digging of vegetation).

- R3.3** The *outage* information provided by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* to the *ISO* must include at a minimum:

- number or name of the transmission line(s) forced out of service;
- date and time;
- duration of the *outage*;

- description of the cause of the *outage*;
 - other pertinent comments; and
 - remedial action taken by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*.
- R3.4** An *outage* must be categorized by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* as one of the following:
- R3.4.1** Category 1 — Grow-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation growing into transmission lines from vegetation inside and/or outside of the ROW;
- R3.4.2** Category 2 — Fall-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation falling into transmission lines from inside the ROW; or
- R3.4.3** Category 3 — Fall-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation falling into transmission lines from outside the ROW.
- R4** The *ISO* must report quarterly to *WECC*, *sustained outages* to transmission lines determined by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* to have been caused by vegetation.
- R4.1** Multiple *sustained outages* within a 24-hour period on an individual transmission line, if caused by the same vegetation, must be reported as one *outage* regardless of the actual number of *outages*.
- R4.2** The *ISO* is not required to report to *WECC*, *sustained outages* to transmission lines caused by either:
- *outages* from vegetation falling onto transmission lines from outside the ROW caused by natural disasters are not reportable (examples of disasters include, but are not limited to, earthquakes, fires, tornados, hurricanes, landslides, wind shear, ice storms, floods, major storms as defined either by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*, or an applicable regulatory body); or
 - *outages* from vegetation caused by human or animal activity are not considered reportable (examples of human or animal activity include, but are not limited to, logging, animal severing tree, vehicle contact with tree, arboricultural, horticultural or agricultural activities, or removal/digging of vegetation).
- R4.3** The *outage* information provided by the *ISO* to *WECC* must include at a minimum:
- number or name of the transmission line(s) forced out of service;
 - date and time;
 - duration of the *outage*;
 - description of the cause of the *outage*;
 - other pertinent comments; and
 - remedial action taken by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility*.
- R4.4** An *outage* must be categorized by the *legal owner* of a *transmission facility* as one of the following:

- R4.4.1** Category 1 — Grow-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation growing into transmission lines from vegetation inside and/or outside of the ROW;
- R4.4.2** Category 2 — Fall-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation falling into transmission lines from inside the ROW; or
- R4.4.3** Category 3 — Fall-ins: *Outages* caused by vegetation falling into transmission lines from outside the ROW.

5. Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this *reliability standard*. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

These measures will be used by the *ISO* in carrying out its compliance monitoring duties in accordance with *ISO rule 12*. The *ISO* may consider other data and information, including any provided by a *market participant*.

MR1 A revision history of the *TVMP* is provided annually to the *ISO*. A *TVMP* exists and is provided in the format specified in the *ISO TVMP* template. The *TVMP* is provided within 30 *days* of request. The *TVMP* is complete and includes the required component sections specified in the template.

MR1.1 A vegetation inspection schedule exists in the *TVMP*. The schedule is completed in accordance with the *ISO TVMP* template. The schedule includes all applicable transmission lines. Documentation exists to show that the vegetation inspections have been performed.

MR1.2 Clearance 1 and Clearance 2 values exist in the *TVMP*

MR1.2.1 Clearance 1 values exist for every transmission line. Clearance 1 values specified are greater than those of Clearance 2.

MR1.2.2 Clearance 2 values exist for every transmission line. Clearance 2 values specified are greater than the minimum clearances set in IEEE standards for the applicable scenarios.

MR1.3 Requirements, training, and qualifications for positions responsible for preparing and implementing the *TVMP* exist. Documentation exists to confirm that personnel meet the requirements, training, and qualifications of the position. Acceptable documentation includes training records, licenses, certificates, and resumes.

MR1.4 A list exists and specifies locations on the ROW where Clearance 1 is not attainable. Mitigation measures exist where there are restrictions. Mitigating measures are appropriate and meet the intent of this *reliability standard*.

MR1.5 A documented process or procedure for communication exists. The process is appropriate and of sufficient detail to meet the intent of the requirement.

MR2 A work plan exists in the form of the *ISO* vegetation management work plan template. The work plan is complete. The work plan is submitted annually and within 30 *days* of being requested.

Evidence exists to show that the work plan is implemented. Evidence may include status and inspection reports, work orders, and/or contracts. The work plan is being followed in accordance to the schedule. The work is completed in accordance with the work plan. Revision documentation exists where the plan has been revised. Evidence is provided to the *ISO* within 30 *days* of a request.

MR3 to 3.4.3 Quarterly reports are submitted to the *ISO* by the dates specified by the *ISO*. Quarterly reports contain all sustained outages caused by vegetation for that reporting period. Quarterly reports contain the specific information in the requirement.

MR4 to 4.4.3 Quarterly reports are submitted to the *WECC* by dates specified by *WECC*. Quarterly reports contain all sustained *outages* caused by vegetation received by the *ISO* for that reporting period. Quarterly reports contain the specific information in the requirement.

7. Appendices

Appendix A - Transmission Facilities Designated as Critical to the AIES

The following facilities have been identified as critical to the *AIES* and require the application of this *reliability standard*:

- 887L (Pocaterra T48S - Alberta / BC border);
- 777L (Pocaterra T48S - Seebe T245S);
- 786L (Coleman T799S - Alberta / BC border); and
- 170L (Coleman T799S - Pincher Creek T396S).

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this *reliability standard*.

Revision History

Date	Description
2012-12-17	Administrative update – “ <i>TFO</i> ” replaced with the “ <i>legal owner of a transmission facility</i> ”; and other minor cleanup items.
2010-01-26	R1 and R2
2013-10-01	New Issue

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that the **facility ratings** used in the reliable planning and operation of the **transmission system** are determined based on technically sound principles. A **facility rating** is an essential component in the determination of **system operating limits**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**:
 - (i) that is part of the **bulk electric system**, except for transformers that do not have a primary terminal and at least one (1) secondary terminal energized at 100 kV or higher;
 - (ii) that the **ISO**:
 - (A) determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system; and
 - (B) publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
 - (iii) who owns a **generating unit** step-up transformer for those generating units listed in subsection (b); or
 - (iv) who owns a transformer connected to a **blackstart resource**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power rating** greater than 18 MW, unless the **generating unit** is part of an industrial complex;
 - (ii) within a power plant that:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power rating** greater than 67.5 MW, unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**;
 - (iv) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
 - (v) material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**, regardless of **maximum authorized real power rating**, as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1; and
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power rating** greater than 67.5 MW, unless the **aggregated generating facility** is part of an industrial complex;
 - (ii) a **blackstart resource**;

- (iii) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and within an industrial complex with **supply transmission service** greater than 67.5 MW; or
- (iv) regardless of **maximum authorized real power rating**, material to this **reliability standard** and to the reliability of the **bulk electric system** as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have documentation for determining the **facility ratings** of its facilities:

- (a) up to the low side terminals of the step-up transformer if the **legal owner** of the **generating unit** or **legal owner** of the **aggregated generating facility** does not own the step-up transformer; or
- (b) including the step-up transformer and associated terminal equipment (as applicable based on ownership) if the **legal owner** of the **generating unit** or **legal owner** of the **aggregated generating facility** owns the step-up transformer.

R1.1 The documentation must contain assumptions used to rate the facilities and at least one (1) of the following:

- (a) design or construction information such as design criteria, ratings provided by equipment manufacturers, equipment drawings and/or specifications, engineering analyses, method(s) consistent with industry standards (e.g. the American National Standards Institute and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers ("IEEE")), or an established engineering practice that has been verified by testing or engineering analysis; or
- (b) operational information such as commissioning test results, performance testing or historical performance records, any of which may be supplemented by engineering analyses.

R1.2 The documentation must be consistent with the principle that the **facility ratings** do not exceed the most limiting applicable **equipment rating** of the individual equipment that comprises that facility.

R2 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have a documented methodology for determining the **facility ratings** of its facilities connected between the location specified in requirement R1 and the interface with a **transmission facility** (based on equipment ownership) that contains all of the following:

R2.1 the method used to establish the **equipment ratings** of the equipment that comprises the facility must be consistent with at least one (1) of the following:

- (a) ratings provided by equipment manufacturers or obtained from equipment manufacturer specifications, such as the nameplate rating;
- (b) one (1) or more industry standards developed through an open process such as the IEEE or the International Council on Large Electric Systems ("CIGRE"); or
- (c) a practice that has been verified by testing, performance history or engineering analysis;

R2.2 the underlying assumptions, design criteria, and methods used to determine the **equipment ratings** identified in requirement R2.1, including identification of how each of the following were considered:

- (a) **equipment rating** standard(s) used in development of this method;

- (b) ratings provided by equipment manufacturers or obtained from equipment manufacturer specifications;
- (c) ambient conditions (for particular or average conditions or as they vary in real time);
- (d) operating limitations; and
- (e) both summer and winter season operations, where summer is defined as May 1st at 12:01 AM Mountain Time to October 31st at 12:00 midnight Mountain Time and winter is defined as November 1st at 12:01 AM Mountain Time to April 30th at 12:00 midnight Mountain Time;

R2.3 a statement that a **facility rating** must not exceed the most limiting applicable **equipment rating** of the individual equipment that comprises that facility;

R2.4 the process by which the **equipment ratings** of the equipment that comprises a facility are determined, where:

R2.4.1 the scope of equipment that comprises the facility, addressed in accordance with requirement R2.4 must include (based on equipment ownership), but not be limited to, conductors, transformers, relay protective devices, terminal equipment, and series and shunt compensation devices; and

R2.4.2 the scope of **equipment ratings** addressed in accordance with requirement R2.4 must include, as a minimum, both **normal ratings** and **emergency ratings**, such that:

R2.4.2.1 the **emergency ratings** for equipment comprising power transformers must be specified for a 30 minute duration and the next 3.5 hour duration; and

R2.4.2.2 the **emergency ratings** for transmission lines must be specified for a ten (10) minute duration.

R3 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must have a documented methodology for determining the **facility ratings** of its facilities (except for those facilities associated with a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** addressed in requirements R1 and R2) that contains all of the following:

R3.1 the method used to establish the **equipment ratings** of the equipment that comprises the facility must be consistent with at least one (1) of the following:

- (a) ratings provided by equipment manufacturers or obtained from equipment manufacturer specifications, such as the nameplate rating;
- (b) one (1) or more industry standards developed through an open process such as the IEEE or CIGRE; or
- (c) a practice that has been verified by testing, performance history or engineering analysis;

R3.2 the underlying assumptions, design criteria, and methods used to determine the **equipment ratings** identified in requirement R3.1, including identification of how each of the following were considered:

- (a) **equipment rating** standard(s) used in development of this method;
- (b) ratings provided by equipment manufacturers or obtained from equipment manufacturer specifications;
- (c) ambient conditions (for particular or average conditions or as they vary in);
- (d) operating limitations; and

- (e) both summer and winter season operations, where summer is defined as May 1st at 12:01 AM Mountain Time to October 31st at 12:00 midnight Mountain Time and winter is defined as November 1st at 12:01 AM Mountain Time to April 30th at 12:00 midnight Mountain Time;

R3.3 a statement that a **facility rating** must not exceed the most limiting applicable **equipment rating** of the individual equipment that comprises that facility; and

R3.4 the process by which the **equipment ratings** of the equipment that comprises a facility are determined, where:

R3.4.1 the scope of equipment that comprises the facility, addressed in accordance with requirement R3.4, must include, but not be limited to, conductors, transformers, relay protective devices, terminal equipment, and series and shunt compensation devices; and

R3.4.2 the scope of **equipment ratings** addressed in accordance with requirement R3.4 must include, at a minimum, both **normal ratings** and **emergency ratings**, such that:

R3.4.2.1 the **emergency ratings** for equipment comprising power transformers must be specified for a 30 minute duration and the next 3.5 hour duration; and

R3.4.2.2 the **emergency ratings** for transmission lines must be specified for a ten (10) minute duration.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

R5 Intentionally left blank.

R6 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have **facility ratings** for its facilities that are consistent with:

- (a) the **facility ratings** methodology in accordance with requirements R2 or R3, for a **transmission facility**, a **generating unit** and an **aggregated generating facility**; and
- (b) the documentation in accordance with requirement R1, for a **generating unit** and an **aggregated generating facility**.

R7 Intentionally left blank.

R8 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of having documentation for determining the **facility ratings** as required in requirements R1, R1.1 and R1.2 exists.

MR2 Evidence of having a documented **facility ratings** methodology as described in requirement R2 exists.

MR3 Evidence of having a documented **facility ratings** methodology as described in requirement R3 exists.

MR4 Intentionally left blank.

MR5 Intentionally left blank.

MR6 Evidence of having **facility ratings** that are consistent with the **facility ratings** methodology in accordance with requirements R2 and R3, and the documentation in accordance with requirement R1 exists.

MR7 Intentionally left blank.

MR8 Intentionally left blank.

5. Appendices

Appendix1 – Amending Process for List of Facilities

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Unbolded “real time”
2019-01-01	Initial release

Appendix 1

Amending Process for List of Facilities

In order to amend a list referenced in subsections (a)(ii), (b)(iv) and (c)(iii) of section 2, Applicability, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** and **operator** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than:
 - (i) eight (8) full calendar quarters after the date of notice, where the **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is commissioned prior to the date of notice; and
 - (ii) no less than four (4) full calendar quarters after the date of notice, where the **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is commissioned on or after the date of notice;
- (b) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be deleted, notify the **legal owner** and **operator** in writing and determine an effective date on which the **legal owner** and **operator** will no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

Alberta Reliability Standard System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon FAC-010-AB1-2.1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that **system operating limits** used in the reliable planning of the **bulk electric system** are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must have a documented **system operating limit** methodology for use in developing **system operating limits** that:

- (a) is applicable for developing **system operating limits** used in the **ISO**'s planning horizon;
- (b) states that **system operating limits** must not exceed any associated **facility rating**; and
- (c) includes a description of how to identify the subset of **system operating limits** that qualify as **interconnected reliability operating limits**.

R2 The **system operating limit** methodology of the **ISO** must include a requirement:

R2.1 That **system operating limits** developed in the pre-contingency state, and with all facilities in service:

- (a) result in:
 - i. **bulk electric system** performance that demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability;
 - ii. all facilities operating within their **facility ratings**; and
 - iii. system conditions within thermal, voltage and stability limits;and
- (b) reflect expected system conditions and changes to **bulk electric system** topology.

R2.2 That **system operating limits** developed starting with all facilities in service and following any single **contingency** including:

- (a) single line to ground **fault** or three-phase **fault**, whichever is most severe, with **normal clearing**, on any **generating unit**, line, transformer or shunt device;
- (b) loss of any **generating unit**, line, transformer or shunt device without a **fault**; or
- (c) single pole block, with **normal clearing**, in a monopolar or bipolar high voltage direct current system;

result in **bulk electric system** performance that:

- (d) demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability;

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- (e) has all facilities operating within their **facility ratings**;
 - (f) is within voltage and stability limits; and
 - (g) has no **cascading** or uncontrolled separation,
- with either or both of the following responses to the single **contingency** being acceptable:
- (h) planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the facility on which the **fault** occurred or by the affected area; or
 - (i) **bulk electric system** reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions.

R2.3 Intentionally left blank.

R2.4 That following a single **contingency**, in preparation for the next **contingency** when developing **system operating limits**, the **ISO** may make system adjustments, including changes to generation, uses of the **transmission system**, and the **transmission system** topology.

R2.5 That **system operating limits** developed starting with all facilities in service and following any of the multiple **contingencies** identified in **reliability standard TPL-003-AB**, result in **bulk electric system** performance that:

- (a) demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage **stability**;
 - (b) has all facilities operating within their **facility ratings**;
 - (c) is within voltage and stability limits; and
 - (d) has no **cascading** or uncontrolled separation,
- with any of the following responses to such multiple **contingencies** being acceptable:
- (e) planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the facility on which the **fault** occurred or by the affected area;
 - (f) **bulk electric system** reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions; or
 - (g) planned or controlled interruption of **demand** to **demand customers**, the planned removal of a **generating unit**, or the curtailment of firm, non-recallable power transfers.

R2.6 Intentionally left blank.

R3 In addition to requirements R1 through R2, the **ISO** must include within the **system operating limit** methodology a description of the:

- (a) study model, which must include at least the Alberta system as well as the critical modeling details from other interconnected jurisdictions that would impact any facility under study;

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FAC-010-AB1-2.1



- (b) selection of applicable **contingencies**;
 - (c) level of system detail included in the study model used to determine **system operating limits**;
 - (d) allowed uses of **remedial action schemes**;
 - (e) anticipated **transmission system** configuration, generation **dispatch** and **load** level;
 - (f) criteria for determining when violating a **system operating limit** qualifies as an **interconnection reliability operating limit** and criteria for developing any associated **interconnection reliability operating limit** T_v ; and
 - (g) any reliability margins applied.
- R4** The **ISO** must provide its **system operating limit** methodology, and any update to that methodology, to all of the following prior to implementation of the methodology or any update to the methodology:
- (a) each adjacent planning authority; and
 - (b) each planning authority that indicated it has a **reliability**-related need for the methodology.
- R5** Intentionally left blank.
- R6** The **system operating limit** methodology of the **ISO** must include a requirement that:
- R6.1** for **interconnections** with other systems within the **WECC**, starting with all facilities in service and following any of the multiple **contingencies** identified in **reliability standard** TPL-003-AB or any of the following multiple **contingencies**:
- (a) simultaneous permanent phase to ground **faults** of each of two (2) adjacent transmission circuits on a multiple circuit tower with **normal clearing**. If multiple circuit towers are used only for station entrance and exit purposes, and if they do not exceed five (5) towers at each station, this condition is an acceptable risk and therefore can be excluded;
 - (b) a permanent phase to ground **fault** on any **generating unit**, transmission circuit, transformer, or **collector bus** section with delayed **fault** clearing except for **collector bus** sectionalizing breakers or **collector bus** tie breakers as specified in requirement R6.2;
 - (c) simultaneous permanent loss of both poles of a direct current bipolar facility without an alternating current **fault**;
 - (d) the failure of a circuit breaker associated with a remedial action scheme to operate when required following the loss of any **system element** without a **fault**, or a permanent phase to ground **fault**, with **normal clearing**, on any transmission circuit, transformer or **collector bus** section; or
 - (e) a single-line-to-ground **fault** with **normal clearing** on common mode **contingency** of two (2) adjacent circuits on separate towers unless the **ISO** determines the event frequency is less than one (1) in thirty (30) years,

Alberta Reliability Standard System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon FAC-010-AB1-2.1



the **system operating limits** result in **bulk electric system** performance that:

- (f) demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage **stability**;
- (g) has all facilities operating within their **facility ratings**;
- (h) is within voltage and stability limits; and
- (i) has no **cascading** or uncontrolled separation,

with any of the following responses to such multiple **contingencies** being acceptable:

- (j) planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the facility on which the **fault** occurred or by the affected area;
- (k) **bulk electric system** reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions; or
- (l) planned or controlled interruption of **demand** to **demand customers**, the planned removal of a **generating unit**, or the curtailment of firm, non-recallable power transfers.

R6.2 for **interconnections** with other systems within the **WECC**, starting with all facilities in service and following either of these multiple **contingencies**:

- (a) a common mode **outage** of two (2) **generating units** connected to the same switchyard not otherwise addressed by **reliability standard** FAC-010-AB; or
- (b) the loss of multiple **collector bus** sections as a result of failure or delayed clearing of a **collector bus** tie or **collector bus** sectionalizing breaker to clear a permanent phase to ground **fault**, the **system operating limits** result in **bulk electric system** performance such that **cascading** does not occur on other systems in other jurisdictions within the **WECC**.

R6.3 where the **ISO** makes changes to any **contingencies** and required responses identified in requirements R6.1 and R6.2 for specific facilities on **interconnections** to other systems within the **WECC** in accordance with the **WECC** performance category adjustment process based upon system performance and robust design, the **system operating limits** result in **bulk electric system** performance that satisfies the performance requirements in requirements R2.4.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 Evidence of having a documented **system operating limit** methodology as required in requirement R1 exists.

MR2 Evidence of the **system operating limit** methodology including requirements as required in sub requirements R2.1, R2.2, R2.4 and R2.5 exists.

MR3 Evidence of the **system operating limit** methodology including the description(s) as required in requirement R3 exists.

Alberta Reliability Standard System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon FAC-010-AB1-2.1



MR4 Evidence of providing the **system operating limit** methodology as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, email or mail to an appropriate recipient that identifies contents submitted.

MR5 Intentionally left blank.

MR6 Evidence of the **system operating limit** methodology including requirements as required in sub requirements R6.1 through R6.3 exists.

Revision History

Effective	Description
2012-07-01	Initial Release
2015-09-01	Revised for ISO assumption of RC functionality for the Alberta footprint
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .

1. Purpose

To ensure that **system operating limits** used in the reliable operation of the **bulk electric system** are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must have a documented methodology for use in developing **system operating limits** (**system operating limit** methodology) within its area. This **system operating limit** methodology must:

- R1.1** be applicable for developing **system operating limits** used in the operations horizon;
- R1.2** state that **system operating limits** must not exceed associated **facility ratings**; and
- R1.3** include a description of how to identify the subset of **system operating limits** that qualify as **interconnection reliability operating limits**.

R2 The **system operating limit** methodology of the **ISO** must include a requirement that **system operating limits** provide **bulk electric system** performance consistent with the following:

- R2.1** in the **pre-contingency** state, the **bulk electric system** must demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all facilities must be within their **facility ratings** and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits. In the determination of **system operating limits**, the **bulk electric system** condition used must reflect current or expected system conditions and must reflect changes to system topology such as facility outages;
- R2.2** following the single **contingencies**¹ identified in requirement 2.2.1 through requirement 2.2.3, the system must demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all facilities must be operating within their **facility ratings** and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and **cascading** or uncontrolled separation must not occur:
 - R2.2.1** single line to ground or three (3) -phase **fault** (whichever is more severe), with **normal clearing**, on any **generating unit**, **aggregated generating facility**, line, transformer, or shunt device that is **faulted**;
 - R2.2.2** loss of any **generating unit**, **aggregated generating facility**, line, transformer, or shunt device without a **fault**; and
 - R2.2.3** single pole block, with **normal clearing**, in a monopolar or bipolar high voltage direct current system;
- R2.3** in determining the system's response to a single **contingency**, the following will be acceptable:
 - R2.3.1** planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the **faulted** facility or by the affected area;

¹ The **contingencies** identified in FAC-011-AB-2 requirement R2.2.1 through requirement R2.2.3 are the minimum **contingencies** that must be studied but are not necessarily the only **contingencies** that are studied.

- R2.3.2** interruption of other network customers, (a) only if the system has already been adjusted, or is being adjusted, following at least one prior outage, or (b) if the real-time operating conditions are more adverse than anticipated in the corresponding studies; and
 - R2.3.3** system reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions; and
 - R2.4** to prepare for the next **contingency**, system adjustments may be made, including changes to generation, uses of the **transmission system**, and the **transmission system** topology.
- R3** The **ISO**'s methodology for determining **system operating limits**, must include, as a minimum, a description of the following, along with any **reliability** margins applied for each:
 - R3.1** study model (must include at least the entire **ISO** area as well as the critical modeling details from other **reliability coordinator areas** that would impact the facility or facilities under study);
 - R3.2** selection of applicable **contingencies**;
 - R3.3** a process for determining which of the stability limits associated with the list of multiple **contingencies** (as determined by the **ISO** in accordance with FAC-014 requirement R6) are applicable for use in the operating horizon given the actual or expected system conditions;
 - R3.3.1** this process must address the need to modify these limits, to modify the list of limits, and to modify the list of associated multiple **contingencies**;
 - R3.4** level of detail of system models used to determine **system operating limits**;
 - R3.5** allowed uses of **remedial action schemes** or remedial action plans;
 - R3.6** anticipated **transmission system** configuration, generation **dispatch** and load level; and
 - R3.7** criteria for determining when violating a **system operating limit** qualifies as an **interconnection reliability operating limit** and criteria for developing any associated **interconnection reliability operating limit** Tv.
- R4** The **ISO** must issue its **system operating limit** methodology and any changes to that methodology, prior to the effective date of the methodology or of a change to the methodology, to all of the following:
 - R4.1** each adjacent **reliability coordinator** and each **reliability coordinator** that indicated it has a reliability-related need for the methodology.
 - R4.2** each **planning authority** and **transmission planner** that models any portion of the **ISO**'s area.
 - R4.3** each **operator** of a **transmission facility** that operates in the **ISO**'s area.
- R5** Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** The **system operating limit** methodology of the **ISO** may address all of the items listed in requirement R1.1 through requirement R1.3. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented **system operating limit** methodology, or other equivalent evidence as required in requirement R1.

- MR2** Evidence of including requirements in the **system operating limit** methodology as set out in requirement R2. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented **system operating limit** methodology, or other equivalent evidence as set out in requirement R2.
- MR3** Evidence of including all of the items as required in requirement R3.1 through R3.7 in the **system operating limit** methodology. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented **system operating limit** methodology, documented processes or other equivalent evidence as required in requirement R2.
- MR4** The **ISO** may have evidence of issuing the **system operating limit** methodology, and any changes to that methodology, including the date they were issued, as required in requirement R4. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, emails, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Unbolded “real-time”
2015-09-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits

FAC-014-AB1-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish and communicate **system operating limits** to be used in the reliable planning and operation of the **bulk electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must ensure that **system operating limits**, including **interconnection reliability operating limits**, for its area are established and that the **system operating limits** (including **interconnection reliability operating limits**) are consistent with its **system operating limit** methodology.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 Intentionally left blank.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

R5 The **ISO** must provide its **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** in the operating horizon to:

- (a) each adjacent **reliability coordinator**;
- (b) each **operator** of a **transmission facility** within its area that has a **reliability**-related need for those limits; and
- (c) each entity that has a **reliability**-related need for those limits and provides a written request for delivery of those limits.

R5.1 For each **interconnection reliability operating limit**, the **ISO** must provide the following supporting information:

R5.1.1 identification and status of the associated **system element** (or group of **system elements**) that is (are) critical to the derivation of the **interconnection reliability operating limit**;

R5.1.2 the value of the **interconnection reliability operating limit** and its associated **Tv**;

R5.1.3 the associated **contingency**(ies); and

R5.1.4 the type of limitation represented by the **interconnection reliability operating limit** (e.g., voltage collapse, angular stability).

R5.2 Intentionally left blank.

R5.3 The **ISO** must provide its **system operating limits** (including the subset of **system operating limits** that are **interconnection reliability operating limits**) in the planning horizon to adjacent **planning authorities**.

R5.4 Intentionally left blank.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits

FAC-014-AB1-2

R6 The **ISO** must identify and develop a list of the subset of multiple **contingencies** from **reliability standard** TPL-003-AB, which result in stability limits as determined if any that exist in its planning horizon.¹

R6.1 Intentionally left blank.

R6.2 Intentionally left blank.

4 Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 Evidence that the **ISO's system operating limits**, including **interconnection reliability operating limits**, for its area are established and consistent with its **system operating limit** methodology. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated reports, voice recordings, business practices or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MR3 Intentionally left blank.

MR4 Intentionally left blank.

MR5 Evidence to confirm the **ISO** provided its **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** and supporting information as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, records of email communication to appropriate recipients that identify contents submitted, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence that the **ISO** identified and listed the subset of multiple **contingencies** as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated reports, letters, or other documentation containing the list of multiple **contingencies**.

MR6.1 Intentionally left blank.

MR6.2 Intentionally left blank.

5. Appendices

No appendices have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .
2015-09-01	Revised for ISO assumption of RC functionality for the Alberta footprint
2012-10-01	Initial Release

¹ Requirement R6 is referenced in requirement R3.3 of FAC-011-AB

Alberta Reliability Standard

Transmission Maintenance

FAC-501-WECC-AB2-1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** of a major transmission path, including any associated **transmission facility**, has a *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* such that a reliable path is available.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that is, or is part of, a major transmission path identified in the table "*Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System*" as provided by the **WECC**.

3. Requirements

R1 The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must detail its inspection and maintenance requirements and must apply to each **transmission facility** that is associated with each of the transmission paths identified by the **ISO**.

R1.1 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must review its *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* annually and update it as required.

R1.2 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must annually submit its *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* and any updates to the **ISO**.

R2 The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must include without limitation the following maintenance categories:

R2.1 Transmission line maintenance details:

R.2.1.1 patrol/inspection;

R.2.1.2 contamination control; and

R.2.1.3 tower and wood pole structure management;

R2.2 Station maintenance details:

R.2.2.1 inspections;

R.2.2.2 contamination control; and

R.2.2.3 equipment maintenance for the following:

(a) circuit breakers;

(b) power transformers (including phase-shifting transformers);

(c) regulators; and

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Transmission Maintenance

FAC-501-WECC-AB2-1



- (d) **reactive power** devices (including, but not limited to, shunt capacitors, series capacitors, static VAR compensators, synchronous condensers, shunt reactors, and tertiary reactors).

- R3** The maintenance practices of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** in the *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* must be either performance-based, time-based, or condition-based, or a combination of all three (3).

The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must include scheduled intervals for any time-based maintenance activities and/or a description supporting condition or performance-based maintenance practices including a description of the condition or performance based trigger.

- R4** The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must implement its *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* and retain records that demonstrate such implementation including without limitation the following:

R4.1 The names of individual or crew members responsible for performing the work or inspection;

R4.2 The date(s) the work or inspection was performed;

R4.3 The **transmission facility** on which the work or inspection was performed; and

R4.4 A description of the inspection or maintenance performed.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** A documented *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* as identified in requirement R1 exists and covers each **transmission facility** as identified by the **ISO**.

MR1.1 Evidence exists that shows the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** reviewed their *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* annually and updated it as needed.

MR1.2 The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* and updates, if any, are received by the **ISO** annually.

- MR2** The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* addresses the required maintenance details of requirement R2.

- MR3** The *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* addresses the items in requirement R3.

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Transmission Maintenance

FAC-501-WECC-AB2-1



MR4 Records exist that show the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** implemented and followed its *Transmission Maintenance and Inspection Plan* .

Revision History

Effective	Description
2015-07-01	Transmission paths identified by the AESO for the purposes of requirement R1 updated to include new Bennett 520S equipment and 632 Russell equipment and moved from the Appendix to another document. Administrative update to standardize formatting, definitions and drafting style.
2012-12-17	Administrative update – “TFO” replaced with “ <i>legal owner of a transmission facility</i> ”; and other minor clean up items.
2010-09-10	Initial Release

Alberta Reliability Standard

Evaluation of Interchange Transactions

INT-006-AB-4



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that responsible entities conduct a **reliability** assessment of each **arranged interchange** before it is implemented.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must approve or deny each on-time **arranged interchange** or emergency **arranged interchange** that it receives and must do so prior to the expiration of the time period defined in Appendix 1, column B.

R1.1 The **ISO** must, when it is either the source **balancing authority** or sink **balancing authority** deny the **arranged interchange** or curtail **confirmed interchange** if it does not expect to be capable of supporting the magnitude of the **interchange**, including ramping, throughout the duration of the **arranged interchange**.

R1.2 The **ISO** must deny the **arranged interchange** or curtail **confirmed interchange** if the **scheduling path** (proper connectivity of **adjacent balancing authorities**) between it and its **adjacent balancing authorities** is invalid.

R2 The **ISO** must approve or deny each on-time **arranged interchange** or emergency **arranged interchange** that it receives and must do so prior to the expiration of the time period defined in Appendix 1, column B.

R2.1 The **ISO** must deny the **arranged interchange** or curtail **confirmed interchange** if the transmission path (proper connectivity of adjacent transmission service providers) between it and its adjacent transmission service providers is invalid.

R3 The **ISO** must, when it receives a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, approve or deny it prior to the expiration of the time period defined in Appendix 1, column B.

R4 The **ISO** must when it is a sink **balancing authority** confirm that none of the following conditions exist prior to transitioning an **arranged interchange** to **confirmed interchange**:

- (a) it is a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, the time period specified in Appendix 1, column B has elapsed, and the **ISO** or the source **balancing authority** associated with the **arranged interchange** has not communicated its approval of the transition;
- (b) it is not a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, the time period specified in Appendix 1, column B, has elapsed, and not all **balancing authorities** and transmission service providers associated with the **arranged interchange** have communicated their approval of the transition; or
- (c) it is not a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, the time period specified in Appendix 1, column B, has elapsed, and any entity associated with the **arranged interchange** has communicated its denial of the transition.

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Evaluation of Interchange Transactions

INT-006-AB-4



R5 For each **arranged interchange** that is transitioned to **confirmed interchange**, the **ISO** must, when it is the sink **balancing authority**, notify the following entities of the on-time **confirmed interchange** such that the notification is delivered in time to be incorporated into scheduling systems prior to ramp start as specified in Appendix 1, column D:

R5.1 the source **balancing authority**;

R5.2 each intermediate **balancing authority**;

R5.3 each **reliability coordinator** associated with each **balancing authority** included in the **arranged interchange**;

R5.4 each transmission service provider included in the **arranged interchange**; and

R5.5 each purchasing selling entity included in the **arranged interchange**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of either approving or denying **arranged interchange** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time stamped electronic logs or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of either approving or denying **arranged interchange** as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time stamped electronic logs or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of either approving or denying **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time stamped electronic logs, studies or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of confirming none of the conditions exist prior to transitioning an **arranged interchange** to **confirmed interchange** as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, an interchange transaction without an implemented e-tag, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of notifying entities of the on-time **confirmed interchange** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time stamped electronic logs, voice recordings or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – Timing Tables

Revision History

Date	Description
2018-10-01	Initial release.

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Evaluation of Interchange Transactions

INT-006-AB-4



Appendix 1 – Timing Tables
Timing Requirements for WECC

		A	B	C	D
If arranged interchange ¹ is submitted	Time Classification	Sink BA makes initial distribution of arranged interchange ²	BA and TSP conduct reliability assessments	Compilation and distribution status ²	BA prepares confirmed interchange for implementation
>1 hour after the start time	ATF		Entities have up to 2 hours to respond.		N/A
<10 minutes prior to ramp start and ≤1 hour after transaction start time where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	Late		Entities have up to 10 minutes to respond.		≤ 3 minutes after receipt of confirmed interchange
<15 minutes prior to ramp start and ≤1 hour after transaction start time where transaction start time is not at the top of the hour	Late		Entities have up to 10 minutes to respond.		≤ 3 minutes after receipt of confirmed interchange
10 minutes prior to ramp start where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	On-time		≤ 5 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start
11 minutes prior to ramp start where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	On-time		≤ 6 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start
12 minutes prior to ramp start where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	On-time		≤ 7 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start

¹ Time classifications and deadlines apply to both initial **arranged interchange** submittal and any subsequent modifications to the **arranged interchange**.

² See NAESB WEQ004. The times are being retained in the NAESB tables but are removed here since they are not being referenced in requirements.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Evaluation of Interchange Transactions

INT-006-AB-4



		A	B	C	D
If arranged interchange ¹ is submitted	Time Classification	Sink BA makes initial distribution of arranged interchange ²	BA and TSP conduct reliability assessments	Compilation and distribution status ²	BA prepares confirmed interchange for implementation
13 minutes prior to ramp start where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	On-time		≤ 8 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start
14 minutes prior to ramp start where transaction start time is at the top of the hour	On-time		≤ 9 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start
< 1 hour and ≥ 15 minutes prior to ramp start	On-time		≤ 10 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 3 minutes prior to ramp start
≥ 1 hour and < 4 hours prior to ramp start	On-time		< 20 minutes from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 39 minutes prior to ramp start
≥ 4 hours prior to ramp start	On-time		≤ 2 hours from arranged interchange receipt		≥ 1 hour 58 minutes prior to ramp start
Submitted before 10:00 PPT with start time ≥ 00:00 PPT of following day	On-time		By 12:00 PPT of day the arranged interchange was recieved		≥ 1 hour 58 minutes prior to ramp start

Alberta Reliability Standard Implementation of Interchange INT-009-AB-2.1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that **balancing authorities** implement the **interchange** as agreed upon in the **interchange** confirmation process.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must agree with each of its **adjacent balancing authorities** that its composite **confirmed interchange** with that **adjacent balancing authority**, at mutually agreed upon time intervals, excluding **dynamic schedules** and pseudo-ties and including any **interchange** per INT-010-AB not yet captured in the **composite confirmed interchange**, is:
- R1.1** identical in magnitude to that of the **adjacent balancing authority**; and
 - R1.2** opposite in sign or direction to that of the **adjacent balancing authority**.
- R2** The **ISO** when it is either the attaining **balancing authority** or the native **balancing authority** must use a dynamic value emanating from a common source that is agreed upon with the other **balancing authority** to account for the pseudo-tie in the **net actual interchange** term of its control **area control error** or alternate control process.
- R3** The **ISO** must, if it is the **balancing authority** in whose area the high-voltage direct current **intertie** is controlled, coordinate the **confirmed interchange** prior to its implementation with the **operator** of the high-voltage direct current **intertie**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of agreeing on composite **confirmed interchange** with **adjacent balancing authorities** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to dated logs, voice recordings, electronic records or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of using a dynamic value emanating from an agreed upon common source as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to dated logs, voice recordings, electronic records, written agreement or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of coordinating the **confirmed interchange** prior to its implementation with the **operator** of the high-voltage direct current **intertie** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to dated logs, electronic records or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2018-10-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Interchange Initiation and Modification for Reliability

INT-010-AB-2.1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to provide guidance for required actions on **confirmed interchange** or **implemented interchange** to address **reliability**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must, if it experiences a loss of resources covered by an energy sharing agreement or other **reliability** needs covered by an energy sharing agreement, ensure that a request for **interchange** is submitted with a start time no more than sixty (60) minutes beyond the resource loss or **reliability** need. If the use of the energy sharing agreement does not exceed sixty (60) minutes from the time of the resource loss or **reliability** need, no request for **interchange** is required.
- R2** The **ISO** must, when it is the sink **balancing authority**, after modifying a **confirmed interchange** or **implemented interchange** for actual or anticipated **reliability**-related reasons, ensure that a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange** reflecting the modification is submitted within sixty (60) minutes of the start of the modification.
- R3** The **ISO** must, when it is a sink **balancing authority**, after scheduling **interchange** for actual or anticipated **reliability**-related reasons, ensure that a request for **interchange** is submitted reflecting that **interchange schedule** within sixty (60) minutes of the start of the scheduled **interchange**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of ensuring that a **request for interchange** is submitted as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time-stamped request for **interchange**, electronic logs or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of ensuring that a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange** is submitted as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time-stamped **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, electronic logs or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of ensuring that a **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange** is submitted as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated and time-stamped **reliability** adjustment **arranged interchange**, electronic logs or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2018-10-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to provide the **ISO** with the capabilities necessary to monitor and analyze data needed to perform their **reliability** functions.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must have data exchange capabilities with entities, that the **ISO** deems necessary, for it to perform operational planning analysis.
- R2** The **ISO** must have data exchange capabilities, with redundant and diversely routed data exchange infrastructure within the **ISO's** primary **control centre**, for the exchange of real time data with entities it deems necessary, for performing its real time monitoring and real time assessments.
- R3A** The **ISO** must test its primary **control centre** data exchange capabilities specified in requirement R2 for redundant functionality at least once every 90 **days**.
- R3B** The **ISO** must, if the test conducted pursuant to requirement R3A is unsuccessful, initiate action within 2 hours to restore redundant functionality.
- R4** The **ISO** must provide its real time operating personnel with the authority to approve planned outages and maintenance of its telecommunication, monitoring, and analysis capabilities.
- R5** The **ISO** must, as necessary, monitor:
- (a) **system elements** that are part of the **bulk electric system**;
 - (b) the status of **remedial action schemes**; and
 - (c) **system elements** that are not part of the **bulk electric system**,
- within Alberta and neighbouring **reliability coordinator areas**, to identify any **system operating limit** exceedances and to determine any **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedances within Alberta.
- R6** The **ISO** must have monitoring systems that provide information utilized by the **ISO's** operating personnel, giving particular emphasis to alarm management and awareness systems, automated data transfers, and synchronized information systems, over a redundant infrastructure.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having data exchange capabilities as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include a document that lists the **ISO's** data exchange capabilities with entities, that the **ISO** deems necessary, for it to perform operational planning analysis, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of having data exchange capabilities as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include system specifications, system diagrams, other documentation that lists the **ISO's** data exchange capabilities, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3A** Evidence of testing the **ISO's** primary **control centre** data exchange capabilities for redundant functionality as required in requirement R3A exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped test records, operator logs, voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.

- MR3B** Evidence of initiating action within 2 hours to restore redundant functionality of the **ISO's** primary **control centre** data exchange capabilities as required in requirement R3B exists. Evidence may include dated and time-stamped test records, operator logs, voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of providing the **ISO's** real time operating personnel with the authority as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include a documented procedure, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of monitoring **system elements** and **remedial action schemes** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include energy management system description documents, computer printouts, SCADA data collection, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of having monitoring systems as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include energy management system description documents, computer printouts, SCADA data collection, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The **ISO** must be continuously aware of conditions within its area and include this information in its reliability assessments. The **ISO** must monitor **bulk electric system** parameters that may have significant impacts upon its area and neighbouring **reliability coordinator areas**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

(a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

R1.1 Intentionally left blank.

R1.2 Intentionally left blank.

R1.3 Intentionally left blank.

R1.4 Intentionally left blank.

R1.5 Intentionally left blank.

R1.6 Intentionally left blank.

R1.7 Intentionally left blank.

R1.8 Intentionally left blank.

R1.9 Intentionally left blank.

R1.10 Intentionally left blank.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 The **ISO** must ensure that it is aware of geomagnetic disturbance forecast information and develop any required response plans.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

R5 Intentionally left blank.

R6 Intentionally left blank.

R7 Intentionally left blank.

R8 Intentionally left blank.

R9 Intentionally left blank.

R10 Intentionally left blank.

R11 Intentionally left blank.

R12 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this reliability standard. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

- MR2** Intentionally left blank.
- MR3** The **ISO** may have evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence to demonstrate that it was aware of geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) forecast information and evidence of the development of any required response plans.
- MR4** Intentionally left blank.
- MR5** Intentionally left blank.
- MR6** Intentionally left blank.
- MR7** Intentionally left blank.
- MR8** Intentionally left blank.
- MR9** Intentionally left blank.
- MR10** Intentionally left blank.
- MR11** Intentionally left blank.
- MR12** Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Effective Date	Description
2019-12-01	Removed all requirements that have been retired at NERC. requirement R3 will be retained until NERC EOP-010-1 is adopted for application in Alberta.
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .
2015-04-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordination – Transmission Loading Relief

IRO-006-AB-5

1. Purpose

To ensure coordinated action between **Interconnections** when implementing **Interconnection-wide** transmission loading relief procedures to prevent or manage potential or actual **system operating limit** and **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedances to maintain reliability of the **bulk electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

(a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 When the **ISO** receives a request pursuant to an **Interconnection-wide** transmission loading relief procedure (such as Eastern Interconnection Transmission Loading Relief, WECC Unscheduled Flow Mitigation, or congestion management procedures from the ERCOT Protocols) from any **reliability coordinator**, **balancing authority**, or **transmission operator** in another **Interconnection** to curtail an **interchange transaction** that crosses an **Interconnection** boundary, the **ISO** must comply with the request, unless it provides a reliability reason to the requestor why it cannot comply with the request.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this reliability standard. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 The **ISO** may have evidence (such as dated logs, voice recordings, **e-tag** histories, and studies, in electronic or hard copy format) that, when a request to curtail an **interchange transaction** crossing an **Interconnection** boundary pursuant to an **Interconnection-wide** transmission loading relief procedure was made from another **reliability coordinator**, **balancing authority**, or **transmission operator** in that other **Interconnection**, the **ISO** complied with the request or provided a reliability reason why it could not comply with the request.

Revision History

Effective Date	Description
2015-04-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Qualified Transfer Path Unscheduled Flow Relief

IRO-006-WECC-AB-2

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to mitigate transmission overloads due to unscheduled flow on **qualified transfer paths**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

(a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must approve schedule curtailment requests submitted to mitigate transmission overloads on **qualified transfer paths**, implement alternative actions, or a combination thereof that collectively meets the relief requirement.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 E-tags, voice recordings or operator logs exist and are provided on request. **E-tags**, voice recordings or operator logs contain content confirming requirement R1 is met.

Revision History

Date	Description
2015-04-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordinator Operational Analyses and Real-time Assessments

IRO-008-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to perform analyses and assessments to prevent instability, uncontrolled separation, and **cascading**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must perform an operational planning analysis that will allow it to assess whether the planned operations for the next day will exceed **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** within its **wide-area**.
- R2** The **ISO** must have an operating plan for next-day operations to address potential **system operating limit** and **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedances identified as a result of its operational planning analysis as performed in requirement R1.
- R3** Intentionally left blank.
- R4** The **ISO** must perform a real time assessment at least once every 30 minutes.
- R5** Intentionally left blank.
- R6** Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of performing an operational planning analysis as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include a completed operational planning analysis, dated power flow study results, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of having an operating plan as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include plans for precluding operating in excess of each **system operating limit** and **interconnected reliability operating limit** that were identified as a result of the operational planning analysis, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Intentionally left blank.
- MR4** Evidence of performing a real time assessment at least once every 30 minutes as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated computer logs showing times of assessment as conducted, dated checklists, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Intentionally left blank.
- MR6** Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to prevent instability, uncontrolled separation, or **cascading** outages that adversely impact the **reliability** of the **Interconnection** by ensuring prompt action to prevent or mitigate instances of exceeding **interconnection reliability operating limits**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must, for each **interconnection reliability operating limit** that the **ISO** identifies one or more **days** prior to the current **day**, have one or more operating processes, procedures, or plans that identify actions to take, or actions to direct others to take, up to and including load shedding, that:
- R1.1** can be implemented in time to prevent the identified **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance; and
 - R1.2** mitigate the magnitude and duration of an **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance such that the **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance is relieved within the **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv**.
- R2** The **ISO** must initiate one or more operating processes, procedures, or plans that are intended to prevent an **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance, as identified in the **ISO**'s real time monitoring or real time assessment.
- R3** The **ISO** must act or direct others to act so that the magnitude and duration of an **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance is mitigated within the **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv**, as identified in the **ISO**'s real time monitoring or real time assessment.
- R4** The **ISO** must operate to the most limiting **interconnection reliability operating limit** or **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv** in instances where there is a difference in an **interconnection reliability operating limit** or its **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv** and that of another **reliability coordinator** where both entities are responsible for that facility or group of facilities.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having one or more operating processes, procedures, or plans to address both preventing and mitigating the magnitude and duration of **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedances as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include a list of any **interconnection reliability operating limit** (and each associated **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv**) identified in advance, along with one or more dated operating processes, procedures, or plans that will be used, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of initiating one or more operating processes, procedures, or plans to prevent an **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include operating processes, procedures, or plans from requirement R1, dated operating logs, dated voice recordings, dated transcripts of voice recordings, or other equivalent evidence.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordinator Actions to Operate within IROLs

IRO-009-AB-2



- MR3** Evidence of acting or requesting others to act so that the magnitude and duration of an **interconnection reliability operating limit** exceedance is mitigated as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include operating processes, procedures, or plans, dated operating logs, dated voice recordings, dated transcripts of voice recordings, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of operating to the most limiting **interconnection reliability operating limit** or **interconnection reliability operating limit Tv** in instances where there was a difference as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated computer printouts, dated operator logs, dated voice recordings, dated transcripts of voice recordings, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordinator Data Specification and Collection

IRO-010-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to prevent instability, uncontrolled separation, or **cascading** outages that adversely impact **reliability**, by ensuring the **ISO** has the data it needs to monitor and assess the operation of the area for which it has **reliability** coordination responsibility.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 The **ISO** must provide data and information, as requested and agreed upon to each **reliability coordinator** with which it has a **reliability** relationship using:

R3.1 a mutually agreeable format;

R3.2 a mutually agreeable process for resolving data conflicts; and

R3.3 a mutually agreeable security protocol.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MR3 Evidence of providing data and information as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include electronic or hard copies of data transmittals, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that the **ISO's** operations are coordinated such that they will not adversely impact other **reliability coordinator areas** and to preserve the **reliability** benefits of interconnected operations.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** The **ISO** must have and implement operating procedures, operating processes, or operating plans, for activities that require notification or coordination of actions that may impact adjacent **reliability coordinator areas**, to support the **reliability** of the **Interconnection**. These operating procedures, operating processes, or operating plans must include the following:
- R1.1** criteria and processes for notifications;
 - R1.2** energy and capacity shortages;
 - R1.3** control of voltage, including the coordination of reactive resources;
 - R1.4** exchange of information including planned and unplanned outage information to support its operational planning analysis and real time assessments; and
 - R1.5** provisions for periodic communications to support reliable operations.
- R2** The **ISO** must maintain its operating procedures, operating processes, and operating plans identified in requirement R1 as follows:
- R2.1** review and update annually with no more than 15 **months** between reviews;
 - R2.2** obtain written agreement from all of the **reliability coordinators** required to take the indicated actions for each update; and
 - R2.3** distribute to all **reliability coordinators** that are required to take the indicated actions within 30 **days** of an update.
- R3** The **ISO**, upon identification of an expected or actual emergency in Alberta, must notify other impacted **reliability coordinators**.
- R4** The **ISO** must operate as though the emergency exists during each instance where the **ISO** and another **reliability coordinator** disagree on the existence of an emergency.
- R5** The **ISO** must, when it identifies an emergency in Alberta, develop an action plan to resolve the emergency during those instances where another impacted **reliability coordinator** disagrees on the existence of an emergency.
- R6** The **ISO** must, when impacted, implement the action plan developed by another **reliability coordinator** that identifies an emergency during those instances where the **ISO** and the other **reliability coordinator** disagree on the existence of an emergency, unless such actions would violate safety, equipment, regulatory, or statutory requirements.
- R7** The **ISO** must, when requested and able, assist another **reliability coordinator** if the requesting **reliability coordinator** has implemented its emergency procedures, unless such actions cannot be physically implemented or would violate safety, equipment, regulatory, or statutory requirements.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Coordination Among Reliability Coordinators

IRO-014-AB-3



Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having and implementing operating procedures, operating processes, or operating plans as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include dated, current in effect documentation with the specified elements, notes from periodic communications, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of maintaining its operating procedures, operating processes, and operating plans as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include dated documentation with confirmation of receipt, dated notice of acceptance or agreement to take specified actions, dated electronic communications with confirmation of receipt and acceptance or agreement to take specified actions, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of notifying impacted **reliability coordinators** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of operating as though an emergency existed as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communication, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of developing an action plan to resolve the emergency as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of implementing the action plan as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include dated operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or dated documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of assisting **reliability coordinators** as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include dated operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that outages are properly coordinated in the operations planning time horizon and near-term transmission planning horizon.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 The **ISO** must provide its planning assessment to impacted **reliability coordinators**.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MR3 Evidence of providing the **ISO's** planning assessment to impacted **reliability coordinators** as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include web postings with an electronic notice of the posting, e-mail records, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordination Real Time Reliability

Monitoring and Analysis Capabilities

IRO-018-AB-1(i)



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish requirements for real time monitoring and analysis capabilities to support reliable system operations.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must implement an operating process or operating procedure, to address the quality of the real time data necessary to perform its real time monitoring and real time assessments, which must include:

R1.1 criteria for evaluating the quality of real time data;

R1.2 provisions to indicate the quality of real time data to the system operator; and

R1.3 actions to address real time data quality issues with each entity responsible for providing the data when data quality affects real time assessments.

R2 The **ISO** must implement an operating process or operating procedure to address the quality of analysis used in its real time assessments which must include:

R2.1 criteria for evaluating the quality of analysis used in its real time assessments;

R2.2 provisions to indicate the quality of analysis used in its real time assessments; and

R2.3 actions to address analysis quality issues affecting its real time assessments.

R3 The **ISO** must have an alarm process monitor that provides notification to its real time operating personnel when a failure of its real time monitoring alarm processor has occurred.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of implementing an operating process or operating procedure as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include an operating process or operating procedure in electronic or hard copy format meeting all provisions of requirement R1 and evidence that the **ISO** implemented the operating process or operating procedure as called for in the operating process or operating procedure, such as dated operator or supporting logs, dated checklists, voice recordings, voice transcripts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of implementing an operating process or operating procedure as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include an operating process or operating procedure in electronic or hard copy format meeting all provisions of requirement R2 and evidence the **ISO** implemented the operating process or operating procedure as called for in the operating process or operating procedure, such as dated operator logs, dated checklists, voice recordings, voice transcripts, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of having an alarm process monitor that provides notification to the **ISO's** real time operating personnel as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include operator logs, computer printouts, system specifications, or other equivalent evidence.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordination Real Time Reliability

Monitoring and Analysis Capabilities

IRO-018-AB-1(i)



Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Steady-State and Dynamic Data for Transmission System Modeling and Simulation

MOD-010&012-AB-0



1 Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to provide for the delivery of data and information necessary to establish consistent power flow and dynamic models to be used in the analysis of the reliability of the **Interconnection**.

2 Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; and
 - (ii) not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (c) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**; and
- (d) the **ISO**.

3 Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** and **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must provide, within thirty (30) **days** of the **ISO**'s written request, equipment characteristics and system data that the **ISO** requires to meet requirements R2 and R3.

R2 Subject to requirement R3, the **ISO** must provide equipment characteristics and system data, including dynamics system modeling, simulation data and interchange schedules, to the **WECC** in compliance with the appropriate **Interconnection-wide WECC** steady-state and dynamics system modeling and simulation data requirements and reporting procedures.

R3 The **ISO** must provide the equipment characteristics and system data, including modeling data and information specified in requirement R2, according to the data bank compilation schedule the **WECC** publishes but if no such schedule has been published, then the **ISO** must provide such equipment characteristics and system data no later than:

- (a) thirty (30) **days** from the date the **WECC** requests it if the **ISO** has received the requested information prior to the date that **WECC** requested it; or
- (b) sixty (60) **days** from the date the **WECC** requests it if the **ISO** has not received the information prior to the date that **WECC** requested it.

4 Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 Evidence of providing equipment characteristics and system data as required in requirement R1. Evidence may include data files, email or mail.

Alberta Reliability Standard Steady-State and Dynamic Data for Transmission System Modeling and Simulation MOD-010&012-AB-0



MR2 Evidence of providing equipment characteristics and system data as required in requirement R2. Evidence may include data files, email or mail.

MR3 Evidence of providing equipment characteristics and system data within the timelines specified in requirement R3. Evidence may include email or mail.

Revision History

Effective	Description
2014-01-01	Initial Release – The first day of the calendar quarter that follows three full calendar quarters after approval by the Commission

Alberta Reliability Standard Demand and Energy Data MOD-031-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to identify the requirements for the **ISO** to provide to the **WECC**, demand, energy and related data to support **reliability** studies and assessments.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 The **ISO** must provide the data listed below, for the Alberta **balancing authority area**, to the **WECC** within 75 **days** of receiving a request for such data, unless the **WECC** and the **ISO** agree otherwise:

R3.1 any or all of the following actual data:

R3.1.1 integrated hourly **demands** in MWs for the prior calendar year;

R3.1.2 **monthly** and annual integrated peak hour **demands** in MWs for the prior calendar year;

R3.1.2.1 if the annual peak hour actual **demand** varies due to weather related conditions (e.g., temperature, humidity or wind speed), the **ISO** must also provide the weather normalized annual peak hour actual **demand** for the prior calendar year;

R3.1.3 **monthly** and annual net energy for load in GWhs for the prior calendar year; and

R3.1.4 **monthly** and annual peak hour controllable and dispatchable **demand** side management under the control or supervision of the **ISO** in MWs for the prior calendar year including, reporting for each hour: 1) the committed MWs (the amount under control or supervision); 2) the MWs issued in a **dispatch** (the amount, if any, activated for use by the system operator); and 3) the realized MWs (the amount of actual demand reduction);

R3.2 any or all of the following forecast data:

R3.2.1 **monthly** peak hour forecast total internal **demands** in MWs for the next 2 calendar years;

R3.2.2 **monthly** forecast net energy for load in GWhs for the next 2 calendar years;

R3.2.3 peak hour forecast total internal **demands** (summer and winter) in MWs for 10 calendar years into the future;

R3.2.4 annual forecast net energy for load in GWhs for 10 calendar years into the future; and

R3.2.5 total and available peak hour forecast of controllable and dispatchable **demand** side management (summer and winter), in MWs, under the control or supervision of the system operator for 10 calendar years into the future;

Alberta Reliability Standard Demand and Energy Data MOD-031-AB-2



R3.3 any or all of the following summary explanations:

- R3.3.1** the assumptions and methods used in the development of aggregated peak **demand** and net energy for load forecasts;
- R3.3.2** the **demand** and energy effects of controllable and dispatchable **demand** side management under the control or supervision of the system operator;
- R3.3.3** how **demand** side management is addressed in the forecasts of its peak **demand** and annual net energy for load;
- R3.3.4** how the controllable and dispatchable **demand** side management forecast compares to actual controllable and dispatchable **demand** side management for the prior calendar year and, if applicable, how the assumptions and methods for future forecasts were adjusted; and
- R3.3.5** how the peak **demand** forecast compares to actual **demand** for the prior calendar year with due regard to any relevant weather-related variations (e.g., temperature, humidity, or wind speed) and, if applicable, how the assumptions and methods for future forecasts were adjusted.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MR3 Evidence of providing the data as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include dated emails or dated transmittal letters, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2018-08-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that operating personnel performing the reliability-related tasks of an **operator** of a **transmission facility** are certified through the NERC System Operator Certification Program when filling a real time operating position responsible for control of the **bulk electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) an **operator** of a **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**.

This **reliability standard** does not apply to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** who only operates **transmission facilities** that are:

- (a) radial **transmission facilities** connected to:
 - (i) load;
 - (ii) one or more **generating unit**; and/or
 - (iii) one or more **aggregated generating facility**;
- (b) connected to an industrial complex, or part of an industrial complex, and the removal of any or all of these **transmission facilities** cannot interrupt power flow on the **interconnected electric system**, other than power flow on its own **transmission facilities** when all transmission facilities in the rest of the **interconnected electric system** are in service; or
- (c) **transmission facilities** where the operation of all these facilities is covered by an operating agreement with a NERC-certified operator whereby the NERC-certified operator has the operating authority for these facilities.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

R2 An **operator** of a **transmission facility** must staff each of its real time operating positions performing reliability-related tasks with operating personnel who have obtained and maintained one of the following NERC certificates:

- (a) Reliability Operator;
- (b) Balancing, Interchange and Transmission Operator; or
- (c) Transmission Operator.

R3 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

MR2 Evidence of staffing its real time operating positions performing reliability-related tasks with operating personnel certified in accordance with the requirement R2 exists. This evidence may

Alberta Reliability Standard

Operations Personnel Credentials

PER-003-AB-1



include, but it is not limited to:

- (a) the list of real time operating positions performing reliability-related tasks;
- (b) the list of operating personnel assigned to the real time operating positions performing reliability-related tasks;
- (c) a copy of each of its operating personnel's NERC certificate; and
- (d) work schedules, logs, or other equivalent evidence showing which operating personnel were assigned to work in real time operating positions performing reliability-related tasks.

MR3 Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Unbolded "real time"
2019-01-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Reliability Coordination - Staffing

PER-004-AB-2

1. Purpose

The **ISO** must have sufficient, competent staff to perform the functions of the **ISO**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must be staffed with adequately trained operating personnel, each possessing a valid NERC Reliability Operator certificate, 24 hours per **day**, seven **days** per week.

R2 The **ISO** must ensure that **ISO** operating personnel have adequate information regarding **system operating limits**, **interconnection reliability operating limits** and **intertie** facility limits available.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence may include, but is not limited to, NERC certificate / certification records, shift schedules or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that the **ISO** is staffed with operating personnel possessing a valid NERC Reliability Operator certificate 24 hours per **day**, seven **days** per week.

MR2 Evidence may include but is not limited to, EMS screenshots, methodology documentation or other equivalent documentation that will be used to confirm that **ISO** operating personnel have adequate information regarding **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits** and **intertie** facility limits.

Revision History

Effective Date	Description
2015-05-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that personnel performing or supporting real time operations on the **bulk electric system** are trained using a systematic approach.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that has personnel who can act independently to operate in real time, or to direct the real time operation of, those **transmission facilities** that are part of the **bulk electric system** from a **control centre**. This does not include field switching personnel.

This reliability standard does not apply to the **operator** of a **transmission facility** whose only **transmission facilities** are:

- (i) radial **transmission facilities** connecting to:
 - (a) load;
 - (b) one or more **generating units**; and / or
 - (c) one or more **aggregated generating facilities**; or
- (ii) either part of an industrial complex or connected to an industrial complex and cannot interrupt power flow on the **interconnected electric system**, other than power flow on its own **transmission facilities**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must use a systematic approach to develop and implement a training program for its real time operating personnel, as follows:

R1.1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must:

- (a) create a definition of a company-specific real time reliability-related task;
- (b) develop a documented methodology for determining company-specific real time reliability-related tasks; and
- (c) create a list of **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related tasks based on that methodology.

R1.1.1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must review, and update if necessary, its list of **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related tasks identified in R1.1 each calendar year.

R1.2 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must design and develop training materials according to its training program, based on the **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related task list created in R1.1.

R1.3 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must deliver training to its real time operating personnel according to its training program.

R1.4 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must conduct an evaluation each calendar year of the training program established in requirement R1 to identify any needed changes to the training program, and must implement the changes identified.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

R3 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must verify, at least once, the capabilities of its real time operating personnel, identified in requirement R1, assigned to perform each of the **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related tasks identified under requirement R1.1.

R3.1 Within six (6) months of a modification or addition of a **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related task, the **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must verify the capabilities of each of its real time operating personnel identified in requirement R1 to perform the new or modified **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related tasks identified in requirement R1.1.

R4 The **ISO** must provide its real time operating personnel identified in requirement R1 with emergency operations training using simulation technology such as a simulator, virtual technology, or other technology that replicates the operational behavior of the **bulk electric system** if the **ISO**:

- (1) has operational authority or control over **facilities** with established **interconnection reliability operating limits**, or
- (2) has established **protection systems** or operating guides to mitigate **interconnection reliability operating limit** violations,

R4.1 The **ISO** must comply with requirement R4 within twelve (12) months of meeting either of the criteria identified in requirements R4(1) or R4(2).

R5 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must use a systematic approach to develop and implement training for its identified **operations support personnel** on how their job function(s) impact those **bulk electric system** company-specific **real time** reliability-related tasks that it has identified pursuant to requirement R1.1.

R5.1 The **ISO** and each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must conduct an evaluation each calendar year of the training established in requirement R5 to identify and implement changes to the training.

R6 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this reliability standard. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of using a systematic approach to develop and implement a training program for its real time operating personnel as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, training program descriptions, meeting minutes, design notes, or other equivalent evidence.

MR1.1 Evidence of having a definition, methodology and **bulk electric system** company-specific real time reliability-related task list and review history, as required in requirement R1.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, a definition for real time reliability-related tasks, a documented methodology for determining company-specific real time reliability-related tasks, a list of real time reliability related tasks, a documented revision history or other equivalent evidence.

MR1.2 Evidence of designing and developing training materials as required in requirement R1.2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, course design documents and examples of training materials or other equivalent evidence.

MR1.3 Evidence of delivering real time operating personnel training, as required in requirement R 1.3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, training records showing the names of the attendees, the title of the training delivered, and the dates of delivery or other equivalent evidence.

MR1.4 Evidence of conducting an evaluation of the training program each calendar year and implementing the identified changes, as required in requirement R1.4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, instructor observations, trainee feedback, course evaluations, meeting minutes, training program document revision history, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MR3 Evidence of verifying, at least once, the capabilities of the real time operating personnel, as required in requirement R3 exists.

Evidence may include, but is not limited to, documented records to show that it verified the capability of each of its real time personnel on company-specific real time reliability-related tasks with the date of verification, employee name, supervisor signature and check sheets for each company-specific real time reliability-related task completed, the results of learning assessments, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3.1 Evidence of verifying the capabilities of real time operating personnel within six (6) months of a modification or addition of a **bulk electric system** company-specific **real time** reliability-related task, as required in requirement R3.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, documented records to show that it verified the capability of each of its personnel on company-specific real time reliability-related tasks with the date of verification, employee name, supervisor signature and check sheets for each company-specific real time reliability-related task completed, the results of learning assessments, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of providing emergency operations training as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated training records or other equivalent evidence.

MR4.1 Evidence of complying with requirement R4 as required in requirement R4.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated training records or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of using a systematic approach to develop and implement training for identified **operations support personnel** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, training records showing employee name, date of training and completion of training, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5.1 Evidence of conducting an evaluation each calendar year of the training established in requirement R5 and that any identified changes were implemented as required in requirement R5.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, instructor observations, trainee feedback, course evaluations, meeting minutes, training program document revision history or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Unbolded "real time"
2018-04-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that personnel are trained on specific topics essential to reliability to perform or support real time operations of the **interconnected electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that:
 - (i) is part of the **bulk electric system**; or
 - (ii) the **ISO**:
 - (A) determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either **the interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system; and
 - (B) publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;and
- (b) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that:
 - (i) is part of the **bulk electric system**; or
 - (ii) the **ISO**:
 - (A) determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either **the interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system; and
 - (B) publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1,

that has personnel who are responsible for the real time control of a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** and directly or indirectly receives operating instructions from the **ISO** or **operator** of a **transmission facility**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must provide training to personnel identified in the Applicability section on the operational functionality of **protection systems** and **remedial action schemes** that affect the output of a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** it operates.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of providing training to the personnel responsible for the real time control of a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include documents such as training records showing successful completion of training that includes training materials, the name of the person, and date of training, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – Amending Process for List of Generating Units and Aggregated Generating Facilities

Revision History

Date	Description
2023-07-01	Initial release

Appendix 1

Amending Process for List of Generating Units and Aggregated Generating Facilities

In order to amend a list referenced in subsections (a)(ii) and (b)(ii) of section 2, Applicability, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is to be added, notify the **operator** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than 4 full calendar quarters after the date of notice;
- (b) upon determining that a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is to be deleted, notify the **operator** in writing and determine an effective date on which the operator will no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Protection System Coordination

PRC-001-AB3-1.1(ii)



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure **protection systems** are coordinated among operating entities.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that is:
 - (i) part of the **bulk electric system**; or
 - (ii) not part of the **bulk electric system** and which the **ISO**:
 - (A) determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system; and
 - (B) publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant which:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the reliability of the **bulk electric system**, regardless of its **maximum authorized real power** rating, as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant or industrial complex which:
 - (A) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (B) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the reliability of the **bulk electric system**, regardless of its **maximum authorized real power** rating, as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;

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- (d) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that is:
 - (i) part of the **bulk electric system**; or
 - (ii) not part of the **bulk electric system** and which the **ISO**:
 - (A) determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system; and
 - (B) publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (e) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant which:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the reliability of the **bulk electric system**, regardless of its **maximum authorized real power** rating, as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1; and
- (f) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant or industrial complex which:
 - (A) is directly connected to the bulk electric system; and
 - (B) has a combined maximum authorized real power rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the reliability of the **bulk electric system**, regardless of its **maximum authorized real power** rating, as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, upon failure of any component of a **protection system** of a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** which it operates, take the actions listed in requirement R1.1 and R1.2.

R1.1 Notify the **operator** of a **transmission facility** to which the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is connected as soon as possible, but no longer than twenty-four (24) hours after becoming aware of such a failure, and provide the following information, regardless of whether or not the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** remains on-line:

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- (a) identify the **protection system** that failed; and
- (b) identify whether or not a **functionally equivalent protection system** remains in service.

R1.2 Correct the failure as soon as possible.

R2 Each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must take the actions listed in requirements R2.1 through R2.3 after becoming aware of the failure of any of the following **protection systems** or teleprotection communication channels under its authority:

- (a) a **protection system**, other than a related teleprotection communication channel referred to in requirement R2(c) or R2(d), that protects a **transmission facility** operated at a nominal voltage greater than 200 kV, whether or not a **functionally equivalent protection system** remains in service;
- (b) a **protection system**, other than a related teleprotection communication channel referred to in requirement R2(c) or R2(d), that protects a **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system** where a **functionally equivalent protection system** is not available;
- (c) a teleprotection communication channel, that is part of a **protection system** for a **transmission facility** operated at a nominal voltage greater than 200 kV, where there is an equivalent backup teleprotection communication channel, and where the failure lasts for more than twenty-four (24) continuous hours; or
- (d) a teleprotection communication channel, where there is no equivalent backup teleprotection communication channel, and where the failure lasts for more than ten (10) consecutive minutes.

R2.1 Provide notification to the **ISO**, and to each directly affected **operator** of a **transmission facility**, directly affected **operator** of a **generating unit**, directly affected **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** and directly affected **interconnected transmission operator** as soon as possible, but no longer than twenty-four (24) hours after becoming aware of a failure identified in requirements R2(a), R2(b) and R2(d), and no longer than forty-eight (48) hours after becoming aware of a failure identified in requirement R2(c), regardless of whether or not the **transmission facility** is removed from service following the awareness of such failure, that includes the following information:

- (a) the identification of the **protection system** or teleprotection communication channel(s) that failed;
- (b) when the **protection system** or teleprotection communication channel(s) failed or when such failure was first discovered; and
- (c) an estimate of the date when the **protection system** or teleprotection communication channel(s) will be returned to service.

R2.2 Where the protection system or teleprotection communication channel(s) are not returned to service by the estimated return to service date identified in requirement R2.1, provide a new estimate of the return to service date up to five (5) **days** after the previous estimated return to service date to the entities that received the notification in accordance with requirement R2.1.

R2.3 Correct the failure as soon as possible.

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- R3** Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must coordinate all new **protection systems** and all **protection system** changes with each affected interconnecting **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** and notify the **ISO** that such coordination has occurred.
- R4** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must coordinate all new **protection systems** and all **protection system** changes with:
- (a) each affected adjacent **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**;
 - (b) each affected **legal owner** of a **generating unit**;
 - (c) each affected **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (d) each affected **interconnected transmission operator**; and
 - (e) the **ISO**, as affected,
- and must notify the **ISO** that such coordination has occurred.
- R5** Each **operator** of a **generating unit**, **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** and **operator** of a **transmission facility** must identify, notify and coordinate planned changes that may require changes in the **protection systems** of others as described in requirements R5.1 and R5.2.
- R5.1** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must identify planned changes to its generation, load, or operating conditions that may require changes to the **protection systems** of others, and must notify the **ISO** and coordinate with each affected **operator** of a **transmission facility** in advance of making such changes.
- R5.2** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must identify planned changes to its transmission, load or operating conditions that may require changes to the **protection systems** of others, and must notify the **ISO** and coordinate with each affected:
- (a) **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
 - (b) adjacent **interconnected transmission operator**;
 - (c) **operator** of a **generating unit**; and
 - (d) **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**,
- in advance of making such changes.
- R6** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility** must monitor the status (on/off) of each **remedial action scheme** in its area, and must notify the **ISO** and each affected:
- (a) **operator** of a **transmission facility**;
 - (b) adjacent **interconnected transmission operator**;
 - (c) **operator** of a **generating unit**; and
 - (d) **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**,
- of each change in status.

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4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this reliability standard. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of notifying, providing information and correcting failures of any component of a **protection system** as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to:

MR1.1 voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence; and

MR1.2 work orders, setting change files, electronic records or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of providing notification, providing an estimate and correcting failures of any of the **protection systems** or teleprotection communication channel(s) as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to:

MR2.1 voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence;

MR2.2 voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence; and

MR2.3 work orders, setting change files, electronic records or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of coordinating **protection systems** and notifying the **ISO** as required in requirement R3 exists.

Evidence of coordinating **protection systems** may include, but is not limited to, a fault analysis study, letters of agreement on settings, notifications of changes or other equivalent evidence.

Evidence of notifying the **ISO** may include, but is not limited to, electronic notifications (emails), hard copy notifications, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of coordinating **protection systems** and notifying the **ISO** as required in requirement R4 exists.

Evidence of coordinating **protection systems** may include, but is not limited to, a fault analysis study, letters of agreement on settings, notifications of changes or other equivalent evidence.

Evidence of notifying the **ISO** may include, but is not limited to, electronic notifications (emails), hard copy notifications or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below:

MR5.1 Evidence of identifying, notifying and coordinating planned changes that may require changes to the **protection systems** of others as required in requirement R5.1 exists.

Evidence may include, but is not limited to, voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence.

MR5.2 Evidence of identifying, notifying and coordinating planned changes that may require changes to the **protection systems** of others as required in requirement R5.2 exists.

Evidence may include, but is not limited to, voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence.

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MR6 Evidence of monitoring the status of each **remedial action scheme** in its area and notifying entities of each change in status as required in requirement R6 exists.

Evidence of monitoring the status of each **remedial action scheme** may include, but is not limited to, SCADA data, wiring diagrams or other equivalent evidence.

Evidence of notifying entities may include, but is not limited to, SCADA data, voice recordings, operator logs, electronic notifications (emails) or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-01	Alberta specific revisions made to improve clarity.
2015-05-01	Revised for ISO assumption of RC functionality for the Alberta footprint
2013-01-02	Administrative update – “TFO” and “GFO” replaced with “legal owner of a transmission facility”, “operator of a transmission facility”, “legal owner of a generating unit”, “operator of a generating unit”, “legal owner of an aggregated generating facility”, and “operator of an aggregated generating facility”; applied standard at the bulk electric system level; added Appendix 1; and other minor cleanup items.
2011-01-13	R1
2010-01-22	New Issue

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Appendix 1 Amending Process for List of Facilities

In order to amend any list referenced in subsections (a)(ii)(B), (b)(iv), (c)(iv), (d)(ii)(B), (e)(iv) and (f)(iv) of section 2, *Applicability*, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** and **operator** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than thirty (30) **days** after the date of notice, by which the **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to meet the applicable requirements;
- (b) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be deleted, notify the **legal owner** and **operator** in writing and determine an effective date on which the **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** will no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

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1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that adequate data is available to facilitate analysis of **disturbances** on the **bulk electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to the following:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that is part of the **bulk electric system**;
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is part of the **bulk electric system**; and
- (d) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must:

- R1.1** identify **bulk electric system** buses for which sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data is required by using the methodology in Appendix 1;
- R1.2** notify other **legal owners** of **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** connected to those **bulk electric system** buses, if any, within 90 **days** of completion of requirement R1.1, that those **system elements** require either one or both of sequence of events recording data and **fault** recording data; and
- R1.3** re-evaluate all **bulk electric system** buses at least once every 5 calendar years in accordance with requirement R1.1 and notify other **legal owners**, if any, in accordance with requirement R1.2, and implement the re-evaluated list of **bulk electric system** buses as per the *Implementation Plan* in Appendix 2.

R2 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have sequence of events recording data for circuit breaker position, open or close, for each circuit breaker it owns connected directly to the **bulk electric system** buses identified in requirement R1 and associated with the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** at those **bulk electric system** buses.

R3 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have **fault** recording data to determine the following electrical quantities for each triggered **fault** recording for the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** it owns connected to the **bulk electric system** buses identified in requirement R1:

- R3.1** phase-to-neutral voltage for each phase of each specified **bulk electric system** bus; and
- R3.2** each phase current and the residual or neutral current for the following **system elements** on the **bulk electric system**:
 - R3.2.1** transformers that have a low-side operating voltage of 100 kV or above; and
 - R3.2.2** transmission lines.

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R4 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have **fault** recording data as specified in requirement R3 that meets the following:

R4.1 a single record or multiple records that include:

- (a) a pre-trigger record length of at least 2 cycles and a total record length of at least 30 cycles for the same trigger point, or
- (b) at least 2 cycles of the pre-trigger data, the first 3 cycles of the post-trigger data, and the final cycle of the **fault** as seen by the **fault** recorder;

R4.2 a minimum recording rate of 16 samples per cycle; and

R4.3 trigger settings for at least the following:

R4.3.1 neutral (residual) overcurrent; and

R4.3.2 phase under voltage or overcurrent.

R5 The **ISO** must:

R5.1 identify **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** for which dynamic **disturbance** recording data is required, including the following:

R5.1.1 generating resources with:

R5.1.1.1 an individual **generating unit** with a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than or equal to 450 MW; and

R5.1.1.2 an individual **generating unit** with a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than or equal to 270 MW where the plant/facility aggregate **maximum authorized real power** rating is greater than or equal to 900 MW;

R5.1.2 any one **system element** on the **bulk electric system** that is part of an angular stability or voltage stability related **system operating limit**;

R5.1.3 each terminal of a high voltage direct current circuit with a nameplate rating greater than or equal to 270 MW, on the alternating current portion of the converter;

R5.1.4 one or more **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** that are part of an **interconnection reliability operating limit**; and

R5.1.5 any one **system element** on the **bulk electric system** within a major voltage sensitive area as defined by an area with an in-service **under voltage load shed** program;

R5.2 identify a minimum dynamic **disturbance** recording coverage, inclusive of those **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** identified in requirement R5.1, of at least:

R5.2.1 one **system element** on the **bulk electric system**; and

R5.2.2 one **system element** on the **bulk electric system** per 3,000 MW of the **ISO**'s historical simultaneous peak **demand** of the **interconnected electric system**;

R5.3 notify all **legal owners** of identified **system elements** on the **bulk electric system**, within 90 **days** of completion of requirement R5.1, that their respective **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** require dynamic **disturbance** recording data when requested; and

R5.4 re-evaluate all **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** at least once every 5 calendar years in accordance with requirements R5.1 and R5.2, and notify **legal owners** in accordance

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with requirement R5.3 to implement the re-evaluated list of **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** as per the implementation plan in Appendix 2.

- R6** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must have dynamic **disturbance** recording data to determine the following electrical quantities for each **system element** on the **bulk electric system** it owns for which it received notification as identified in requirement R5:
- R6.1** one phase-to-neutral or positive sequence voltage;
 - R6.2** the phase current for the same phase at the same voltage corresponding to the voltage in requirement R6.1, or the positive sequence current;
 - R6.3** **real power** and **reactive power** flows expressed on a 3-phase basis corresponding to all circuits where current measurements are required; and
 - R6.4** frequency of any one of the voltages in requirement R6.1.
- R7** Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must have dynamic **disturbance** recording data to determine the following electrical quantities for each **system element** on the **bulk electric system** it owns for which it received notification as identified in requirement R5:
- R7.1** one phase-to-neutral, phase-to-phase, or positive sequence voltage at either the generator step-up transformer high-side or low-side voltage level;
 - R7.2** the phase current for the same phase at the same voltage corresponding to the voltage in requirement R7.1, phase currents for any phase-to-phase voltages, or positive sequence current;
 - R7.3** **real power** and **reactive power** flows expressed on a 3-phase basis corresponding to all circuits where current measurements are required; and
 - R7.4** frequency of at least one of the voltages in requirement R7.1.
- R8** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** responsible for dynamic **disturbance** recording data for the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** for which it received notification as identified in requirement R5 must, unless it complies with subsection 7(1) of Section 502.9 of the **ISO rules**, *Synchrophasor Measurement Unit Technical Requirements*, have continuous data recording and storage, unless the equipment was installed prior to the effective date of this **reliability standard** and is not capable of continuous recording, in which case, triggered records must meet the following:
- R8.1** triggered record lengths of at least 3 minutes; or
 - R8.2** at least one of the following 3 triggers:
 - (a) off nominal low frequency trigger set at < 59.55 Hz and off nominal high frequency trigger set at > 61.0 Hz;
 - (b) rate of change of frequency trigger set at < -0.05625 Hz/sec and > 0.125 Hz/sec; or
 - (c) undervoltage trigger set no lower than 85% of normal operating voltage for a duration of 5 seconds.

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R9 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** responsible for dynamic **disturbance** recording data for the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** identified in requirement R5 must have dynamic **disturbance** recording data that meet the following:

R9.1 input sampling rate of at least 960 samples per second; and

R9.2 output recording rate of electrical quantities of at least 30 times per second.

R10 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must time synchronize all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data for the **bulk electric system** buses identified in requirement R1 and dynamic **disturbance** recording data for the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** identified in requirement R5 to meet the following:

R10.1 synchronization to Coordinated Universal Time with or without a local time offset; and

R10.2 synchronized device clock accuracy within ± 2 milliseconds of Coordinated Universal Time.

R11 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must provide to the **ISO**, upon written request, all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data for the **bulk electric system** buses identified in requirement R1 and dynamic **disturbance** recording data for the **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** identified in requirement R5, in accordance with the following:

R11.1 data is retrievable for the period of 10 **days**, inclusive of the **day** the data was recorded;

R11.2 data subject to requirement R11.1 is provided within 30 **days** of a request unless an extension is granted by the **ISO**;

R11.3 sequence of events recording data are provided in ASCII Comma Separated Value format following Appendix 3;

R11.4 **fault** recording and dynamic **disturbance** recording data are provided in electronic files that are formatted in conformance with C37.111, *IEEE Standard for Common Format for Transient Data Exchange (COMTRADE)*, revision C37.111-1999 or later; and

R11.5 data files will be named in conformance with C37.232, *IEEE Standard for Common Format for Naming Time Sequence Data Files (COMNAME)*, revision C37.232-2011 or later.

R11-A The **ISO** must provide to the **WECC** or the **NERC** upon written request, all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data that the **ISO** subsequently receives, through making the same request of responsible entities in Alberta, in accordance with requirement R11, within 60 **days** of a request unless an extension is granted by the either the **WECC** or the **NERC**.

R12 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, within 90 **days** of the discovery of a failure of the recording capability for the sequence of events recording, **fault** recording or dynamic **disturbance** recording data, either:

(a) restore the recording capability, or

(b) submit a corrective action plan to the **ISO** and implement it.

R12.1 the **ISO** must submit a corrective action plan to the **WECC** within 15 **days** of receiving a corrective action plan from any of a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**.

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4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of identifying **bulk electric system** buses, notifying **legal owners**, re-evaluating all **bulk electric system** buses, and implementing the re-evaluated list as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include lists, dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of having sequence of events recording data for circuit breaker positions as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include documents describing the device interconnections and configurations which may include a single design standard as representative for common installations, station drawings, and data recordings, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of having **fault** recording data as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include documents describing the device specifications and configurations which may include a single design standard as representative for common installations, station drawings, and data recordings, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of having **fault** recording data as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include data recordings, technical specification sheets, settings documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of identifying **system elements** on the **bulk electric system**, identifying a minimum dynamic **disturbance** recording coverage, and notifying all **legal owners** of identified **system elements** on the **bulk electric system** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include lists and related documentation, dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of having dynamic **disturbance** recording data as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include data records, documents describing the device specifications and configurations, which may include a single design standard as representative for common installations, station drawings, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of having dynamic **disturbance** recording data as required in requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include data records, documents describing the device specifications and configurations, which may include a single design standard as representative for common installations, station drawings, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8** Evidence of having continuous data recording and storage, or of having triggered records that meet the criteria required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include data recordings, technical specification sheets, settings documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR9** Evidence of having dynamic **disturbance** recording data as required in requirement R9 exists. Evidence may include data recordings, technical specification sheets, settings documentation or other equivalent evidence.
- MR10** Evidence of time synchronizing all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data, and dynamic **disturbance** recording data as required in requirement R10 exists. Evidence may include technical specification sheets, settings documentation, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR11** Evidence of providing all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data as required in requirement R11 exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence, documents describing data storage capability, device specification, configuration or settings, data records, or other equivalent evidence.

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MR11-A Evidence of providing all sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data as required in requirement R11-A exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.

MR12 Evidence of either restoring the recording capability or submitting a corrective action plan and implementing it as required in requirement R12 exists. Evidence may include dated reports of discovery of a failure, documentation noting the date the data recording was restored, SCADA records, work orders, dated correspondence, a corrective action plan, or other equivalent evidence.

MR12.1 Evidence of submitting a corrective action plan to the **WECC** as required in requirement R12.1 exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 - *Methodology for Selecting Bulk Electric System Buses for Capturing Sequence of Events Recording and Fault Recording Data*

Appendix 2 - *Implementation Plan*

Appendix 3 - *Sequence of Events Recording Data Format*

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-10-01	Initial release.

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Appendix 1

Methodology for Selecting Bulk Electric System Buses for Capturing Sequence of Events Recording and Fault Recording Data

(Requirement R1)

To identify monitored **bulk electric system** buses for sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data required by requirement R1, each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must follow sequentially, unless otherwise noted, the steps listed below:

- Step 1 Determine a complete list of **bulk electric system** buses that it owns.
- For the purposes of this **reliability standard**, a single **bulk electric system** bus includes physical buses with breakers connected at the same voltage level within the same physical location sharing a common ground grid. These buses may be modeled or represented by a single node in **fault** studies. For example, ring bus or breaker-and-a-half bus configurations are considered to be a single bus.
- Step 2 Reduce the list to those **bulk electric system** buses that have a maximum available calculated 3-phase short circuit MVA of 1,500 MVA or greater. If there are no buses on the resulting list, proceed to Step 7.
- Step 3 Determine the 11 **bulk electric system** buses on the list with the highest maximum available calculated 3-phase short circuit MVA level. If the list has 11 or fewer **bulk electric system** buses, proceed to Step 7.
- Step 4 Calculate the median MVA level of the 11 **bulk electric system** buses determined in Step 3.
- Step 5 Multiply the median MVA level determined in Step 4 by 20%.
- Step 6 Reduce the **bulk electric system** buses on the list to only those that have a maximum available calculated 3-phase short circuit MVA higher than the greater of:
- (a) 1,500 MVA; or
 - (b) 20% of median MVA level determined in Step 5.
- Step 7 If there are no **bulk electric system** buses on the list: the procedure is complete and no **fault** recording and sequence of events recording data is required. Proceed to Step 9.
- If the list has one or more, but less than or equal to 11 **bulk electric system** buses: **fault** recording and sequence of events recording data is required at the **bulk electric system** bus with the highest maximum available calculated 3-phase short circuit MVA as determined in Step 3. Proceed to Step 9.
- If the list has more than 11 **bulk electric system** buses: sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data is required on at least the 10% of the **bulk electric system** buses determined in Step 6 with the highest maximum available calculated 3-phase short circuit MVA. Proceed to Step 8.
- Step 8 Sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data is required at additional **bulk electric system** buses on the list determined in Step 6. The aggregate of the number of **bulk electric system** buses determined in Step 7 and in this Step 8 are at least 20% of the **bulk electric system** buses determined in Step 6. The additional **bulk electric system** buses are selected, at the discretion of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, to provide maximum wide-area coverage for sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data. The following **bulk electric system** bus locations are recommended:

Alberta Reliability Standard Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements PRC-002-AB-2



- (a) electrically distant **bulk electric system** buses or electrically distant from other **disturbance monitoring equipment** devices;
 - (b) voltage sensitive areas;
 - (c) cohesive load and generation zones;
 - (d) **bulk electric system** buses with a relatively high number of incident transmission circuits
 - (e) **bulk electric system** buses with **reactive power** devices; and
 - (f) major facilities interconnecting outside the area of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**.
- Step 9 The list of monitored **bulk electric system** buses for sequence of events recording and **fault** recording data for requirement R1 is the aggregate of the **bulk electric system** buses determined in Steps 7 and 8.

Alberta Reliability Standard Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements PRC-002-AB-2



Appendix 2 Implementation Plan

Effective Date

This **reliability standard** is effective on the first **day** 3 full calendar quarters after the date that it is approved by the **Commission**.

Implementation Plan for PRC-002-AB-2 Requirements R1 and R5:

Entities must be 100% compliant on the first **day** following 3 full calendar quarters after the date that the **reliability standard** is approved by the **Commission**.

Implementation Plan for PRC-002-AB-2 Requirements R2, R3, R4, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, and R11:

Entities must be at least 50% compliant within 4 calendar years of the effective date of PRC-002-AB-2 and 100% compliant within 6 calendar years of the effective date.

Entities that own only one identified **bulk electric system** bus, **system element** on the **bulk electric system**, or **generating unit** must be 100% compliant within 6 calendar years of the effective date.

Entities must be 100% compliant with a re-evaluated list from requirements R1 or R5 within 3 calendar years following the notification by the **ISO** or the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that re-evaluated the list.

Standards for Retirement

PRC-018-AB-1

Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must maintain documentation to demonstrate compliance with PRC-018-AB-1 until that entity meets the requirements of PRC-002-AB-2 in accordance with this Implementation Plan. **Reliability standard** PRC-018-AB-1 remains effective throughout the phased implementation period of PRC-002-AB-2 and is applicable to an entity's **disturbance** monitoring and reporting activities not yet transitioned to PRC-002-AB-2. PRC-018-AB-1 will be retired following full implementation of PRC-002-AB-2 as noted below.

PRC-018-AB-1 Midnight of the day immediately prior to 6 years after the effective date of PRC-002-AB-2.

Alberta Reliability Standard Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements PRC-002-AB-2



Appendix 3 Sequence of Events Recording Data Format (Requirement R11, R11.3)

Date, Time, Local Time Code, Substation, Device, State¹

08/27/13, 23:58:57.110, -5, Sub 1, Breaker 1, Close

08/27/13, 23:58:57.082, -5, Sub 2, Breaker 2, Close

08/27/13, 23:58:47.217, -5, Sub 1, Breaker 1, Open

08/27/13, 23:58:47.214, -5, Sub 2, Breaker 2, Open

¹ "OPEN" and "CLOSE" are used as examples. Other terminology such as TRIP, TRIP TO LOCKOUT, RECLOSE, etc. is also acceptable.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Analysis and Mitigation of Transmission and Generation Protection System Misoperation

PRC-004-AB2-1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure all **misoperations** of transmission and generation **protection systems** affecting the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system** are analyzed and mitigated.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that:
 - (i) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (ii) has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 4.5 MW;
 - (iii) is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; and
 - (iv) has **protection systems** that directly affect the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**;
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that:
 - (i) is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
 - (ii) has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 4.5 MW; and
 - (iii) has **protection systems** that directly affect the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**; and
- (d) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

- R1** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must analyze **misoperations** of its **protection systems** affecting the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**, and develop and implement a corrective action plan to avoid future **misoperations** of a similar nature.
- R2** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must provide to the **ISO** documentation of its **misoperations** analyses and corrective action plans upon request by the **ISO**.
- R3** The **ISO** must provide to the **WECC** documentation of the **misoperations** analyses and corrective action plans upon request by the **WECC**.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of analyzing **misoperations**, and developing and implementing a corrective action plan as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include reports that include analysis and corrective action plans, emails, work orders, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of providing to the **ISO** documentation of **misoperations** analyses and corrective action

Alberta Reliability Standard Analysis and Mitigation of Transmission and Generation Protection System Misoperation PRC-004-AB2-1



plans as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include emails, dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of providing to the **WECC** documentation of the **misoperations** analyses and corrective action plans as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include emails, dated correspondence, or other equivalent evidence

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-04-01	Clarification to ensure the protections system misoperations that must be analyzed are those affecting the reliability of the bulk electric system. Administrative update: existing PRC-004-AB1-1 is being renamed PRC-004-AB2-1; and amendments to ensure consistent use of defined terms as included in the AESO's Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary ("CADG"); formatting and grammatical corrections; the deletion of the following sections: (a) "Definitions"; (b) "Processes and Procedures", (c) "Appendices"; and (d) "Guidelines"
2013-01-02	Administrative update – "TFO" and "GFO" replaced with "legal owner of a transmission facility", "legal owner of a generating unit" and "legal owner of an aggregated generating facility"; and other minor clean up items.
2010-02-11	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme

Misoperation

PRC-004-WECC-AB1-1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure all **misoperations** of transmission and generation **protection systems** and RASs on transmission paths are analyzed and mitigated.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that is the **legal owner** of a **WECC** major transmission path **facility** or **RAS** listed in the tables titled "Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System" and "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the **WECC**;
- (b) the **operator** of a **transmission facility** that operates a **WECC** major transmission path **facility** or **RAS** listed in the tables titled "Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System" and "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the **WECC**;
- (c) the legal owner of a generating unit that owns components of RASs listed in the table titled "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the WECC;
- (d) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that owns components of **RASs** listed in the table titled "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the **WECC**;
- (e) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that operates **RASs** listed in the table titled "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the **WECC**;
- (f) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that operates **RASs** listed in the table titled "Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)" as provided by the **WECC**; and
- (g) the **ISO**.

3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the ***Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary***.

4. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**, **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must ensure that its **system operators** and protection personnel analyze all **protection system** and **RAS** operations as follows:

- R1.1** Each **operator** of a **transmission facility**, **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must review all tripping of transmission **system elements** and **RAS** operations to identify apparent **misoperations** within 24 hours.
- R1.2** Protection personnel of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must analyze all operations of **protection systems** and **RAS** within 20 business **days** of the

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Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme

Misoperation

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operation of either such system or **RAS** to determine whether a **misoperation** has occurred.

- R2** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must perform the actions listed in requirements R2.1 to R2.4 inclusive for each **misoperation** of the **protection system** or **RAS**, subject to the following:

Requirements R2.1 to R2.4 inclusive do not apply to **protection system** and/or **RAS** operations that appear to have operated correctly at the time of occurrence. If the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** later finds through **system** protection personnel analysis that the **protection system** or **RAS** misoperated, the requirements of R2.1 to R2.4 inclusive become applicable at the time the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** identifies the **misoperation**.

Table 1 is provided as a simplified summary of the requirements in R2.1 to R2.4 inclusive.

- 2.1** If the **protection system** or **RAS** has a **security-based misoperation** and two or more **FEPS** or **FERAS** remain in service to ensure **BES reliability**, the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must remove from service the **protection system** or **RAS** that misoperated, within 22 hours following the identification of the **misoperation**.

Repair or replacement of the failed **protection system** or **RAS** is at the discretion of the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**.

- R2.2** If the **protection system** or **RAS** has a **security-based misoperation** and only one **FEPS** or **FERAS** remains in service to ensure **BES reliability**, the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** responsible for the **protection system** or **RAS**, as the case may be, must perform the following:

R2.2.1 Remove from service, within 22 hours for repair or modification, the **protection system** or **RAS** that misoperated.

R2.2.2 Repair or replace any **protection system** or **RAS** that misoperated with a **FEPS** or **FERAS** within 20 business days of the date of removal.

R2.2.3 Remove the **system element** from service or disable the **RAS** if repair or replacement is not completed within 20 business days.

- R2.3** If the **protection system** or **RAS** has a **security-based** or **dependability-based misoperation** and a **FEPS** or **FERAS** is not in service to ensure **BES reliability**, the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** responsible for the **protection system** or **RAS**, as the case may be, must repair and place back in service within 22 hours the **protection system** or **RAS** that misoperated.

If this cannot be done, the responsible legal owner of a transmission facility, legal owner of a generating unit or legal owner of an aggregated generating facility must perform the following:

R2.3.1 When a **FEPS** is not available, remove the associated **system element** from service.

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Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme

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R2.3.2 When **FERAS** is not available, meet one of the following requirements:

R2.3.2.1 If the responsible entity is a **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**, it must advise the **ISO**, and the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must adjust generation to a reliable operating level as directed by the **ISO**.

R2.3.2.2 If the responsible entity is a **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, it must advise the **ISO**, and the **operator** of a **transmission facility** must operate the **facilities** within the adjusted **SOL** as determined and directed by the **ISO**.

R2.4 If the **protection system** or **RAS** has a **dependability-based misoperation**, but has one or more **FEPS** or **FERAS** that operated correctly, the associated **system element** or transmission path may remain in service without removing from service the **protection system** or **RAS** that failed, provided one of the following is performed

R2.4.1 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must repair or replace any **protection system** or **RAS** that misoperated with **FEPS** and **FERAS** within 20 business **days** of the date of the **misoperation** identification, or

R2.4.2 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must remove from service the associated **system element** or **RAS**.

R3 The **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must submit a **misoperation** incident report to the **ISO** within six business **days** of identifying the **misoperation** for the following:

R3.1 Identification of a **misoperation** of a **protection system** and/or **RAS**

R3.2 Completion of repairs or the replacement of the protection system and/or **RAS** that misoperated.

R4 The **ISO** must submit **misoperation** incident reports to **WECC** within 10 business **days** of identifying the **misoperation**.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below.

MR1.1 Documentation exists that confirms a review was completed within the timelines as specified in requirement R1.1.

MR1.2 Documentation exists that confirms an analysis was completed and in the timelines as specified in requirement R1.2.

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- MR2** Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below.
- MR2.1** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.1.
- MR2.2** Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below.
- MR2.2.1** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.2.1.
- MR2.2.2** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.2.2.
- MR2.2.3** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.2.3.
- MR2.3** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.3.
- MR2.3.1** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.3.1.
- MR2.3.2** Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below.
- MR2.3.2.1** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.3.2.1.
- MR2.3.2.2** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.3.2.2.
- MR2.4** Measures for this requirement are identified in the subsections below
- MR2.4.1** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.4.1.
- MR2.4.2** Evidence exists and shows that required actions were taken in the timelines as specified in requirement R2.4.2.
- MR3** **Misoperation** incident report is submitted within timelines as specified in requirement R3.
- MR3.1** **Misoperation** incident report contains content as specified in requirement R3.1.
- MR3.2** **Misoperation** incident report contains content as specified in requirements R3.2.
- MR4** Confirmation exists that incident reports as specified in requirement R4 were received within the timelines specified, or evidence that requests for confirmation were made for the incident reports provided as specified in requirement R4.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1 – Requirement R2: Table of Required Actions for Protection System or RAS Misoperation (see below)

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8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .
2013-01-02	Administrative update – “ TFO and GFO ” replaced with “ legal owner of a transmission facility ” “ legal owner of a generating unit ” and “ legal owner of an aggregated generating facility ”; and other minor cleanup items.
2010-02-11	New Issue

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Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme

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Appendix 1 – Requirement R2: Table of Required Actions for Protection System or RAS Misoperation

PRC-004-WECC-1 Requirement R2 - Table of Required Actions for Protection System or RAS Misoperation					
Protective System/RAS Situation			Required Mitigating Actions		
Protection Basis:	Number of FEPS or RAS in place after misoperation	Misoperating protection system is:	Protection System/RAS Removal Requirement	Protection System/RAS Repair or Replacement Requirement	System Element Removal Requirement
Security	2 or more	PS	Remove within 22h.	At owners discretion.	
	1	PS	Remove within 22h.	Repair within 20 days .	Remove system element from service.
	0	PS	None.	Repair within 22 hours.	If not repaired in 22 hours then remove system element from service.
	2 or more	RAS	Remove within 22h.	At owners discretion.	
	1	RAS	Remove within 22h.	Repair within 20 days .	If not repaired in 20 days then disable RAS or remove system element from service.
	0	RAS	None.	Repair within 22 hours.	Either the legal owner of a transmission facility , legal owner of a generating unit or legal owner of an aggregated generating facility must advise the ISO , and the operator of a generating unit or operator of an aggregated generating facility must adjust generating operating levels to a reliable operating level as directed by the ISO or the ISO will adjust the SOL and the operator of a transmission facility will operate the facilities within established limits.

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Dependability	1 or more that operated correctly	PS	Can leave in service.	Repair in 20 days or remove system element from service.	
	0	PS	None.	Repair within 22 hours.	If not repaired in 22 hours then remove system element from service.
	1 or more that operated correctly	PS	Can leave in service.	Repair in 20 days or remove RAS or system element from service.	
	0	RAS	None.	Repair within 22 hours.	Either the legal owner of a transmission facility , legal owner of a generating unit or legal owner of an aggregated generating facility must advise the ISO , and the operator of a generating unit or operator of an aggregated generating facility must adjust generating operating levels to a reliable operating level as directed by the ISO or the ISO will adjust the SOL and the operator of a transmission facility will operate the facilities within established limits.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance

PRC-005-AB2-6



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to document and implement programs for the maintenance of all **protection systems**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying affecting the reliability of the **transmission system** so that they are kept in working order.

2. Applicability

The entities identified in subsection 2.1 must apply the requirements of this **reliability standard** to the devices listed in subsection 2.2, unless exempted under subsection 2.3.

2.1 This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that:
 - (i) is part of the **bulk electric system**, excluding any transformer with less than 2 terminals energized at 100 kV or higher;
 - (ii) is not part of the **bulk electric system**, and owns any of the following:
 - (A) the **protection systems** used for the **ISO's underfrequency load shedding program**;
 - (B) the **protection systems** used for **undervoltage load shed systems** installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**;
 - (C) **protection systems** installed as a **remedial action scheme**, including automatic reclosing applied as an integral part of a **remedial action scheme**, for the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**; or
 - (iii) is material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system, as the **ISO** determines and includes on a list published on the AESO website, which the **ISO** may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 3.
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that:
 - (i) has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW and is either:
 - (A) directly connected to the **transmission system**,
 - (B) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat, or
 - (C) part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
 - (ii) is within a power plant that:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) is a **black start resource**; or
 - (iv) is material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system, regardless of the **maximum authorized real power** rating of the **generating unit**, as the **ISO** determines and

Alberta Reliability Standard

Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance

PRC-005-AB2-6



includes on a list published on the AESO website, which the **ISO** may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 3;

- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that:
 - (i) has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW and is either:
 - (A) directly connected to the **transmission system**;
 - (B) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; or
 - (C) part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
 - (ii) is a **black start resource**; or
 - (iii) is material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system, regardless of the **maximum authorized real power** rating of the **aggregated generating facility**, as the **ISO** determines and includes on a list published on the AESO website, which the **ISO** may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 3.

2.2 This **reliability standard** applies to the following devices:

- (a) **protection systems** and sudden pressure relaying that are installed for the purpose of detecting faults on **system elements** as identified in section 2.1;
- (b) **protection systems** used for the **ISO's underfrequency load shedding** program;
- (c) **protection systems** used for **undervoltage load shed** systems installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for the reliability of the **interconnected electric system**;
- (d) **protection systems** installed as a **remedial action scheme** for the **reliability** of the **interconnected electric system**;
- (e) **protection systems** and sudden pressure relaying for **generating units**, including:
 - (i) **protection systems** that act to trip the **generating unit** either directly or via lockout or auxiliary tripping relays;
 - (ii) **protection systems** and sudden pressure relaying for **generating unit** step-up transformers; and
 - (iii) **protection systems** and sudden pressure relaying for station service or excitation transformers connected to the **generating unit** bus, that act to trip the **generating unit** either directly or via lockout or tripping auxiliary relays;
- (f) **protection systems** and sudden pressure relaying for **aggregated generating facilities** from and including the **collector bus** to a common point of connection at 100 kV or above;
- (g) automatic reclosing :
 - (i) applied on all transmission lines connected to a bus operated at a voltage level of 100 kV or higher located at generating plant substations where the combined **maximum authorized real power** is greater than 500 MW;
 - (ii) applied on all transmission line terminals operated at a voltage level of 100 kV or higher at substations one bus away from generating plants specified in Section 2.2 (g)(i) when the substation is less than 10 circuit-miles from the generating plant substation; and

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Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance

PRC-005-AB2-6



(iii) applied as an integral part of a **remedial action scheme** specified in subsection (d) above.

2.3 Automatic reclosing addressed in subsections 2.2(g)(i) and 2.2(g)(ii) may be excluded if the equipment owner can demonstrate to the **ISO** that a close-in three-phase fault present for twice the normal clearing time (capturing a minimum trip-close-trip time delay) does not result in a total loss of gross generation in either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system exceeding the gross capacity of the largest **generating unit** where the automatic reclosing is applied.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must establish a **protection system** maintenance program for its **protection systems**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying.

The **protection system** maintenance program must:

R1.1 identify which maintenance method (a time-based method, the performance-based method per Appendix 2, or a combination of these maintenance methods) is used to address each **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component type (as identified in Appendix 1). All batteries associated with the station dc supply component type of a **protection system** must be included in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3 of Appendix 1.

R1.2 include the applicable monitored component attributes applied to each **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-3, and Table 5 of Appendix 1, where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying components.

R2 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its **protection system** maintenance program must follow the procedure established in Appendix 2 to establish and maintain its performance-based intervals.

R3 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses time-based maintenance program(s) must maintain its **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying components that are included within the time-based maintenance program in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-3, and Table 5 of Appendix 1.

R4 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses performance-based maintenance program(s) in accordance with requirement R2 must implement and follow its **protection system** maintenance program for its **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying components that are included within the performance-based program(s).

R5 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must demonstrate efforts to correct identified unresolved maintenance issues.

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4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

- MR1** Evidence of having a documented **protection system** maintenance program in accordance with requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to a documented **protection system** maintenance program that may include supporting information such as manufacturer's specifications or engineering drawings or other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of following the procedure for performance-based maintenance intervals as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, component lists, dated maintenance records and dated analysis records and results or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of maintaining **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying components in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of following the **protection system** maintenance program for performance-based maintenance program(s) as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of demonstrating efforts to correct identified unresolved maintenance issues as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, work orders, replacement component orders, invoices, project schedules with completed milestones, return material authorizations or purchase orders or other equivalent evidence.

5. Implementation Plan

Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must implement requirements R1 through R5 in accordance with the implementation plan in Appendix 5.

6. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Tables describing protection system, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component types, maintenance activities and intervals:*

Table 1-1	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-2	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Communications Systems Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-3	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-4(a)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS

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Table 1-4(b)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-4(c)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-4(d)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS
Table 1-4(e)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Protection System Station dc Supply for non-bulk electric system Interrupting Devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems
Table 1-4(f)	Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems
Table 1-5	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems for Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS, Automatic Reclosing, and Sudden Pressure Relaying
Table 2	Alarming Paths and Monitoring
Table 3	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems
Table 4-1	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components for Reclosing and Supervisory Relay
Table 4-2(a)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components for Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing and Supervisory Relays that are NOT an Integral Part of RAS
Table 4-2(b)	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components for Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing and Supervisory Relays that are an Integral Part of RAS
Table 4-3	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components for Voltage Sensing Devices Associated with Supervisory Relays
Table 5-1	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Sudden Pressure Relaying for Fault Pressure Relay
Table 5-2	Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Sudden Pressure Relaying for Control Circuitry Associated with a Fault Pressure Relay

Appendix 2 – Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program;

Appendix 3 – Amending Process for List of Facilities;

Appendix 4 – Amending Process for List of Devices; and

Appendix 5 – Implementation Plan

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Revision History

Date	Description
2020-10-13	Revised Applicability section 2.2(g) to clearly identify the reclosers that this reliability standard applies to.
2019-10-01	Revised: - the Applicability section to clearly apply the reliability standard to protection systems associated with underfrequency load shedding, under voltage load shedding, and remedial action schemes that are not part of the bulk electric system, add clarity regarding the reference to the bulk electric system and the exclusion of certain types of transformers, and to add a provision enabling the ISO to add transmission facilities it determines are material to this reliability standard; - the Implementation Plan to add references to Tables 4 and 5 in subsection 5.5 in Appendix 5; and - reliability standard to correct various typos, update references, and replace the descriptions of compliance dates in Appendix 5 with the actual calendar dates.
2019-10-01	Initial release.

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Appendix 1 – Protection system, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component types, maintenance activities and intervals

Table 1-1 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)		
Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below.	6 calendar years	For all unmonitored relays: ☐ Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor relays: ☐ Test and, if necessary, calibrate. For microprocessor relays: ☐ Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system; and ☐ Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values.

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Table 1-1 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)		
Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: ☐ Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (see Table 2); ☐ Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics; and ☐ Alarming for power supply failure (see Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify: ☐ Settings are as specified; ☐ Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system; and ☐ Acceptable measurement of power system input values.

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Table 1-1 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)		
Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: ☐ Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2); ☐ Some or all inputs and outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2); and ☐ Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system .

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Table 1-2 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems Component Type - Communications Systems Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)		
Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any unmonitored communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions, and not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below.	4 months	Verify that the communications system is functional.
	6 calendar years	Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system .
Any communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions with continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the presence of the channel function, and alarming for loss of function (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system .

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Table 1-2 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems Component Type - Communications Systems Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)		
Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any communications system with all of the following: ☐ Continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the performance of the channel using criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate, and alarming for excessive performance degradation); (See Table 2); and ☐ Some or all inputs and outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify only the unmonitored communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system

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Table 1-3

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type - Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any voltage and current sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below.	12 calendar years	Verify that current and voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays.
Voltage and current sensing devices connected to microprocessor relays with ac measurements that are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure (see Table 2).	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 1-4(a)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Protection system station dc supply using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f).	4 months unless a variance is granted by the AESO	Verify: ☐ Station dc supply voltage Inspect: ☐ Electrolyte level; and ☐ For unintentional grounds
	18 months	Verify: ☐ Float voltage of battery charger ☐ Battery continuity ☐ Battery terminal connection resistance ☐ Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance

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Table 1-4(a)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA)
Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
		Inspect: ☐ Cell condition of all individual battery cells where cells are visible – or measure battery cell/unit internal ohmic values where the cells are not visible; and ☐ Physical condition of battery rack.
	18 months -or- 6 calendar years	Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank.

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Table 1-4(b)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Protection system station dc supply with Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f).	4 months unless a variance is granted by the AESO	Verify: ☐ Station dc supply voltage Inspect: ☐ For unintentional grounds
	6 months	Inspect: ☐ Condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values.
	18 months	Verify: ☐ Float voltage of battery charger; ☐ Battery continuity;

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Table 1-4(b)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
		☐ Battery terminal connection resistance; and ☐ Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance. Inspect: ☐ Physical condition of battery rack.
	6 months -or- 3 calendar years	Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank.

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Table 1-4(c)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Protection system station dc supply Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f).	4 months unless a variance is granted by the AESO	Verify: ☐ Station dc supply voltage. Inspect: ☐ Electrolyte level; and ☐ For unintentional grounds.
	18 months	Verify: ☐ Float voltage of battery charger; ☐ Battery continuity; ☐ Battery terminal connection resistance; and ☐ Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance.

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Table 1-4(c)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
		Inspect: ☐ Cell condition of all individual battery cells; and ☐ Physical condition of battery rack.
	6 calendar years	Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank.

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Table 1-4(d)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-bulk electric system interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any protection system station dc supply not using a battery and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f).	4 months	Verify: ☐ Station dc supply voltage Inspect: ☐ For unintentional grounds
	18 months	Inspect: Condition of non-battery based dc supply
	6 calendar years	Verify that the dc supply can perform as manufactured when ac power is not present.

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Table 1-4(e)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply for non-bulk electric system Interrupting Devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any protection system dc supply used for tripping only non- bulk electric system interrupting devices as part of a remedial action scheme , non-distributed UFLS, or non-distributed UVLS system and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f).	When control circuits are verified (See Table 1-5)	Verify station dc supply voltage.

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Table 1-4(f)

Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any station dc supply with high and low voltage monitoring and alarming of the battery charger voltage to detect charger overvoltage and charger failure (See Table 2).	No periodic maintenance specified	No periodic verification of station dc supply voltage is required.
Any battery based station dc supply with electrolyte level monitoring and alarming in every cell (See Table 2).		No periodic inspection of the electrolyte level for each cell is required.
Any station dc supply with unintentional dc ground monitoring and alarming (See Table 2).		No periodic inspection of unintentional dc grounds is required.
Any station dc supply with charger float voltage monitoring and alarming to ensure correct float voltage is being applied on the station dc supply (See Table 2).		No periodic verification of float voltage of battery charger is required.
Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of battery string continuity (See Table 2).		No periodic verification of the battery continuity is required.

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Table 1-4(f)

Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of the intercell and/or terminal connection detail resistance of the entire battery (See Table 2).		No periodic verification of the intercell and terminal connection resistance is required.
Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with internal ohmic value or float current monitoring and alarming, and evaluating present values relative to baseline internal ohmic values for every cell/unit (See Table 2).		No periodic evaluation relative to baseline of battery cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance is required to verify the station battery can perform as manufactured.
Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with monitoring and alarming of each cell/unit internal ohmic value (See Table 2).		No periodic inspection of the condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values of a station VRLA or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) battery is required.

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Table 1-5

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Protection Systems

Component Type - Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3), Automatic Reclosing (see Table 4), and Sudden Pressure Relaying (see Table 5)

Note: Table requirements apply to all Control Circuitry Components of Protection Systems, and RAS except as noted.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Trip coils or actuators of circuit breakers, interrupting devices, or mitigating devices (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). As long as there is monitoring on the mitigating devices for high-voltage direct current/ flexible alternating current transmission system (HVDC/FACTS) devices no maintenance is required.	6 calendar years	Verify that each trip coil is able to operate the circuit breaker, interrupting device, or mitigating device.
Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the protective relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry).	6 calendar years	Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices.
Unmonitored control circuitry associated with RAS. (See Table 4-2(b) for RAS which include automatic reclosing.)	12 calendar years	Verify all paths of the control circuits essential for proper operation of the RAS.

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Unmonitored control circuitry associated with protective functions inclusive of all auxiliary relays.	12 calendar years	Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices.
Control circuitry associated with protective functions and/or RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2).	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 2 – Alarming Paths and Monitoring

In Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-3, and Table 5 alarm attributes used to justify extended maximum maintenance intervals and/or reduced maintenance activities are subject to the following maintenance requirements

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any alarm path through which alarms in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-3, and Table 5 are conveyed from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated, and not having all the attributes of the “Alarm Path with monitoring” category below. Alarms are reported within 24 hours of detection to location where corrective action can be initiated.	12 calendar years	Verify that the alarm path conveys alarm signals to a location where corrective action can be initiated.
Alarm Path with monitoring: The location where corrective action is taken receives an alarm within 24 hours for failure of any portion of the alarming path from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated.	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 3
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below.	6 calendar years	Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor relays: ☐ Test and, if necessary calibrate. For microprocessor relays: ☐ Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system; and ☐ Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values.
Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: ☐ Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2); and ☐ Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify: ☐ Settings are as specified; ☐ Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system; and ☐ Acceptable measurement of power system input values.

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Table 3
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: ☐ Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2); and ☐ Some or all inputs and outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the protection system .
Voltage and/or current sensing devices associated with UFLS or UVLS systems.	12 calendar years	Verify that current and/or voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays.
Protection system dc supply for tripping non-bulk electric system interrupting devices used only for a UFLS or UVLS system.	12 calendar years	Verify protection system dc supply voltage.

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Table 3
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Control circuitry between the UFLS or UVLS relays and electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices (excludes non- bulk electric system interrupting device trip coils).	12 calendar years	Verify the path from the relay to the lockout and/or tripping auxiliary relay (including essential supervisory logic).
Electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices associated only with UFLS or UVLS systems (excludes non- bulk electric system interrupting device trip coils).	12 calendar years	Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices.
Control circuitry between the electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices and the non- bulk electric system interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems, or between UFLS or UVLS relays (with no interposing electromechanical lockout or auxiliary device) and the non- bulk electric system interrupting devices (excludes non- bulk electric system interrupting device trip coils).	No periodic maintenance specified	None.
Trip coils of non- bulk electric system interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems.	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 4-1

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Reclosing and Supervisory Relay

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-1 through 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any unmonitored reclosing relay or supervisory relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below.	6 calendar years	Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor reclosing or supervisory relays: ☐ Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor reclosing or supervisory relays: ☐ Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. For microprocessor supervisory relays: ☐ Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values.

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Table 4-1

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Reclosing and Supervisory Relay

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-1 through 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
☐ Monitored microprocessor reclosing relay or supervisory relay with the following: Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). ☐ Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2). For supervisory relay: Voltage waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics.	12 calendar years	Verify: ☐ Settings are as specified. ☐ Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. For supervisory relays: ☐ Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values.

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Table 4-1

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Reclosing and Supervisory Relay

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-1 through 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Monitored microprocessor reclosing relay or supervisory relay with preceding row attributes and the following: ☐ Some or all inputs and outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). ☐ Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). For supervisory relay: ☐ Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2).	12 calendar years	Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the automatic reclosing.

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Table 4-2(a)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components

Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing and Supervisory Relays that are NOT an Integral Part of RAS

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Unmonitored control circuitry associated with automatic reclosing that is not an integral part of an RAS.	12 calendar years	Verify that automatic reclosing, upon initiation, does not issue a premature closing command to the close circuitry.
Control circuitry associated with automatic reclosing that is not part of an RAS and is monitored and alarmed for conditions that would result in a premature closing command. (See Table 2)	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance

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Table 4-2(b)

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components

Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing and Supervisory Relays that are an Integral Part of RAS

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Close coils or actuators of circuit breakers or similar devices that are used in conjunction with automatic reclosing as part of an RAS (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry).	6 calendar years	Verify that each close coil or actuator is able to operate the circuit breaker or mitigating device.
Unmonitored close control circuitry associated with automatic reclosing used as an integral part of an RAS.	12 calendar years	Verify all paths of the control circuits associated with automatic reclosing that are essential for proper operation of the RAS.
Control circuitry associated with automatic reclosing that is an integral part of an RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2).	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 4-3

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components

Component Type – Voltage Sensing Devices Associated with Supervisory Relays

Note: In cases where Components of Automatic Reclosing are common to Components listed in Table 1-3, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any voltage sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below.	12 calendar years	Verify that voltage signal values are provided to the supervisory relays.
Voltage sensing devices that are connected to microprocessor supervisory relays with ac measurements that are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure. (See Table 2)	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Table 5-1

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Sudden Pressure Relaying

Component Type – Fault Pressure Relay

Note: In cases where Components of Sudden Pressure Relaying are common to Components listed in Table 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Any fault pressure relay.	6 calendar years unless a variance is granted by the AESO	Verify the pressure or flow sensing mechanism is operable.

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Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance

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Table 5-2

Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Sudden Pressure Relaying

Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with a Fault Pressure Relay

Note: In cases where Components of Sudden Pressure Relaying are common to Components listed in Table 1-5, the Components only need to be tested once during a distinct maintenance interval.

Component Attributes	Maximum Maintenance Interval	Maintenance Activities
Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the fault pressure relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry).	6 calendar years unless a variance is granted by the AESO	Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices.
Unmonitored control circuitry associated with sudden pressure relaying.	12 calendar years	Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices.
Control circuitry associated with sudden pressure relaying whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2).	No periodic maintenance specified	None.

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Appendix 2 – Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program

Purpose:

1. To establish a technical basis for initial and continued use of a performance-based **protection system** maintenance program.
2. To establish the technical justification for the initial use of a performance-based **protection system** maintenance program:
 - (a) Develop a list with a description of components included in each designated segment, with a minimum segment population of 60 components;
 - (b) Maintain the components in each segment according to the time-based maximum allowable intervals established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-2, and Table 5 until results of maintenance activities for the segment are available for a minimum of 30 individual components of the segment;
 - (c) Document the maintenance program activities and results for each segment, including maintenance dates and countable events for each included component;
 - (d) Analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each segment to determine the overall performance of the segment and develop maintenance intervals; and
 - (e) Determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each segment such that the segment experiences countable events on no more than 4% of the components within the segment, for the greater of either the last 30 components maintained or all components maintained in the previous year.
3. To maintain the technical justification for the ongoing use of a performance-based **protection system** maintenance program:
 - (a) At least annually, update the list of components and segments, and/or description if any changes occur within the segment;
 - (b) Perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the components (addressed in the performance based **protection system** maintenance program) in each segment or 3 individual components within the segment in each year;
 - (c) For the prior year, analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each segment to determine the overall performance of the segment; and
 - (d) Using the prior year's data, determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each segment such that the segment experiences countable events on no more than 4% of the components within the segment, for the greater of either the last 30 components maintained or all components maintained in the previous year.

If the components in a segment maintained through a performance-based **protection system** maintenance program experience 4% or more countable events, develop, document and implement an action plan to reduce the countable events to less than 4% of the segment population within 3 years.

Appendix 3 – Amending Process for List of Facilities

In order to amend any list referenced in subsections 2.1(a)(iii), 2.1(b)(iv) and 2.1(c)(iii), of section 2, *Applicability* of this **reliability standard**, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine when the **legal owner** is to be compliant with the requirements of this **reliability standard**, which from the date of notice must be at a minimum the maximum maintenance interval identified in Tables 1 to 5 plus six (6) full **months**;
- (b) upon determining that a **transmission facility, generating unit or aggregated generating facility** is to be deleted, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date for the **legal owner** to no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

Appendix 4 – Amending Process for List of Devices

If devices are added or removed as described in subsections 2.2(b), 2.2(c) and 2.2(d) of section 2, *Applicability* of this **reliability standard** the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **protection system** that is to be used for **underfrequency load shedding, under voltage load shed** or that is to be installed as a **remedial action scheme** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine when the **legal owner** is to be compliant with the requirements of this **reliability standard**, which from the date of notice must be at a minimum the maximum maintenance interval identified in Tables 1 to 5 plus 6 full months;
- (b) upon determining that a **protection system** that is used for **underfrequency load shedding, under voltage load shed** or that is installed as a **remedial action scheme** is to be removed, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date for the **legal owner** to no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements.

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Appendix 5 – Implementation Plan

1. Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to set the effective dates and the implementation timelines for Alberta reliability standard PRC-005-AB, *Protection System, Automatic Reclosing and Sudden Pressure Relaying Maintenance* ("PRC-005-AB").

2. Compliance with Reliability Standards

The entities identified in section 2 of this **reliability standard** must comply with the requirements of PRC-005-AB in accordance with the implementation schedule.

3. Effective Date

PRC-005-AB will become effective on October 1, 2019. Entities must follow the phased implementation plan set out in sections 4 and 5 below.

4. Implementation Plan for Requirements R1, R2 and R5

Entities must be compliant with requirements R1, R2 and R5 of PRC-005-AB on October 1, 2019.

5. Implementation Plan for Requirements R3 and R4

1. For **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component maintenance activities with maximum allowable intervals of less than 1 calendar year, as established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, the entity must be compliant with PRC-005-AB by April 1, 2020.
2. For **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component maintenance activities with maximum allowable intervals 1 calendar year or more, but 2 calendar years or less, as established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, the entity must be compliant with PRC-005-AB by October 1, 2021.
3. For **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component maintenance activities with maximum allowable intervals of 3 calendar years, as established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, maintenance must be completed in accordance with the following:
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 30% of identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2020 or, for generating plants with scheduled outage intervals exceeding 2 years, at the conclusion of the first succeeding maintenance outage;
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 60% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2021.
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 100% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2022.
4. For **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component maintenance activities with maximum allowable intervals of 6 calendar years, as established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, Table 4-1, Table 4-2b, Table 5-1, and Table 5-2 maintenance must be completed in accordance with the following:
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 30% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2021 or, for generating plants with scheduled outage intervals exceeding 3 years, at the conclusion of the first succeeding maintenance outage.

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- The entity must complete maintenance on 60% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2023.
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 100% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2025.
5. For **protection system**, automatic reclosing, and sudden pressure relaying component maintenance activities with maximum allowable intervals of 12 calendar years, as established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, Tables 4-1 through 4-3, and Table 5-2 maintenance must be completed in accordance with the following:
- The entity must complete maintenance on 30% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2023.
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 60% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2027.
 - The entity must complete maintenance on 100% of the identified components in accordance with their **protection system** maintenance program by October 1, 2031.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding

PRC-006-AB-3



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish design and documentation requirements for any automatic **underfrequency load shedding** program that arrests declining frequency, assists recovery of frequency following underfrequency events, and provides last resort system preservation measures.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that has responsibility in an **underfrequency load shedding** program the **ISO** establishes;
- (b) the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that has responsibility in an **underfrequency load shedding** program the **ISO** establishes;
- (c) a **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** that has responsibility in an **underfrequency load shedding** program the **ISO** establishes; and
- (d) the **ISO**.

Entities identified in item (a), (b) and (c) above are collectively referred to as "UFLS entities" in this **reliability standard**. For requirements in this **reliability standard** where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly.

3. Requirements

R1 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.1 The **ISO** must participate, through its involvement in the **WECC** UFLS Review Group or its successor, in a joint regional review with the other planning coordinators in the **WECC** regional entity area that develops and documents criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the **bulk electric system** that may form islands.

R2 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.2 The **ISO** must identify one or more islands from the regional review, set out in requirement RD.B.1, to serve as a basis for designing a region-wide coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** program including:

RD.B.2.1 those islands selected by applying the criteria in requirement RD.B.1; and

RD.B.2.2 any portions of the **bulk electric system** designed to detach from the **Interconnection** as a result of the operation of a **protection system** or **remedial action scheme**.

R3 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.3. The **ISO** must adopt an **underfrequency load shedding** program;

- (a) coordinated across the **WECC** regional entity area; and
- (b) modified as appropriate for Alberta;

including notification to the UFLS entities of the adopted **underfrequency load shedding** program and a schedule for implementation within Alberta.

R4 Intentionally left blank.

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RD.B.4 The **ISO** must participate in a coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** design assessment with the other planning coordinators in the **WECC** regional entity area at least once every five years.

RD.B.4.1 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.2 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.3 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.4 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.5 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.6 intentionally left blank.

RD.B.4.7 Intentionally left blank.

R5 Intentionally left blank.

R6 The **ISO** must maintain the set of **underfrequency load shedding** data necessary to model its **underfrequency load shedding** program for use in event analyses and assessments of the **underfrequency load shedding** program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 **months** between maintenance activities.

R7 Intentionally left blank.

R8 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** and **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** must provide data to support maintenance of the **underfrequency load shedding** program, to the **ISO** according to the schedule the **ISO** specifies.

R9 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** and **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** must provide, as the **ISO** determines, automatic tripping of load in accordance with the **underfrequency load shedding** program design, and schedule for implementation, including any corrective action plan.

R10 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** must provide, as the **ISO** determines, automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, transmission lines, and reactors to control over-voltage as a result of **underfrequency load shedding** if required by the **underfrequency load shedding** program and schedule for implementation, including any corrective action plan.

R11 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.11 The **ISO** must, if a **bulk electric system** islanding event in Alberta results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the **ISO's underfrequency load shedding** program, participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all affected planning coordinators within one year of event actuation to evaluate:

RD.B.11.1 the performance of the **underfrequency load shedding** equipment; and

RD.B.11.2 the effectiveness of the **underfrequency load shedding** program.

R12 Intentionally left blank.

RD.B.12 The **ISO** must, if an islanding event assessment (per RD.B.11) identifies deficiencies in the **underfrequency load shedding** program, participate in and document a coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** design assessment of the **underfrequency load shedding**

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program with the other planning coordinators in the **WECC** regional area to consider the identified deficiencies within 2 years of event actuation.

R13 Intentionally left blank.

R14 Intentionally left blank.

R15 Intentionally left blank.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MD.B.1 is the measure for requirement RD.B.1.

MR1 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.1 Evidence of participating in a joint regional review as required in requirement RD.B.1 exists. Evidence may include reports, or other documentation of its criteria, developed as part of the joint regional review with other planning coordinators in the **WECC** regional entity area, to select portions of the **bulk electric system** that may form islands, including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per requirement RD.B.1, meeting minutes showing attendance at the **WECC** UFLS Review Group or its successor, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.2 Evidence of identifying one or more islands from the regional review as required in requirement RD.B.2 exists. Evidence may include reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.3 Evidence of adopting an **underfrequency load shedding** program as required in requirement RD.B.3 exists. Evidence may include reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its adoption of a **underfrequency load shedding** program, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.4 Evidence of participating in a coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** design assessment as required in requirement RD.B.4 exists. Evidence may include dated documentation of the **ISO's** participation in a coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** design assessment with the other planning coordinators in the **WECC** or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Intentionally left blank.

MR6 Evidence of maintaining **underfrequency load shedding** data as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include **underfrequency load shedding** data, data requests, data input forms, other dated documentation or other equivalent evidence.

MR7 Intentionally left blank.

MR8 Evidence of providing data to the **ISO** as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include responses to data requests, spreadsheets, letters or other dated documentation or other equivalent evidence.

MR9 Evidence of providing automatic tripping of load as required in requirement R9 exists. Evidence may include:

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- spreadsheets summarizing feeder load armed with **underfrequency load shedding** relays;
- the relay settings and implementation date;
- schedules for implementation of the **underfrequency load shedding** program or any required corrective action plan; or
- other equivalent evidence.

MR10 Evidence of providing automatic switching of capacitor banks, transmission lines, and reactors as required in requirement R10 exists. Evidence may include:

- relay settings and, in some cases, the tripping logic and the implementation date;
- schedules for implementation of the **underfrequency load shedding** program or any required corrective action plan; or
- other equivalent evidence.

MR11 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.11 Evidence of participating in and documenting a coordinated event assessment with all affected planning coordinators as required in requirement RD.B.11 exists. Evidence may include reports, data gathered from an historical event, other dated documentation, or other equivalent evidence.

MR12 Intentionally left blank.

MD.B.12 Evidence of participating in and documenting a coordinated **underfrequency load shedding** design assessment of the **underfrequency load shedding** program with the other planning coordinators as required in requirement RD.B.12 exists. Evidence may include reports, data gathered from an historical event, dated documentation, or other equivalent evidence.

MR13 Intentionally left blank.

MR14 Intentionally left blank.

MR15 Intentionally left blank.

Revision History

Date	Description
2022-01-01	Initial release.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to establish an integrated and coordinated approach to the design, evaluation, and reliable operation of **under voltage load shed** programs.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that has responsibility in an **under voltage load shed** program the **ISO** establishes;
- (b) the **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system** that has responsibility in an **under voltage load shed** program the **ISO** establishes;
- (c) a **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** that has responsibility in an **under voltage load shed** program the **ISO** establishes; and
- (d) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must, if it is developing an **under voltage load shed** program, evaluate its effectiveness and subsequently provide the **under voltage load shed** program's specifications and implementation schedule to the **under voltage load shed** entities responsible for implementing the **under voltage load shed** program. The evaluation must include studies and analyses that show that:

- (a) the implementation of the **under voltage load shed** program resolves the identified under voltage issues that led to its development and design; and
- (b) the **under voltage load shed** program is integrated with consideration given to the following at the discretion of the **ISO**:
coordination with **generating unit** and **aggregated generating facility** voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems, including transmission line protection, automatic reclosing, **remedial action schemes**, and other **under voltage load shed** programs or schemes.

R2 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, and **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** must adhere to the **under voltage load shed** program specifications and implementation schedule the **ISO** determines and associated with any corrective action plans in accordance with requirement R5.

R3 The **ISO** must perform a comprehensive assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of each of its **under voltage load shed** programs at least once every 60 **months**. Each assessment must include, studies and analyses that evaluate whether the **under voltage load shed** program:

- (a) resolves the identified under voltage issues for which the **under voltage load shed** program is designed; and

- (b) is integrated with consideration given to the following at the discretion of the **ISO**: coordination with **generating unit** and **aggregated generating facility** voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems, including transmission line protection, automatic reclosing, **remedial action schemes**, and other **under voltage load shed** programs or schemes.

R4 The **ISO** must, within 12 **months** of an event that resulted in a voltage excursion for which its **under voltage load shed** programs were designed to operate, perform an assessment to evaluate:

- (a) whether its **under voltage load shed** program resolved the under voltage issues associated with the event; and
- (b) the performance (i.e., operation and non-operation) of the **under voltage load shed** program equipment.

R5 The **ISO** must, when it identifies deficiencies during an assessment performed in either requirement R3 or R4, develop a corrective action plan to address the deficiencies and subsequently provide the corrective action plan, including an implementation schedule, to **under voltage load shed** entities within 3 **months** of completing the assessment in either requirement R3 or R4.

R6 The **ISO** must, if it has an **under voltage load shed** program in its area, collect data necessary to model the **under voltage load shed** program in its area for use in event analyses and assessments of the **under voltage load shed** program at least once each calendar year.

R7 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of an **electric distribution system**, and **market participant** receiving service under Rate DTS of the **ISO tariff** must provide data to support maintenance of the **under voltage load shed** program, to the **ISO** according to the schedule the **ISO** specifies.

R8 The **ISO** must, if it has an **under voltage load shed** program in its area, provide its **under voltage load shed** program data to:

- (a) planning coordinators within its **Interconnection**;
- (b) **transmission planners** within its **Interconnection**; and
- (c) other entities with a **reliability** need,

within 30 **days** of a written request.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of evaluating **under voltage load shed** programs and providing its specifications and implementation schedule to the **under voltage load shed** entities as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped studies and analyses, reports, or other documentation detailing the effectiveness of the **under voltage load shed** program, and date-stamped communications showing that the **under voltage load shed** program specifications and implementation schedule were provided to **under voltage load shed** entities, or other equivalent evidence.

- MR2** Evidence of adhering to specifications, implementation of the **under voltage load shed** program and any corrective action plans as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped documentation on the completion of actions and may include identifying the equipment armed with **under voltage load shed** relays, the **under voltage load shed** relay settings, associated load summaries, work management program records, work orders, and maintenance records, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of performing a comprehensive assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of each **under voltage load shed** program as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped reports or other documentation detailing the assessment of each **under voltage load shed** program, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR4** Evidence of performing an assessment to evaluate the **under voltage load shed** program as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped event data, event analysis reports, or other documentation detailing the assessment of the **under voltage load shed** program and performance of the associated equipment, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR5** Evidence of developing a corrective action plan and providing it to **under voltage load shed** entities as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include:
- a date-stamped corrective action plan that addresses identified deficiencies and may also include date-stamped reports or other documentation supporting the corrective action plan;
 - date-stamped communications showing that the corrective action plan and an associated implementation schedule were provided to **under voltage load shed** entities, or
 - other equivalent evidence.
- MR6** Evidence of collecting data necessary to model each **under voltage load shed** program as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped spreadsheets, data reports, or other documentation demonstrating the **under voltage load shed** program data was updated, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR7** Evidence of providing data to the **ISO** in accordance with requirement R7 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped emails, letters, or other documentation demonstrating data was provided to the **ISO** as specified, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR8** Evidence of providing its **under voltage load shed** data as required in requirement R8 exists. Evidence may include date-stamped emails, letters, or other documentation demonstrating that the **under voltage load shed** program data was provided within 30 **days** of receipt of a written request, or other equivalent evidence.

Revision History

Date	Description
2022-01-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard Coordination of Generating Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulating Controls, and Protection PRC-019-AB-2



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to verify coordination of **generating unit** or synchronous condenser voltage regulating controls, limit functions, equipment capabilities, and protection system settings.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that owns a synchronous condenser greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the **transmission system**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** whose **generating unit** has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **transmission system**;
 - (ii) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; or
 - (iii) part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **transmission system**;
- (c) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** whose **generating unit** is within a power plant that has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW and that:
 - (i) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**; and
 - (ii) is directly connected to the **transmission system** or to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (d) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW, where voltage regulating control for the facility is performed solely at the individual **generating units** of the **aggregated generating facility**, and the **aggregated generating facility** is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **transmission system**;
 - (ii) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat; or
 - (iii) part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **transmission system**;
- (e) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** whose **generating unit** is a **blackstart resource**; and
- (f) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, the **legal owner** of a **aggregated generating facility** and the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** whose resource is material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system as the **ISO** determines and includes on a list published on the AESO website, which the **ISO** may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, by the effective date of this **reliability standard** and at a maximum of every 5 calendar years, coordinate the voltage regulating system controls, including in-service limiters and protection functions, with the applicable equipment capabilities and settings of the applicable **protection system** devices and functions, assuming normal automatic voltage

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Coordination of Generating Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulating Controls, and Protection

PRC-019-AB-2



regulator control loop and steady-state system operating conditions, by verifying the following coordination items for each applicable facility:

- (a) the in-service limiters are set to operate before the **protection system** of the applicable facility in order to avoid disconnecting the **generating unit** or synchronous condenser unnecessarily; and
- (b) the applicable in-service **protection system** devices are set to operate to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits.

R2 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must:

- (a) by the later of either the effective date of this **reliability standard** or within 90 **days** following the identification of unplanned systems, equipment or setting changes that will affect the coordination described in requirement R1; or
- (b) prior to electrically connecting to the **transmission system**:
 - (i) a **generating unit**;
 - (ii) a synchronous condenser; or
 - (iii) a **generating unit** that is part of an **aggregated generating facility**;

any of which are impacted by planned system, equipment or setting changes that will affect the coordination as described in requirement R1,

perform the coordination described in requirement R1.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of coordinating the voltage regulating system controls by verifying the coordination items as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include dated documentation that demonstrates the coordination was performed, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of performing the coordination as described in requirement R1 in accordance with the requirements in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include dated documentation that demonstrates the specified interval in requirement R2(a) has been met or an operator log, or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Amending Process for List of Generating Units, Synchronous Condensers and Aggregated Generating Facilities*

Revision History

Date	Description
2022-01-01	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard Coordination of Generating Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulating Controls, and Protection PRC-019-AB-2



Appendix 1 Amending Process for List of Generating Units, Synchronous Condensers and Aggregated Generating Facilities

In order to amend the list referenced in subsections (f) of section 2, Applicability, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **generating unit**, synchronous condenser, or **aggregated generating facility** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than 4 full calendar quarters after the date of notice, for the **legal owner** to meet the applicable requirements;
- (b) upon determining that a **generating unit**, synchronous condenser, or **aggregated generating facility** is to be deleted, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date for the **legal owner** to no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure the protection relay settings do not limit transmission loadability, do not interfere with an **operator's** ability to take remedial action to protect the **reliability** of the **transmission system**, and are set to reliably detect all **fault** conditions and protect the electrical network from these **faults**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** with load-responsive phase **protection systems**, as described in Appendix 1, applied at the terminals of any one or more of the following facilities:
 - (i) transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except **system elements** that are part of a radial circuit, including transmission step-up transformers and lines, that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
 - (ii) transmission lines operated below 200 kV which the **ISO** identifies, as required in requirement R6.2, as essential to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**, except transmission lines that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
 - (iii) transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above; or
 - (iv) transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 200 kV, which the **ISO** identifies in accordance with requirement R6.2, except transformers that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
- (b) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, that also owns the associated switch yard, with load-responsive phase **protection systems**, as described in Appendix 1, applied at the terminals of any one or more of the following facilities:
 - (i) transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except transmission lines that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
 - (ii) transmission lines operated below 200 kV which the **ISO** identifies, as required in requirement R6.2, as essential to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**, except transmission lines that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
 - (iii) transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above; or
 - (iv) transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 200 kV which the **ISO** identifies in accordance with requirement R6.2, except transformers that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from a **generating unit** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**, that also owns the associated switch yard, with load-responsive phase **protection systems**, as described in Appendix 1, applied at the terminals of any one or more of the following facilities:
 - (i) transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except transmission lines that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from an **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**;

- (ii) transmission lines operated below 200 kV which the **ISO** identifies, as required in requirement R6.2, as essential to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**, except transmission lines that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from an **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**; or
- (iii) transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 200 kV which the **ISO** identifies in accordance with requirement R6.2, except transformers that are part of a radial circuit that are only used to export energy directly from an **aggregated generating facility** to a single **system element** on the networked **transmission system**; and

(d) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must:

- (a) use one of the criteria set out in requirements R1.1 through R1.14, inclusive, for each specific circuit terminal, being either a transmission line or a transformer, to prevent its phase protection relay settings from limiting **transmission system** loadability; and
- (b) for R1.1 through R1.14 evaluate the phase protection relay's loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a **power factor** angle of 30°.

A load encroachment function within protection relays may be used to meet (a) and (b).

R1.1 Set transmission line protection relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal facility rating of a circuit for the available defined loading duration nearest to 4 hours, expressed in amperes;

R1.2 Set transmission line protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the 10-minute emergency facility rating of a circuit, expressed in amperes;

R1.3 Set transmission line protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability, using a 90° angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance of the circuit, expressed in amperes, using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:

R1.3.1 an infinite source, i.e. zero source impedance, with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the transmission line; or

R1.3.2 an impedance at each end of the transmission line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance;

R1.4 Set transmission line protection relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the transmission line, determined as the greater of:

- (a) 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor, or
- (b) 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit, expressed in amperes, calculated in accordance with requirement R1.3, using the full transmission line inductive reactance;

R1.5 Set transmission line protection relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase **fault** magnitude, expressed in amperes;

R1.6 Set transmission line relays applied on transmission lines connected to a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** remote to load so they do not operate at or below 230% of the total nameplate capability of all the **generating units** at the facility;

- R1.7** Set transmission line protection relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility**, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration;
- R1.8** Set transmission line protection relays applied on the system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration;
- R1.9** Set transmission line protection relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration;
- R1.10** Set transformer **fault** protection relays and transmission line protection relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that they do not operate at or below the greater of:
- (a) 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating, expressed in amperes, including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment; or
 - (b) 115% of the highest established emergency transformer rating;
- R1.11** Set load responsive transformer **fault** protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a **fault** level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability;
- R1.12** For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with requirement R1.10:
- (a) set the protection relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater;
 - (b) the protection relay must allow overload in requirement R1.12(a) for at least 30 minutes to allow the **ISO** to take controlled action to relieve the overload;
 - (c) install supervision for the protection relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element; and
 - (d) the protection relay setting should be no less than 100°C for the top oil or 140°C for the winding hot spot temperature;
- R1.13** When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line and a load encroachment function is not available within the protection relay, set the transmission line distance protection relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance, at the impedance angle of the transmission line, subject to the following constraints:
- R1.13.1** set the maximum torque angle to 90° or the highest setting supported by the manufacturer;
 - R1.13.2** evaluate the protection relay loadability in amperes at the protection relay trip point 0.85 per unit voltage and a **power factor** angle of 30°; and
 - R1.13.3** include a protection relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in requirement R1.13.2 in the facility rating determination for the circuit; and
- R1.14** Where other extraordinary situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, as the **ISO** approves in writing, set the phase protection relays and associated current transformer ratios so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- R2** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase

protection relays for **faults** that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line protection relay loadability per requirement R1.

- R3** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in requirements R1.7, R1.8, R1.9, R1.13, or R1.14 must use the calculated circuit capability as the facility rating of the circuit and must obtain the **ISO's** written agreement to use the calculated circuit capability.
- R4** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses requirement R1.2 as the basis for verifying transmission line protection relay loadability must provide the **ISO** with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line protection relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than **15 months** between reports.
- R5** Each **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, or **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that uses requirement R1.13 as the basis for verifying transmission line protection relay loadability must provide the **ISO** with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line protection relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than **15 months** between reports.
- R6** The **ISO** must conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in Appendix 2, to identify the circuits in its planning area for which the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** must comply with requirements R1 through R5. The **ISO** must:
- R6.1** maintain a list of circuits per the application of Appendix 2, including an effective date that is no earlier than **24 months** from identification of the circuits; and
- R6.2** provide the list of circuits to the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, and **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** within its planning area within **30 days** of the establishment of the initial list and within **30 days** of any changes to that list.

2. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

- MR1** Evidence of using one of the criteria set out in requirements R1.1 through R1.14, evaluating the phase protection relay's loadability, and implement transmission line protection relays settings, all as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include:
- (a) spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission line protection relays is set in accordance with one of the criteria set out in requirements R1.1 through R1.14;
 - (b) coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that protection relays set per criterion set out in requirement R1.11 do not expose the transformer to **fault** levels and durations beyond those indicated in the **reliability standard**;
 - (c) evidence to demonstrate settings implementation, or
 - (d) other equivalent evidence.
- MR2** Evidence of setting its out-of-step blocking elements as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include spreadsheets or summaries of calculations, or other equivalent evidence.
- MR3** Evidence of using, and obtaining the **ISO's** written agreement to use, the calculated circuit capability as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include:
- (a) facility rating spreadsheets or facility rating database to show that the calculated circuit capability

was used as the facility rating of the circuit;

- (b) dated correspondence to show that the **ISO** agreed to the calculated circuit capability; or
- (c) other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of providing the **ISO** with an updated list of circuits as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence to the appropriate **ISO** recipient with the updated list which may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, a statement that there are no changes to the previous list, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of providing the **ISO** with an updated list of circuits as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence to the appropriate **ISO** recipient with the updated list which may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, a statement that there are no changes to the previous list, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of conducting an assessment as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include power flow results, calculation summaries or study reports that the **ISO** used the criteria established within Appendix 2 to identify the circuits in its planning area, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.1 Evidence of maintaining the list of circuits as required in requirement R6.1 exists. Evidence may include a documented list of circuits with the effective date and the revision history captured, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.2 Evidence of providing the list of circuits as required in requirement R6.2 exists. Evidence may include dated correspondence to the applicable entities, or other equivalent evidence.

3. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Associated Switch Yard with Load-Responsive Phase Protection Systems*

Appendix 2 – *Criteria for Identifying Circuits and Establishing a List*

Appendix 3 – *Retirement of Requirement R1.6*

Alberta Reliability Standard Transmission Relay Loadability PRC-023-AB-4



Revision History

Effective	Description
2020-07-01	Initial Release

Appendix 1

Associated Switch Yard with Load-Responsive Phase Protection Systems

1. This **reliability standard** includes any protection functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including:
 - (a) phase distance;
 - (b) out-of-step tripping;
 - (c) switch-on-to-**fault**;
 - (d) overcurrent relays;
 - (e) communications aided **protection system** including:
 - (i) permissive overreach transfer trip;
 - (ii) permissive under-reach transfer trip;
 - (iii) directional comparison blocking;
 - (iv) directional comparison unblocking; and
 - (f) phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e. phase **fault** detectors) associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e. pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
2. The following **protection systems** are excluded from the requirements of this **reliability standard**:
 - (a) relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail, including:
 - (i) overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions; and
 - (ii) relay elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in subsection 1(f) above;
 - (b) **protection systems** intended for the detection of ground **fault** conditions;
 - (c) **protection systems** intended for protection during stable power swings;
 - (d) Not used;
 - (e) relay elements used only for **remedial action scheme** purposes;
 - (f) **protection systems** that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions;
 - (g) thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic facility ratings; and
 - (h) relay elements associated with direct current lines.

Appendix 2

Criteria for Identifying Circuits and Establishing a List

The **ISO** must evaluate the following circuits:

- (a) transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV; and
- (b) transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are essential to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system**.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the **ISO** must identify the circuit as required in requirement R6.

- 1 A major transfer path within the Western **Interconnection** as defined by the Regional Entity.
- 2 The circuit is a monitored facility of an **interconnection reliability operating limit**, where the **interconnection reliability operating limit** was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to **reliability standard** FAC-010-AB.
- 3 The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses:
 - (a) simulate double **contingency** combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the 2 **contingencies** (reflects a situation where real time operating personnel may not have time between the 2 **contingencies** to make appropriate system adjustments), performed by the **ISO** for the one-to-five-year planning horizon;
 - (b) for circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV, evaluate the post-**contingency** loading, in consultation with the **legal owner**, against a threshold based on the facility rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the **ISO**;
 - (c) when more than one facility rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the **ISO** must base the threshold for selection on the facility rating for the loading duration nearest 4 hours;
 - (d) the threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the facility rating:
 - (i) if the facility rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including 4 hours, the circuit must comply with this **reliability standard** if the loading exceeds 115% of the facility rating;
 - (ii) if the facility rating is based on a loading duration greater than 4 and up to and including 8 hours, the circuit must comply with this **reliability standard** if the loading exceeds 120% of the facility rating; or
 - (iii) if the facility rating is based on a loading duration of greater than 8 hours, the circuit must comply with this **reliability standard** if the loading exceeds 130% of the facility rating; and
 - (e) radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- 4 The **ISO** must select the circuit based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria 1 through 3, in consultation with the **legal owner**.

- 5 The **ISO** and the **legal owner** must mutually agree upon the circuit for inclusion.

Appendix 3

Appendix 3 – Retirement of Requirement R1.6

Requirement R1.6 will be retired as of midnight the **day** before the effective date of **reliability standard** PRC-025-AB-2, *Generator Load Reliability*.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to set load-responsive protection relays associated with generation facilities at a level to prevent unnecessary tripping of a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** during a **disturbance** for conditions that do not pose a risk of damage to the associated equipment.

2. Applicability

2.1 Inclusions

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, including all electrical equipment that connects the stator windings of any **generating unit** to the **transmission system**, that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system**, or that is part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**, and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 18 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant or industrial complex which:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (b) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that is:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (ii) within a power plant or industrial complex which:
 - (A) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (B) has a combined **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than 67.5 MW;
 - (iii) a **blackstart resource**; or
 - (iv) material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1;
- (c) the **legal owner** of a **transmission facility** that is:
 - (i) part of the **bulk electric system**; or
 - (ii) which the **ISO** determines is necessary for the reliable operation of either the **interconnected electric system** or the City of Medicine Hat electric system and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time on notice to **market participants** in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit**, **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility**, and **legal owner** of a **transmission facility**, must apply settings that are in accordance with Appendix 3 - *Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria* to **protection systems**, excluding those listed in Appendix 2 – *Excluded Protection Systems*, on each load-response protection relay while maintaining reliable **fault** protection.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of applying protection relay settings in accordance with requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include summaries of coordination studies, calculations, setting sheets, and protection relay test reports or records of installation of settings in protection relays including references to how the requirements of Table 1 and maintaining reliable **fault** protection have been met, or other equivalent evidence.

It is only necessary to provide evidence that the protection relays settings do not limit loadability. PRC-025-AB-2 does not require evidence to be provided that the protection relays reliably detect all **fault** conditions and protect the applicable **system elements** from these **faults**.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Amending Process for List of Facilities*

Appendix 2 – *Excluded Protection Systems*

Appendix 3 - *Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria*

Revision History

Date	Description
2024-10-01	Initial release.

Appendix 1

Amending Process for List of Facilities

In order to amend any list referenced in subsections 2.1(a)(iv), 2.1(b)(iv) and 2.1(c)(ii) of section 2.1, Inclusions, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **generating unit**, an **aggregated generating facility**, or a **transmission facility** is to be added, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than 4 full calendar quarters after the date of notice, for the **legal owner** to meet the applicable requirements;
- (b) upon determining that a **generating unit**, an **aggregated generating facility**, or a **transmission facility** is to be deleted, notify the **legal owner** in writing and determine an effective date for the **legal owner** to no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) publish the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.

Appendix 2

Excluded Protection Systems

This **reliability standard** does not apply to the following **protection systems**:

- (a) any protection relay elements that are in-service only during startup of a **generating unit**;
- (b) load-responsive components of a **protection system** that are armed only when the **generating unit** is disconnected from the **interconnected electric system**;
- (c) phase **fault** detector protection relay elements employed to supervise other load-responsive phase protection distance relays, provided the phase distance relay is set in accordance with the criteria outlined in this **reliability standard**;
- (d) protection relay elements that are only enabled when other protection elements fail;
- (e) protection relay elements used only for **remedial action schemes**;
- (f) **protection systems** that detect **generating unit** overloads that are designed to coordinate with the **generating unit** short time capability by using an extremely inverse characteristic set to operate no faster than 7 seconds at 218% of full-load current, and prevent operation below 115% of full-load current; and
- (g) **protection systems** that detect transformer overloads and are designed only to respond in time periods which allow real time operating personnel 10 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.

Appendix 3 - Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Table 1 - Summary

Technology Type	Applicability of options
Synchronous generating units , and aggregating generating facilities comprised of synchronous generating units	1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8a, 8b, 8c, 9a, 9b, 9c, 13a, 13b, 14a, 14b, 15a, 15b, 16a, 16b
Asynchronous generating units , and aggregating generating facilities comprised of asynchronous generating units including inverter-based installations	4, 5a, 5b, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13a, 13b, 17, 18, 19

Table 2 - Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria				
Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Synchronous generating units , or aggregated generating facilities	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	1a	The voltage of a generating unit stator winding terminal, collector bus , corresponding to 0.95 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the real power value, derived from the generating unit , or aggregated generating facility nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		1b	The voltage calculated at the generating unit stator winding terminal, collector bus , corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance).	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the real power value, derived from the generating unit , or aggregated generating facility nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		

¹ Calculations using the transmission step-up transformer turns ratio must use the actual tap that is applied (i.e. in service) for transmission step-up transformers with off-load tap changers. If on-load tap changers are used, the calculations must reflect the tap that results in the lowest **generating unit** stator winding terminal voltage. When the criterion specifies the use of the transmission step-up transformer's impedance, the nameplate impedance at the nominal transmission step-up turns ratio must be used.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
		1c	The simulated voltage at the generating unit stator winding terminal, collector bus coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer prior to field-forcing.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 100% of the maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Synchronous generating units , or aggregated generating facilities	Phase overcurrent relay (e.g. 50,51) or (51V-R) – voltage-restrained	2a	Generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the real power value, derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		2b	Calculated generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance).	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the real power value, derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		2c	Simulated generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer prior to field-forcing.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of maximum authorized real power or, and (2) Reactive power output –100% of the maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
	Phase time overcurrent relay (e.g. 51V-C) – voltage controlled (Enabled to operate as a function of voltage)	3	Generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	Voltage control setting must be set less than 75% of the calculated generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage.

A different application starts on the next page

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities (including inverter-based installations)	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	4	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
	Phase overcurrent relay (e.g. 50, 51 or 51V-R) – voltage-restrained	5a	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
		OR		
		5b	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The lower tolerance of the overcurrent element tripping characteristic must not infringe upon the resource capability (including the MVAR output of the resource and any static or dynamic reactive power devices) See Figure A.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
	Phase time overcurrent relay (e.g. 51V-C) – voltage controlled (enabled to operate as a function of voltage)	6	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	Voltage control setting must be set less than 75% of the calculated generating unit bus voltage or collector bus voltage.
A different application starts on the next page				

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator-side ² / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to synchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	7a	Generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generator nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		7b	Calculated generating unit stator or collector bus winding terminal voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance).	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		7c	Simulated generating unit stator winding or collector bus terminal voltage coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer prior to field-forcing.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.

² If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 14.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator-side ³ / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to synchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities	Phase overcurrent relay (e.g. 50 or 51)	8a	Generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		8b	Calculated generating unit stator winding or collector bus terminal voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance).	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		

³ If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 15.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
		8c	Simulated generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer prior to field-forcing.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.
The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type				

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator-side ⁴ / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to synchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities	Phase directional overcurrent relay (e.g. 67) – directional toward the transmission system	9a	Generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value , derived from the generating unit nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		9b	Calculated generating unit stator winding or collector bus terminal voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance).	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 150% of the aggregate generation real power value , derived from the generator nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		

⁴ If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 16.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
		9c	Simulated generating unit stator winding terminal or collector bus voltage coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer prior to field-forcing.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.

A different application starts on the next page

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator–side ⁵ / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities comprised of asynchronous generating units , including inverter-based installations	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	10	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

⁵ If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 17.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities comprised of asynchronous generating units , including inverter-based installations	Phase overcurrent relay (e.g. 50 or 51) ⁶	11	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer for overcurrent relays installed on the low-side.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type				

⁶ If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 18.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on generator – side / collector bus side of the transmission step-up transformers connected to asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facilities comprised of asynchronous generating units , including inverter-based installations	Phase directional overcurrent relay (e.g. 67) – directional toward the transmission system ⁷	12	Generating unit bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit nominal voltage of the high voltage side of the transmission step-up transformer times the turns ratio of the transmission step-up transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
A different application starts on the next page				

⁷ If the relay is installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 19.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Generating unit or aggregated generating facilities auxiliary transformers	Phase overcurrent relay (e.g. 50 or 51) applied at the high-side terminals of the generating unit auxiliary transformer, for which operation of the relay will cause the associated generating unit to trip.	13a	1.0 per unit of the winding nominal voltage of the generating unit auxiliary transformer.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 150% of the calculated current derived from the generating unit auxiliary transformer maximum nameplate apparent power rating.
		OR		
		13b	Generating unit auxiliary transformer bus voltage corresponding to the measured current.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 150% of the generating unit auxiliary transformer measured current at the maximum authorized real power of the generating unit .
A different application starts on the next page				

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on the high side of the transmission step-up transformer ⁸ including relays installed on the remote end of the line for system elements that connect any transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy from a generating unit, aggregated generating facility, or generating plant – connected to synchronous generators.	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	14a	0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the relay location.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 120% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generator nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		14b	Simulated line voltage at the relay location coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the remote end of the line prior to field-forcing.	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregated maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.
The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type				

⁸ If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 7.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer ⁹ , including relays installed at the remote end of the line, for system elements that connect the transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy directly from a generating unit , generating plant or aggregating generating facilities – connected to synchronous generators.	Phase Instantaneous overcurrent supervisory element (e.g. 50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications and/or phase time overcurrent relay (e.g. 51)	15a	0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the relay location	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 120% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generator nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		15b	Simulated line voltage at the relay location coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the remote end of the line prior to field-forcing.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

⁹ If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer use Option 8

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria				
Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer ¹⁰ including relays installed at the remote end of the line for system elements that connect the transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy from a power plant, generating unit or aggregated generating facility – connected to synchronous generators .	Phase directional instantaneous overcurrent supervisory element (e.g. 67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the transmission system and/or phase directional time overcurrent relay (e.g. 67) – directional toward the transmission system	16a	0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the relay location	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 120% of the aggregate generation real power value, derived from the generator nameplate apparent power rating at rated power factor .
		OR		
		16b	Simulated line voltage at the relay location coincident with the highest reactive power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the remote end of the line prior to field-forcing.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real power output – 100% of the aggregate maximum authorized real power , and (2) Reactive power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross reactive power output during field-forcing as determined by simulation.
A different application starts on the next page				

¹⁰ If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 9.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on the high-side of the transmission step up transformer ¹¹ including relays installed at the remote end of the line for system elements that connect the transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy from a power plant, asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facility comprised of asynchronous generating units including inverter-based installations.	Phase distance relay (e.g. 21) – directional toward the transmission system	17	1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the relay location	The impedance element must be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

¹¹ If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 10.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria

Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relays installed on the high side of the transmission step-up transformer ¹² including relays installed at the remote end of the line for system elements that connect the transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy from a power plant, asynchronous generating unit or aggregated generating facility comprised of asynchronous generating units including inverter-based installations.	Phase overcurrent supervisory element (e.g. 50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications or phase time overcurrent relay (e.g. 51)	18	1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage at the relay location	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).
	The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type			

¹² If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 11.

Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria


Application	Relay Type	Option	Bus Voltage ¹	Pickup Setting Criteria
Relay installed on the high-side of the transmission step-up transformer ¹³ including relays installed at the remote end of the line for system elements that connect the transmission step-up transformers to the transmission system that are used to export energy from a power plant, asynchronous generating units or aggregated generating facility comprised of asynchronous generating units including inverter-based installations.	Phase directional instantaneous overcurrent supervisory element (e.g. 67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the transmission system and/or phase directional time overcurrent relay (e.g. 67)	19	1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage.	The overcurrent element must be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate apparent power output at rated power factor (including the reactive power output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices).

End of Table 1

¹³ If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the transmission step-up transformer, use Option 12.



Figure A.



This figure is for demonstration of Option 5b and does not mandate a specific type of protective curve or device manufacturer.

Alberta Reliability Standard

System Performance Under Normal Conditions

TPL-001-AB-0



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that a reliable transmission system is planned that meets specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time. The transmission system must continue to be modified or upgraded as required to meet present and future system specified performance requirements as identified by periodically performed system simulations and associated planning assessments.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) **ISO**

3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the [Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must demonstrate through a planning assessment that a transmission system is planned such that, with all **transmission facilities** in service and with pre-**contingency** operating procedures in effect, the transmission system can be operated to accommodate forecasted customer **demands**, supply and forecasted **firm** (non- recallable reserved) transmission services at all **demand** levels over the range of forecast system **demands**, under the conditions defined in Category A of Appendix 1.

The **ISO** planning assessment must:

R1.1 Be carried out annually.

R1.2 Be conducted for years one through five and years six through ten planning horizons.

R1.3 Be supported by a study and/or system simulation testing, conducted within the last five years, that addresses each of the requirements in requirement R1.3.1 to R1.3.9, showing system performance for the conditions defined in Category A of Appendix 1.

R1.3.1 Cover critical system conditions and study years as determined necessary by the **ISO**.

R1.3.2 Be conducted annually unless the **ISO** determines that changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

R1.3.3 Be conducted beyond the five year planning horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead time solutions.

R1.3.4 Have pre-**contingency** operating procedures established and in place.

R1.3.5 Have all projected firm transfers modeled, if any.

R1.3.6 Be performed for selected **demand** levels over the range of forecast system **demands** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.

R1.3.7 Demonstrate that system performance meets the conditions defined in Category A of Appendix 1.

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R1.3.8 Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.

R1.3.9 Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.

R1.4 Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements for the conditions defined in Category A of Appendix 1.

R2 When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as set out in R1.3.7 in this **reliability standard**, the **ISO** must:

R2.1 Develop corrective plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon.

R2.1.1 Including a schedule for implementation.

R2.1.2 Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of **facilities**.

R2.1.3 Consider lead times necessary to implement corrective plans.

R2.2 Review in subsequent annual assessments, where sufficient lead time exists, the continuing need for identified system **facilities**. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.

R3 The **ISO** must provide the planning assessment to **WECC** on an annual basis.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 The planning assessment will be valid and meet requirement in R1 through the following measures:

- (a) The scope of the planning assessment identifies where area studies have been conducted in the past year. It also identifies area studies that have been conducted in previous years and are still valid. Where area studies have not been conducted, a plan and schedule to conduct one is included in the planning assessment.
- (b) The planning assessment includes time horizons as specified in R1.2.
- (c) The planning assessment has been prepared within the last year.
- (d) A certification that the planning assessment complies with each of the R1 technical requirements is provided and states that the planning assessment meets all requirements, identifies requirements not met, and states reasons where the requirement was not met.
- (e) A summary list of supporting area studies and needs identification documents is provided. The summary list includes the title and date of the study. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided if requested.

MR2 The area studies and needs identification documents contain recommendations and projects for corrective plans where an inability of the systems to respond to requirements specified in R1 has been identified. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided on request. The

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area studies and needs identification documents contain the technical components as specified in R2 and its subsections.

MR3 A written or email confirmation from **WECC** that it has received the planning assessment from the **ISO**. The confirmation includes the date of when the planning assessment was received and source identification information.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions (see below)

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2010-09-24	New Issue
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .

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System Performance Under Normal Conditions

TPL-001-AB-0



Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency System Element(s)	System Stable and Both Thermal and Voltage Limits Within Applicable Rating ^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transmission Service Transfers	Cascading
A No contingencies	All facilities in service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single system element	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) fault, with normal clearing :	Yes	No ^b	No
	1. Generator	Yes	No ^b	No
	2. Transmission circuit	Yes	No ^b	No
	3. Transformer	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) system elements	SLG fault, with normal clearing ^e :			
	1. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing ^e , manual system adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing ^e			
	3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency , manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar block, with normal clearing ^e :			
	4. Bipolar (dc) line fault (non 3Ø), with normal clearing ^e :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^t	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG fault, with delayed clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure)			

- a) Applicable **rating** refers to the applicable normal and emergency **facility** thermal and voltage **rating** as applied by the **facility** owner or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the ISO. Applicable **ratings** may include emergency **ratings** applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All **ratings** must be established by the applicable entity consistent with applicable **ISO** rules addressing **facility ratings**.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the faulted **system element** or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems. To prepare for the next **contingency**, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers.

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- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (**load shedding**), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme **contingencies** that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible **facility outages** under each listed **contingency** of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) **Normal clearing** is when the **protection system** operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed **protection systems**. Delayed clearing of a fault is due to failure of any **protection system** component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (i.e., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with exemption criteria.

Alberta Reliability Standard

System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

TPL-002-AB1-0



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that a reliable transmission system is planned that meets specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time. The transmission system must continue to be modified or upgraded as required to meet present and future system specified performance requirements as identified by periodically performed system simulations and associated planning assessments.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) **ISO**

3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the [Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must demonstrate for **transmission facilities** rated 69 kV and above, through a planning assessment, that a transmission system is planned such that the transmission system can be operated to accommodate forecasted customer **demands** and forecasted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission services, at all **demand** levels over the range of forecast system **demands**, under the **contingency** conditions as defined in Category B of Appendix 1.

The **ISO** planning assessments must:

R1.1 Be carried out annually.

R1.2 Be conducted for near term (year one through five) and longer term (year six through ten) planning horizons.

R1.3 Be supported by a study and/or system simulation testing, conducted within the last five years that addresses each of the requirements in requirement R1.3.1 to R1.3.12, showing system performance for the conditions defined in Category B of Appendix 1.

R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category B **contingencies** that the **ISO** has determined would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the **contingencies** selected for evaluation and an explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results must be included in the study.

R1.3.2 Cover critical system conditions and study years as determined necessary by the **ISO**.

R1.3.3 Be conducted annually unless the **ISO** determines that changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

R1.3.4 Be conducted beyond the five year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead time solutions.

R1.3.5 Have all projected firm transfers modeled, if any.

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- R1.3.6** Be performed and evaluated for selected **demand** levels over the range of forecast system **demands** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
- R1.3.7** Demonstrate that system performance meets the conditions defined in Category B of Appendix 1.
- R1.3.8** Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
- R1.3.9** Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.10** Include the effects of existing and planned **protection systems**, including any backup or redundant systems.
- R1.3.11** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
- R1.3.12** Include the planned **outage** and maintenance of any bulk electric equipment (including **protection systems** or their components) at those **demand** levels for which planned (including maintenance) **outages** are performed. For stations supplied by two lines, if one line is out for maintenance, then those stations are considered to be supplied by a radial line.
- R1.4** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements for the conditions defined in Category B of Appendix 1.
- R1.5** Consider all **contingencies** applicable to Category B of Appendix 1.
- R2** When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as set out in R1.3.7 of this **reliability standard** the **ISO** must:
 - R2.1** Provide corrective plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon:
 - R2.1.1** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - R2.1.2** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of **facilities**.
 - R2.1.3** Consider lead times necessary to implement corrective plans.
 - R2.2** Review, in subsequent annual assessments, where sufficient lead time exists, the continuing need for identified system **facilities**. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- R3** The **ISO** must provide the planning assessment to **WECC** on an annual basis.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 The planning assessment will be valid and meet requirements in R1 through the following measures:

- (a) The scope of the planning assessment identifies where area studies have been conducted in the past year. It also identifies area studies that have been conducted in previous years and

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are still valid. Where area studies have not been conducted, a plan and schedule to conduct one is included in the planning assessment.

- (b) The planning assessment includes time horizons as specified in R1.2.
- (c) The planning assessment has been prepared within the last year.
- (d) A certification that the planning assessment complies with each of the R1 technical requirements is provided and states that the planning assessment meets all requirements, identifies requirements not met, and states reasons where the requirement was not met.
- (e) A summary list of supporting area studies and needs identification documents is provided. The summary list includes the title and date of the study. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided if requested.

MR2 The area studies and needs identification documents contain recommendations and projects for the corrective plans where an inability of the systems to respond to requirements specified in R1 has been identified. The area studies and needs identification documents must be provided on request.

MR3 A written or email confirmation from **WECC** that it has received the planning assessment from the **ISO**. The confirmation includes the date of when the planning assessment was received and source identification information.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions (see below)

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2017-10-30	Initial release.

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Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency System Element(s)	System Stable and Both Thermal and Voltage Limits Within Applicable Rating ^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transmission Service Transfers	Cascading
A No contingencies	All facilities in service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single system element	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) fault, with normal clearing :	Yes	No ^b	No
	1. Generator	Yes	No ^b	No
	2. Transmission circuit	Yes	No ^b	No
	3. Transformer	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) system elements	SLG fault, with normal clearing ^e :			
	1. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing ^e , manual system adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing ^e			
	3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency , manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar block, with normal clearing ^e :			
	4. Bipolar (dc) line fault (non 3Ø), with normal clearing ^e :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^t	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG fault, with delayed clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure)			

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- a) Applicable **rating** refers to the applicable normal and emergency **facility** thermal and voltage **rating** as applied by the **facility** owner or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the ISO. Applicable *ratings* may include emergency **ratings** applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All **ratings** must be established by the applicable entity consistent with applicable *ISO* rules addressing **facility ratings**.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the faulted **system element** or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems. To prepare for the next **contingency**, system

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System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

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adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers.

- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (**load** shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme **contingencies** that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible **facility outages** under each listed **contingency** of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) **Normal clearing** is when the **protection system** operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed **protection systems**. Delayed clearing of a fault is due to failure of any **protection system** component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (i.e., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with exemption criteria.

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System Performance Following Loss of Two or more BES Elements

TPL-003-AB-0



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that a reliable transmission system is planned that meets specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time. The transmission system must continue to be modified or upgraded as required to meet present and future system specified performance requirements as identified by periodically performed system simulations and associated planning assessments.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) **ISO**

3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the [Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must demonstrate for **transmission facilities** rated 100 kV and above, through a planning assessment that the **AIES** is planned such that the **AIES** can be operated to accommodate forecasted customer **demands**, supply and forecasted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission services, at all demand **levels** over the range of forecast system **demands**, under the **contingency** conditions as defined in Category C of Appendix 1. The controlled interruption of **demand** to **demand customers**, the planned removal of generating units, or the curtailment of firm (non-recallable reserved) power transfers may be necessary to meet this **reliability standard**.

The **ISO** planning assessments must:

R1.1 Be carried out annually.

R1.2 Be conducted for near term (year one through five) and longer term (year six through ten) planning horizons.

R1.3 Be supported by a study and/or system simulation testing, conducted within the last five years that addresses each of the requirements in requirement R1.3.1 to R1.3.1, showing system performance for the conditions defined in Category C of Appendix 1.

R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C **contingencies** that the **ISO** determines would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the **contingencies** selected for evaluation and an explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results must be included in the study.

R1.3.2 Cover critical system conditions and study years as determined necessary by the **ISO**.

R1.3.3 Be conducted annually unless the **ISO** determines that changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

R1.3.4 Be conducted beyond the five year planning horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.

R1.3.5 Have all projected firm transfers modeled, if any.

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System Performance Following Loss of Two or more BES Elements

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- R1.3.6** Be performed and evaluated for selected **demand** levels over the range of forecast system **demands** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
- R1.3.7** Demonstrate that system performance meets the conditions defined in Category C of Appendix 1.
- R1.3.8** Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
- R1.3.9** Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.7** Demonstrate that system performance meets the conditions defined in Category C of Appendix 1.
- R1.3.8** Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
- R1.3.9** Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.10** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
- R1.3.11** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
- R1.3.12** Include the planned **outage** and maintenance of any bulk electric equipment (including **protection systems** or their components) at those **demand** levels for which planned (including maintenance) **outages** are performed. This requirement applies only to **BES facilities** greater than 200 kV or other **facilities** as specified by the **ISO**.
- R1.4** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements for the conditions defined in Category C of Appendix 1.
- R1.5** Consider all **contingencies** applicable to Category C of Appendix 1.
- R2** When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as set out in R1.3.7 of this reliability standard, the **ISO** must:
 - R2.1** Provide corrective plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon:
 - R2.1.1** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - R2.1.2** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of **facilities**.
 - R2.1.3** Consider lead times necessary to implement plans.
 - R2.2** Review in subsequent annual assessments where sufficient lead time exists, the continuing need for identified system **facilities**. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- R3** The **ISO** must provide the planning assessment to **WECC** on an annual basis.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

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System Performance Following Loss of Two or more BES Elements

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6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 The planning assessment will be valid and meet requirements in R1 through the following measures:

- (a) The scope of the planning assessment identifies where area studies have been conducted in the past year. It also identifies area studies that have been conducted in previous years and are still valid. Where area studies have not been conducted, a plan and schedule to conduct one is included in the planning assessment.
- (b) The planning assessment includes time horizons as specified in R1.2.
- (c) The planning assessment has been prepared within the last year.
- (d) A certification that the planning assessment complies with each of the R1 technical requirements is provided and states that the planning assessment meets all requirements, identifies requirements not met, and states reasons where the requirement was not met.
- (e) A summary list of supporting area studies and needs identification documents is provided. The summary list includes the title and date of the study. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided if requested.

MR2 The area studies and needs identification documents contain recommendations and projects that correct the situations where an inability of the systems to respond to requirements specified in R1 has been identified. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided on request.

The area studies and needs identification documents contain the technical components as specified in R2 and its subsections.

MR3 A written or email confirmation from **WECC** that it has received the planning assessment from the **ISO**. The confirmation includes the date of when the planning assessment was received and source identification information.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions (see below)

8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2010-09-24	Initial release.
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .

Alberta Reliability Standard

System Performance Following Loss of Two or more BES Elements

TPL-003-AB-0



Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency System Element(s)	System Stable and Both Thermal and Voltage Limits Within Applicable Rating^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transmission Service Transfers	Cascading
A No contingencies	All facilities in service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single system element	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) fault, with normal clearing :	Yes	No ^b	No
	1. Generator	Yes	No ^b	No
	2. Transmission circuit	Yes	No ^b	No
	3. Transformer	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) system elements	SLG fault, with normal clearing^e :			
	1. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing^e , manual system adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing^e			
	3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency , manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar block, with normal clearing^e :			
	4. Bipolar (dc) line fault (non 3Ø), with normal clearing^e :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^t	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG fault, with delayed clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure)			

- a) Applicable **rating** refers to the applicable normal and emergency **facility** thermal and voltage **rating** as applied by the **facility** owner or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the ISO. Applicable **ratings** may include emergency **ratings** applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All **ratings** must be established by the applicable entity consistent with applicable **ISO** rules addressing **facility ratings**.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the faulted **system element** or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems. To prepare for the next **contingency**, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers.

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System Performance Following Loss of Two or more BES Elements

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- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (**load shedding**), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme **contingencies** that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible **facility outages** under each listed **contingency** of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) **Normal clearing** is when the **protection system** operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed **protection systems**. Delayed clearing of a fault is due to failure of any **protection system** component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (i.e., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with exemption criteria.

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System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

TPL-004-AB-0



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that a reliable transmission system is planned that meets specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time. The transmission system must continue to be modified or upgraded as required to meet present and future system specified performance requirements as identified by periodically performed system simulations and associated planning assessments.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) **ISO**

3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the [Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

4. Requirements

- R1** The ISO must demonstrate for transmission facilities rated 100 kV and above, through a planning assessment that a transmission system is planned such that it has been evaluated for the risks and consequences of a number of each of the extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D of Appendix 1.

The **ISO** planning assessments must:

- R1.1** Be carried out annually.
- R1.2** Be conducted for near term (year one through five).
- R1.3** Be supported by a study and/or system simulation that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category D **contingencies** of Appendix 1.
 - R1.3.1** Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D **contingencies** that **ISO** determines would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the **contingencies** selected for evaluation and an explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results must be included in the study.
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
 - R1.3.3** Be conducted annually unless the **ISO** determines that changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4** Have all projected firm transfers modeled, if any.
 - R1.3.5** Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.
 - R1.3.6** Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.

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System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

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R1.3.7 Include the effects of existing and planned **protection systems**, including any backup or redundant systems.

R1.3.8 Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.

R1.3.9 Include the planned **outage** and maintenance of any bulk electric equipment (including **protection systems** or their components) at those **demand** levels for which planned (including maintenance) **outages** are performed. This requirement applies only to **BES facilities** greater than 200 kV or other **facilities** as specified by the **ISO**.

R1.4 Consider all **contingencies** applicable to Category D of Appendix 1.

R2 The **ISO** must provide the planning assessment to **WECC** on an annual basis.

5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 The planning assessment will be valid and meet requirement in R1 and associated sub-sections through the following measures:

- (a) The scope of the planning assessment identifies where area studies have been conducted in the past year. It also identifies area studies that have been conducted in previous years and are still valid. Where area studies have not been conducted, a plan and schedule to conduct one is included in the planning assessment.
- (b) The planning assessment includes time horizons as specified in R1.2.
- (c) The planning assessment has been prepared within the last year.
- (d) A certification that the planning assessment complies with each of the R1 technical requirements is provided and states that the planning assessment meets all requirements, identifies requirements not met, and states reasons where the requirement was not met.
- (e) A summary list of supporting area studies and needs identification documents is provided. The summary list includes the title and date of the study. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided if requested.

MR2 A written or email confirmation from **WECC** that it has received the planning assessment from the **ISO**. The confirmation includes the date of when the planning assessment was received and source identification information.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions (see below)

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8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

Revision History

Date	Description
2010-09-24	Initial release.
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term system element .

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Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency System Element(s)	System Stable and Both Thermal and Voltage Limits Within Applicable Rating^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transmission Service Transfers	Cascading
A No contingencies	All facilities in service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single system element	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) fault, with normal clearing :	Yes	No ^b	No
	1. Generator	Yes	No ^b	No
	2. Transmission circuit	Yes	No ^b	No
	3. Transformer	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) system elements	SLG fault, with normal clearing^e :			
	1. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing^e , manual system adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø fault, with normal clearing^e			
	3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency , manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar block, with normal clearing^e :			
	4. Bipolar (dc) line fault (non 3Ø), with normal clearing^e :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^t	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG fault, with delayed clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure)			

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	6. Generator	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	7. Transformer	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	8. Transmission circuit	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	9. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
D^d Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) system elements removed or cascading out of service	3Ø fault, with delayed clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):		Evaluate for risks and consequences • May involve substantial loss of customer demand and generation in a widespread area or areas • Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point • Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems	
	1. Generator 2. Transmission circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus section			
	3Ø fault, with normal clearing^e :			
	5. Breaker (failure or internal fault)			
	6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits			
	7. All transmission lines on a common right-of -way			
	8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers)			
	9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers)			
	10. Loss of all generating units at a station			
	11. Loss of a large load or major load center			
	12. Failure of a fully redundant special protection system (or remedial action scheme) to operate when required			
	13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant special protection system (or remedial action scheme) in response to an event or abnormal system			
	14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization			

- a) Applicable **rating** refers to the applicable normal and emergency **facility** thermal and voltage **rating** as applied by the **facility** owner or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the ISO. Applicable **ratings** may include emergency **ratings** applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All **ratings** must be established by the applicable entity consistent with applicable **ISO** rules addressing **facility ratings**.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the faulted **system element** or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems. To prepare for the next **contingency**, system

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System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

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adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers.

- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (**load** shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme **contingencies** that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible **facility outages** under each listed **contingency** of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) **Normal clearing** is when the **protection system** operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed **protection systems**. Delayed clearing of a fault is due to failure of any **protection system** component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (i.e., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with exemption criteria.

1. Purpose

To ensure that voltage levels, reactive flows, and reactive resources are monitored, controlled, and maintained within limits in real-time to protect equipment and the reliable operation of the **Interconnection**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **ISO**.

3. Requirements

R1 The **ISO** must specify a system voltage range with an associated tolerance band, as part of its plan to operate within **system operating limits** and **interconnection reliability operating limits**.

R1.1 The **ISO** must provide a copy of the system voltage range with an associated tolerance band to an **interconnected transmission operator** within thirty (30) **days** of a request.

R2 The **ISO** must operate with sufficient **reactive power** resources available within Alberta to protect the voltage levels of the **transmission system** under normal and **contingency** conditions.

R3 The **ISO** must be able to regulate transmission voltage and **reactive power** flow by issuing **directives** or instructions to operate the devices necessary to do so.

R4 The **ISO** must specify the criteria that will exempt a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** from:

- a) following a voltage or **reactive power** instruction or **directive**;
- b) having its **automatic voltage regulator** or **voltage regulating system** in service or being in voltage control mode; or
- c) making any associated notifications.

R4.1 If the **ISO** determines that a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** has satisfied the exemption criteria, the **ISO** must notify the associated **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**.

R5 The **ISO**, when issuing **directives** or instructions for voltage level or **reactive power**, to the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**, must specify the following:

- a) the voltage level at the **point of connection** between the **transmission system** and a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility**, including those in a power plant or an industrial complex; or
- b) the **reactive power** to be achieved by the **generating unit**, **aggregated generating facility**, power plant or industrial complex.

R6 The **ISO** must, after a review with the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** or the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** regarding necessary off-load tap changes for the step-up transformer that connects to the **transmission system**, provide documentation to the **legal owner** of a **generating**

unit or the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** specifying the required tap changes, a timeframe for making the changes, and technical justification for these changes.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1. Evidence of specifying a system voltage range with an associated tolerance band as required in requirement R1 exists.

MR1.1 Evidence of providing a copy of the system voltage range with an associated tolerance band as required in requirement R1.1 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, emails, website postings, or any other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of operating with sufficient **reactive power** resources as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, data files or any other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of being able to regulate transmission voltage and **reactive power** flow as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, relevant **ISO** authoritative documents.

MR4 Evidence of specifying the criteria that will exempt a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** as specified in requirement R4 exists.

MR4.1 Evidence of notifying the associated **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** if the **ISO** determines that the exemption criteria were satisfied. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, emails, data files or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of issuing **directives** or instructions to the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, voice recordings or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of providing documentation as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated study results or email to appropriate recipients that identifies contents submitted or other equivalent evidence.

5. Appendices

Appendix 1 - *Exemptions*

Revision History

Date	Description
2019-12-01	Unbolded "real time"
2016-04-01	Revised to align with NERC version 4.
2012-10-01	Initial release

Appendix 1 - Exemptions

1. Exemption Criteria

A **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** must, in order to meet the exemption criteria referred to in requirement R4 of this **reliability standard**:

- (a) be a wind **aggregated generating facility**;
- (b) not be equipped with a **voltage regulating system**; and
- (c) be the subject of an executed *Construction Commitment Agreement* and have completed the **ISO's** approval process for connection to the **transmission system** under the *Technical Requirements for connecting generators (1999)*.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure **generating units** and **aggregated generating facilities** provide **reactive power** support and voltage control, within generating facility capabilities, in order to protect equipment and maintain reliable operation of the **interconnected electric system**.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **legal owner** of a **generating unit** that has a **maximum authorized real power** greater than or equal to 5 MW and where the **generating unit** is:
 - (i) connected to a switchyard at which **system access service** is provided to:
 - (A) the **generating unit**; or
 - (B) an industrial complex of which the **generating unit** is a part; or
 - (ii) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (b) the **operator** of a **generating unit** that has a **maximum authorized real power** greater than or equal to 5 MW and where the **generating unit** is:
 - (i) connected to a switchyard at which system access service is provided to:
 - (A) the **generating unit**; or
 - (B) an industrial complex of which the **generating unit** is a part; or
 - (ii) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat;
- (c) the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that has a **maximum authorized real power** greater than or equal to 5 MW and is:
 - (i) connected to a switchyard at which **system access service** is provided to:
 - (A) the **aggregated generating facility**; or
 - (B) an industrial complex of which the **aggregated generating facility** is a part; or
 - (ii) directly connected to transmission facilities within the City of Medicine Hat; and
- (d) the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that has a **maximum authorized real power** greater than or equal to 5 MW and is:
 - (i) connected to a switchyard at which **system access service** is provided to:
 - (A) the **aggregated generating facility**; or
 - (B) an industrial complex of which the **aggregated generating facility** is a part; or
 - (ii) directly connected to **transmission facilities** within the City of Medicine Hat.

Notwithstanding subsections (c) and (d) above, this **reliability standard** does not apply to the **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that meets the criteria listed in Appendix 1 of VAR-001-AB.

3. Requirements

R1 The **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, while a **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is electrically connected to the **transmission system**, operate the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** with its **automatic voltage regulator** or **voltage regulating system** in service and in automatic voltage control mode, or in a different control mode as instructed by the **ISO** unless:

- (a) the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is exempted by the **ISO**;
- (b) the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** has notified the **ISO** in accordance with requirement R3 that the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating**

- facility** is not being operated in automatic voltage control mode or in the control mode that was instructed by the **ISO** for a reason other than start-up, shutdown, or testing. Such reasons may include a forced or unplanned change in control mode;
- (c) the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** is being operated during start-up or shutdown in accordance with the procedure of the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility**; or
 - (d) the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** has previously obtained approval from the **ISO** allowing the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** to be in a testing mode.
- R2** Unless exempted by the **ISO**, each **operator** of a **generating unit** and each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, upon receiving an instruction from the **ISO** regarding voltage levels or **reactive power**, comply with that instruction.
- R2.1** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and each **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must, when:
- (a) the **automatic voltage regulator** of a **generating unit** or the **voltage regulating system** of an **aggregated generating facility** is out of service; or
 - (b) the **generating unit** does not have an **automatic voltage regulator**, or the **aggregated generating facility** does not have a **voltage regulating system**,
- use an alternative method to control the generator **reactive power** output to comply with an instruction from the **ISO** regarding voltage levels or **reactive power**.
- R2.2** Notwithstanding requirement R2, where the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** cannot comply with an instruction to modify voltage, the **operator** of a **generating unit** or the **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must provide an explanation for why the instruction cannot be met.
- R2.3** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** that does not monitor the voltage or **reactive power** at the location specified in an instruction or **directive** from the **ISO** must have a methodology for converting the voltage or **reactive power** at the location specified by the **ISO**.
- R3** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must notify the **ISO** within 30 minutes after a status or control mode change of the **automatic voltage regulator**, **voltage regulating system**, alternative voltage controlling device or power system stabilizer, as applicable, on any **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility**.
- R3.1** If the status or control mode has been restored within 30 minutes of such change, then the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** is not required to notify the **ISO** of the status or control mode change.
- R3.2** If a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** is in testing, start-up, shut-down or offline mode, requirement R3 does not apply.
- R3.3** If a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** is operating below the safe and stable level for power system stabilizer operation, then the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** is not required to notify the **ISO** of a change in status of the power system stabilizer caused by the low output level of the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility**.
- R4** Each **operator** of a **generating unit** and **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** must notify the **ISO** within 30 minutes after becoming aware of a change in **reactive power** capability due to factors other than a status or control mode change described in requirement R3, or unless:
- R4.1** the capability has been restored within 30 minutes of the **operator** of a **generating unit** or **operator** of an **aggregated generating facility** becoming aware of such change, then the **operator** is not required to notify the **ISO** of the change in **reactive power** capability; or

R4.2 a **generating unit** or an **aggregated generating facility** is in testing, start-up, shut-down or offline mode, requirement R4 does not apply.

R5 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and each **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** whose step-up transformer for connecting to the **transmission system** or auxiliary transformer has primary voltages equal to or greater than the **generating unit** terminal voltage must provide any one or more of the following to the **ISO** within 30 **days** of a request:

- (a) tap settings;
- (b) available fixed tap ranges; and
- (c) impedance data.

R6 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and each **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that has a step-up transformer, with off-load taps for connecting to the **transmission system** must, change the tap positions according to the specifications the **ISO** provides.

R6.1 Each **legal owner** of a **generating unit** and each **legal owner** of an **aggregated generating facility** that cannot comply with requirement R6 must notify the **ISO** within 30 **days** of the **ISO** providing the specifications and must include the technical justification along with the notice.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for requirement R1.

MR1 Evidence of operating the **generating unit** or **aggregated generating facility** in automatic voltage control mode as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include exemption letters, data files, start-up or shut-down procedures, **operator** logs, voice recordings, e-mail, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2 Evidence of complying with an instruction as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include data files, **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2.1 Evidence of using an alternative method to control generator **reactive power** output as required in requirement R2.1 exists. Evidence may include data files, **operator** logs, voice recordings, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2.2 Evidence of providing an explanation to the **ISO**, as required in requirement R2.2 exists. Evidence may include voice recordings, **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.

MR2.3 Evidence of having a methodology as required in requirement R2.3 exists. Evidence may include a documented methodology, or other equivalent evidence.

MR3 Evidence of notifying the **ISO** within 30 minutes of any status or control mode change as required in requirement R3 exists. Evidence may include data logs, SCADA logs, voice recordings, **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.

MR4 Evidence of notifying the **ISO** within 30 minutes of becoming aware of a change in reactive power capability as required in requirement R4 exists. Evidence may include voice recordings, **operator** logs, or other equivalent evidence.

MR5 Evidence of providing the **ISO** with information on its step-up and auxiliary transformers, as required in requirement R5 exists. Evidence may include dated written or electronic records, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6 Evidence of changing step-up transformer taps in accordance with the **ISO**'s specifications as required in requirement R6 exists. Evidence may include written or electronic records, or other equivalent evidence.

MR6.1 Evidence of notifying the **ISO** as required in requirement R6.1 exists. Evidence may include written or electronic notifications, or other equivalent evidence.

Alberta Reliability Standard Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltages VAR-002-AB-4.1



Revision History

Date	Description
2021-06-24	Initial release.

Alberta Reliability Standard

Power System Stabilizer

VAR-501-WECC-AB-1



1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that **power system stabilizers** on **generating units** are kept in service.

2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) the **operator** of a **generating unit** equipped with a **power system stabilizer** that is either:
 - (i) directly connected to the **bulk electric system** or part of an industrial complex that is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**, and has a **maximum authorized real power** rating greater than eighteen (18) MW; or
 - (ii) within a power plant which:
 - (A) is not part of an **aggregated generating facility**;
 - (B) is directly connected to the **bulk electric system**; and
 - (C) has a combined **maximum authorized real power rating** greater than sixty-seven point five (67.5) MW;
 - (iii) a black start resource; or
 - (iv) regardless of **maximum authorized real power** rating, material to this **reliability standard** and to the **reliability** of the **bulk electric system** as the **ISO** determines and publishes on the AESO website and may amend from time to time in accordance with the process set out in Appendix 1.

3. Requirements

R1 Each **operator** of a **generating unit** equipped with a **power system stabilizer** must have the **power system stabilizer** in service ninety-eight (98%) of all operating hours except that the operating hours determined in accordance with requirements R 1.1 through 1.12 inclusive may be excluded to achieve the ninety-eight percent (98%) requirement.

R1.1 The operating hours during which the **generating unit** operates for less than five percent (5%) of all hours during any calendar quarter.

R1.2 The operating hours during which maintenance or testing on the **power system stabilizer** was performed, up to a maximum of seven (7) **days** per calendar quarter.

R1.3 The operating hours during which the **power system stabilizer** exhibits instability due to abnormal system configuration.

R1.4 The operating hours during which the **generating unit** is operating in the synchronous condenser mode and the **generating unit** is very near or at a zero (0) **real power** level.

R1.5 The operating hours during which the **generating unit** is generating less **real power** than its design limit for effective **power system stabilizer** operation.

R1.6 The operating hours during which the **generating unit** is passing through a range of output that is a known “rough zone” being a range in which a **generating unit** is experiencing excessive

Alberta Reliability Standard

Power System Stabilizer

VAR-501-WECC-AB-1



vibration.

R1.7 The operating hours during which the **automatic voltage regulator** of the **generating unit** is not in service.

R1.8 The operating hours, up to a maximum of sixty (60) consecutive **days** per incident, during which the **power system stabilizer** is out of service for repair due to a component failure.

R1.9 The operating hours, up to a maximum of twelve (12) consecutive **months**, during which the **power system stabilizer** had a component failure, but only if the **operator** of a **generating unit** submitted documentation to the **ISO** identifying the need for time to obtain replacement parts and identifying a scheduled **outage**, if required.

R1.10 The operating hours, up to a maximum of twenty-four (24) consecutive **months**, during which the **power system stabilizer** had a component failure, but only if the **operator** of a **generating unit** submitted documentation to the **ISO** identifying the need for time to replace the **power system stabilizer** and to schedule an **outage**.

R1.11 The operating hours during which the **generating unit** is not in **commercial operation**.

R1.12 The operating hours for which the **ISO** has issued a **directive** to the **operator** of a **generating unit** to operate the **generating unit** when the **power system stabilizer** is unavailable for service

R2 Each **operator of a generating unit** must have documentation supporting the identification of the number of operating hours excluded for each requirement in requirements R1.1 through R1.12 inclusive.

4. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in section 3 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

MR1 Evidence of having the **power system stabilizer** in service as required in requirement R1 exists. Evidence may include documentation that summarizes for each calendar quarter:

- (a) the number of hours the **power system stabilizer** was in service while the **generating unit** was operating;
- (b) the number of hours the **power system stabilizer** was out of service while the **generating unit** was operating;
- (c) the number of operating hours excluded in accordance with requirements R1.1 through R1.12; and
- (d) the percentage of operating hours that the **power system stabilizer** was in service excluding the number of operating hours determined in accordance with requirements R1.1 through R1.12

MR2 Evidence of having documentation as required in requirement R2 exists. Evidence may include a document identifying the subject of each exclusion, the date and the period of time that the exclusion refers to, reasons, the supporting data and the supporting logs.

Alberta Reliability Standard Power System Stabilizer VAR-501-WECC-AB-1



5. Appendices

Appendix 1 – *Amending Process for List of Generating Units*

Revision History

Effective	Description
2013-10-01	

Alberta Reliability Standard Power System Stabilizer VAR-501-WECC-AB-1



Appendix 1

Amending Process for List of Generating Units

In order to amend the list referenced in subsection (a)(iv) of section 2, *Applicability*, the **ISO** must:

- (a) upon determining that a **generating unit** is to be added, notify each affected **operator** of a **generating unit** in writing and determine an effective date, which must be no less than thirty (30) **days** after the date of notice, for the **operator** to meet the applicable requirements;
- (b) upon determining that a **generating unit** is to be deleted, notify each affected **operator** of a **generating unit** in writing and determine an effective date for the **operator** to no longer be required to meet the applicable requirements; and
- (c) post the amended list with effective dates on the AESO website.